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1 Introduction 
On my first morning of fieldwork in Taiwan , as I wondered where to 
begin, my next-door neighbor announced that a ritual was in prog-
ress , and led me by the arm to a nearby Buddhist temple . As it turned 
out, little would happen until the afternoon, and in the lull I asked my 
new neighbor to show me around the temple. According to my 
neighbor, all three huge , golden Buddhas that dominated the main 
room were Hut Co, the Buddha Patriarch. This seemed typical of 
popular religion in Taiwan; temples often have multiple images of a 
single deity on their main altars. These images looked a little different 
from the usual popular deities - they wore robes instead of traditional 
Chinese dress , and they were bigger than most images in popular 
temples - but these differences seemed like minor Buddhist varia-
tions on a common Taiwanese theme. 
Next my neighbor identified the two colorful images that flanked 
either side of the main altar as the temple door gods (mng-sin) . One 
was red, the other was white , and both had the colorful dress and 
threatening posture typical of door gods found in all popular temples. 
They were statues instead of the more usual paintings on the temple 
doors, but this again seemed like a minor Buddhist variation . 
Finally, I learned the proper procedure for worship. Just as in any 
non-Buddhist temple, the supplicant should offer incense first to the 
Emperor of Heaven (Thi: Kong) in a large incense pot that stands 
outside the main doors of the temple, then to the gods on the main 
altar, and finally to the secondary deities like the door gods. None of 
this information surprised me; all of it fits the extensive literature on 
popular religion in Taiwan. 
The surprises came the next day , when I put the same questions to 
two nuns who lived in the temple . First , the main gods were not Hut 
Co. In fact , they. were not gods (sin) at all, but a Buddha (Sakya-
muni) and two associated Bodhisattvas. I pointed out that the three 
images looked identical, but the nuns showed me slight iconographic 
differences. Second, the 'door gods' also got new identities . One nun 
explained that the red-faced statue represented Kuan Kong, one of 
the most important deities in the popular beliefs ; I could see the 
strong resemblance. She seemed to be claiming that Buddhism 
was so powerful that even the major deities of the popular religion 
became merely devoted door gods in a Buddhist temple. My surprise 
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increased when the second nun interrupted, saying that because I had 
come to study religion, I should learn who the 'door gods' really 
were. In fact, the two images were not door gods at all, but the 
Protectors of the Dharma (Hufa Shen), two Bodhisattvas (not mere 
gods at all) who protect the faith. Finally, I learned that even the 
Emperor of Heaven had lost his place at the top of the cosmology. 
The nuns held that incense should go first to the Buddhas, and only 
afterwards to mere gods like the Emperor of Heaven. 
These new interpretations no longer seemed like simple variations 
on the popular tradition, but instead called the entire popular cos-
mology into question. The popular cosmology closely parallels the 
secular political hierarchy. People will explain that the Emperor of 
Heaven is like President Jiang, that Co Su Kong (the main deity in 
Sanxia, the area I studied) is like a governor, that the Earth God 
(Tho Te Kong) is like a police officer, and so on. Did Buddhist 
interpretations challenge that political metaphor? If so, what were 
the implications for political and ideological unity in a complex 
society like China? 
I was especially puzzled as to how my neighbor and the nuns could 
maintain their apparently very different interpretations so easily 
while worshipping in the same temple. These questions about unity 
and diversity, interpretation and reinterpretation, set the tone for the 
research that followed. This book examines Chinese religion in 
Taiwan as a whole, covering both the popular religious traditions and 
the established traditions like Buddhism, Taoism and the state cult. 
How far can we say that more than one religious tradition exists in 
China? How do people use and interpret religion in different situa-
tions? How far does religion unify this complex society, and how far 
does it instead divide one group from another? What are the political 
implications of religious unity and diversity? 
Unity or Diversity 
Debates about unity or diversity have been central in recent studies 
of religion in complex societies. C. K. Yang (1961, p. 276), for 
example, holds that the elite and the common people in China shared 
their most central religious concepts. 
Even taking into account the relative difference in the belief in 
magic and miracles, the Confucians did not constitute a group 
separate from the general current of religious life of traditional 
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Chinese society. They shared with the rest of the population a basic 
system of religious beliefs in Heaven, fate, and other supernatural 
concepts. More important was the interflow of religious ideas 
between the Confucians and the general population. 
Maurice Freedman (1974, p. 20), who cited Yang approvingly, 
writes that Chinese religion shows an order 'of a kind that should 
allow us . .. to trace ruling principles of ideas across a vast field of 
apparently heterogeneous beliefs, and ruling principles of form and 
organization in an equally enormous terrain of varied action and 
association'. He goes on to justify this search for unity behind 
apparent diversity: 
It is reasonable to assume (I think) that a country of China's extent 
and political cohesion would demonstrate a large measure of 
agreement on religious assumptions among all its people. And, 
more important, one might predict from first principles that a 
society so differentiated by social status and power would develop 
a religious system that allowed differences in beliefs and rites to 
complement one another- or, to put the point more provocatively , 
that allowed religious similarity to be expressed as though it were 
religious difference. (Freedman, 1974, p. 38) ~ 
Although Freedman never developed this argument in detail, it 
rests on the assumption that the diversity of Chinese religion stems 
from various transformations of a basic structural unity.• He writes, 
for example, that apparently diverse ideas may be 'reflections, per-
haps misshapen reflections, or idiomatic translations of one another' 
(1974, p. 21), and that differences between elite and popular under-
standings of geomancy are a 'neat transformation' (1969, p. 10). 
Certain basic themes do underlie much of Chinese religion. A strong 
parallel between the supernatural hierarchy and the secular political 
hierarchy, for example, penetrates much of Chinese society at all 
levels (see Chapter 2). Yet the search for underlying unities can be 
misleading if it simply dismisses diversities like the alternate interpret-
ations of Buddhist iconography that I encountered in my first two 
days of fieldwork. The chapters that follow discuss many similar 
examples of fundamental diversity in detail. The religious diversity of 
complex societies like India, China or Enrope is striking, and it 
demands explanation beyond reduction to a structural unity. 2 
Freedman's presentation of his ideas about Chinese religious unity 
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met with some disagreement. Robert Smith, for example, replied to 
Freedman that 'this society may have treated religious differences as 
though they were religious similarities' (1974, p. 341). Arthur Wolf 
also disagreed with Freedman. Wolf expects people with different 
perspectives on Chinese society to hold different sets of beliefs, and 
he thus sees 'a vast gulf between the religion of the elite and that of 
the peasantry' (1974a, p. 9). Wolf (1974a, p. 9) thus emphasizes 
diversity over unity : 
We should begin by reconstructing the beliefs of people who viewed 
the Chinese landscape from different perspectives . . . The fact 
that an idea was shared by people with such very different perspec-
tives would suggest to me that it was relatively insignificant or that 
it was easily invested with very different meanings. 
Some studies from other parts of the world also suggest that 
complex societies support diversity within their religions . For six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century England, for example , Thomas 
(1971 , pp. 159-66) argues that formal religion had only a precarious 
hold on much of the population , in spite of the ongoing religious 
controversies among the elite. Most of the population maintained its 
own set of traditional interpretations, largely independent from 
arguments about Christian orthodoxy. In a study of a modern Spa-
nish valley, Christian ( 1972) argues that there are three major struc-
tures of interaction between people and God . For most people, saints 
are divine intermediaries who can act in the world, and who can help 
on the road to salvation. For older priests with local roots, the 
Church and its priests mediate people 's relation to saints, who in turn 
mediate with God. Both structures are hierarchical, and are close 
enough to each other to allow peaceful coexistence. More recently , a 
younger group of priests has challenged these structures, stressing 
individual, personal relationships with God, and promoting com-
munity action as a means to personal spiritual satisfaction (Christian , 
1972, pp . 180-7). All of this variation exists within the rural com-
munity, and it extends even to the basic structures of worship.1 
Thus some people stress the unity of religion in complex societies: 
different groups may use different methods of expression, but tpe 
entire society shares the fundamental meanings of the religion . 
Others, however , emphasize its diversity: different groups have dif-
ferent life experiences, and the fundamental meanings olthe religion 
must vary according to each group's position in the society . There are 
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convincing arguments for both unity and diversity in religion, and in 
culture more generally. Both the unity and the diversity hypotheses 
suggest that there is a shared body of culture (or at least religion), but 
they differ in the social group with which they associate it. One view 
associates culture with society as a whole, while the other associates 
culture with groups within the society . Phrased in this form, the two 
hypotheses cannot be reconciled (as the Freedman/Wolf debate 
seems to require): culture is unified if one focuses on the whole 
society, and diverse if one focuses on the groups within it. A solution 
is possible, however, by adopting a more flexible and less traditional 
view of culture, which does not automatically associate a predeter-
mined set of beliefs with a particular, bounded group. 
Culture and Work 
Edward Sapir (1934, p. 200) was an early proponent of a more 
flexible view of culture: 
Culture, as it is ordinarily constructed by the anthropologist, is a 
more or less mechanical sum of the more striking or picturesque 
generalized patterns of behavior which he has either abstracted for 
himself out of the sum total of his observations or has had ab-
stracted for him by his informants in verbal communication . .. 
No matter how accurate their individual itemization, their integra-
tions into suggested structures are uniformly fallacious and unreal. 
He concludes that culture is 'not something given but something to 
be gradually and gropingly discovered ' by members of a society 
(1934, p. 205). Culture is thus not an entity to be located at the level 
of either whole societies or of classes (or other groups) within them; 
culture is instead made by people experiencing the real constraints of 
both society and class. 
People create their culture (including their religion) within the 
constraints of their society as a whole, and of their own position 
within that society. These constraints produce both a fundamental 
unity (where the general social constraints are active) and a funda-
mental diversity (where the individual or group constraints are 
active). 4 Certain meanings are indeed shared, while others are 
shaped by particular experiences . It is not possible to provide a 
catch-all characterization of religion in a complex society as unified or 
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diverse . Instead the variation (or lack of it) relates to the varying 
social relations of the people involved. 
E . P. Thompson's studies of class and consciousness explore one 
path toward a more flexible and historical view of culture . 
By class I understand an historical phenemenon, unifying a num-
ber of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the 
raw material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that 
it is an historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a 'structure', 
nor even as a 'category' , but as something which in fact happens 
(and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships. 
(Thompson, 1963, p. 9) 
While this study is not primarily about class, it makes a similar 
point: people make their ideas and ideologies within the changing 
constraints of social organization. There is no need to choose be-
tween unity and diversity. or between opposed elite and peasant 
ideologies. All these processes become clearer by examining how 
they really occur in the experiences of people in particular social 
positions. 
Raymond Williams has developed a similar approach, which sees 
culture and ideology as a kind of work. The production of meanings 
in culture is a concrete social process just as crucial to the society as 
the production of material commodities . He writes that 
The limiting condition within ' ideology' as a concept, from its 
beginning in Destutt, was the tendency to limit processes of mean-
ing and valuation to formed, separable ' ideas' or 'theories'. To 
attempt to take these back to 'a world of sensations' or, on the 
other hand, to a 'practical consciousness' or a 'material social 
process' which has been so defined as to exclude these fundamental 
signifying processes, or to make them essentially ~econdary , is the 
persistent thread of error. For the practical link between 'ideas' 
and 'theories' and the 'production of real life' are all in this 
material social process of signification itself, (Williams, 1977, p. 
70) 
Meaning, in other words, cannot be isolated from social process. 
This view of culture as a kind of work leads to an emphasis on active 
interpretation , rather than seeing culture as a code of predetermined 
meanings. Throughout this book, I shall be concerned with the 
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constant interpretation and reinterpretation of religious practice. 
Religion is not simply a mental object for members of the appropri-
ate class or society to decode. It is instead a process of making 
meaning out of a set of symbols and practices, based on experience of 
a particular set of social relations . 
People make meanings (as they work) in social organizations. 
Some meanings are in fact very institutionalized; the Church is the 
final interpreter and promoter of Catholicism; the imperial govern-
ment controlled the state cult in China, and so on . Institutions 
promote their systems of thought and reserve the right to impose 
'correct' interpretations of them. Institutions tend to promote self-
consciously organized , explicit systems of thought- ideologies. They 
ideologize thought because promoting a set of ideas requires making 
them explicit, and because imposing an interpretation requires a 
self-conscious organization of those ideas. The ideas that most insti-
tutions promote generally support the social status quo, simply 
because major institutions that fundamentally oppose the power 
structure are not likely to survive long. If they do survive, they 
usually create a new power structure , which they support by ideol-
ogizing their ideas. 
Much culture, however, is neither strongly institutionalized nor 
strongly ideologized. It exists instead as a process of pragmatic 
interpretation and reinterpretation. I take the term pragmatic from 
sociolinguists like Hymes (1974) and Silverstein (1976) who disting-
uish between two crucial functions of language: (1) a referential 
function in which factual information is communicated, and (2) a 
pragmatic function in which social situations are defined and mani-
pulated. Most native speakers, for example, hold no explicit, self-
conscious theories about their language, and they do not learn what it 
means through any formal institution . Language , like common sense, 
is instead taken for granted as part of daily social interaction. Wil-
liams contrasts this kind of pragmatic interpretation, which he sees 
organized into 'structures of feeling', with more ideologized thought: 
'structures of feeling can be defined as social experiences in solution, 
as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been 
precipitated and are more evidently and more immediately available ' 
(Williams 1977, pp. 133-4) . Pragmatic interpretations (those in solu-
tion) are less explicitly worked out than precipitated ideologies; they 
are also less tied to specific institutions , and more to everyday social 
relations. Yet both ideologized and pragmatic interpretations remain 
processes of making meaning, not predetermined codes for thought. 5 
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These processes, as they have shaped religion in Taiwan over the last 
century, form the core of this study. 
Styles of Interpretation 
This new viewpoint changes the focus of the unity/diversity debate, 
because it no longer asks simply whether the culture of a group is 
unified or diverse. Instead, a series of new questions should clarify 
both the unities and the diversities in Chinese or any other culture: 
when do ideologies precipitate out of pragmatic interpretations? how 
can we characterize the differences between more and less ideol-
ogized interpretations? what types of social experiences support 
particular styles of interpretation, and how do those experiences 
relate to the political economy and its institutions? 
Max Weber (1951) is the most important social theorist who 
applied a general theory about the development of particular types of 
consciousness specifically to Chinese material. 'Traditional' religion, 
according to Weber, fills popular needs for meaning and assurance by 
providing an enchanted world where every object is filled with 
supernatural qualities. Under certain historical conditions, however, 
a particular status group may begin to question traditional religious 
assumptions self-consciously. The result is a 'rational' religion that 
abstracts the supernatural from the natural world, and that uses the 
supernatural as a basis for an ethical code. Traditional and rational 
religion thus partially resemble pragmatic and ideologized interpreta-
tion, as defined above . 
Geertz (1964b, p. 172) has summarized Weber's distinction be-
tween traditional and rational: 
Traditional religions consist of a multitude of very concretely 
defined and only loosely ordered sacred entities, an untidy collec-
tion of fussy ritual acts and vivid animistic images which are able to 
involve themselves in an independent, segmental, and immediate 
manner with almost any sort of actual event . . . Rationalized 
religions, on the other hand, are more abstract, more logically 
coherent, and more generally phrased. The problems of meaning, 
which in traditional systems are expressed only implicitly and 
fragmentally, here get inclusive formulations and evoke com-
prehensive attitudes. They become conceptualized as universal and 
inherent qualities of human existence as such, rather than being 
seen as inseparable aspects of this or that specific event. 
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In his discussion of China, Weber opposes the traditional 'magic 
garden' of Taoism to the rational 'disenchanted' world of Confucian-
ism (Weber, 1951, pp. 226-7). There are many specific problems in 
Weber's analysis of China (see Metzger, 1977), but the most serious 
problem for understanding unity and diversity in religion lies in his 
characterization of popular and elite beliefs. On the traditional side, 
he conflates Taoist and popular beliefs despite the important differ-
ences between them (see Chapter 4). He also includes diviners, 
geomancers and other experts in five-phase theory as part of tradi-
tional religion, although this theory was an important part of elite 
education (see Chapter 6). On the elite side, he overemphasizes the 
unity and dominance of the Confucian tradition, and underestimates 
the importance of Buddhism, Taoism, the state cult and five-phase 
theory. Elite ability to manipulate the popular religion was also 
important in China, especially at the local level. Thus he oversimpli-
fies the distinction between a rational elite religion (Confucianism) 
and a magical popular religion (Taoism) on at least two counts: (1) he 
combines traditions that are in fact significantly different (e.g., Tao-
ism and geomancy), and (2) he underestimates the importance of 
access to more than one tradition (e.g., for local elites, see Chapter 
2). In addition, Weber does not allow for flexible interpretation and 
reinterpretation; his analysis of China tends to treat meaning as a 
given, rather than as a process of work. In spite of the problems in 
Weber's specific application of his distinctions, his work suggests 
several possibilities for analysis of Chinese religious traditions. Are 
some traditions more systematized than others? more rationalized? 
more associated with elites? Where, in other words, does the distinc-
tion between pragmatic and ideologized interpretation apply in Chin-
ese religion? 
Other scholars make distinctions reminiscent of Weber's. Basil 
Bernstein (1970, 1972), for instance, suggests a relationship between 
the form of language and the social experiences of its speakers. The 
working class, which he characterizes by 'restricted social relation-
ships based on communalized roles' (Bernstein, 1972, p. 166), tends 
to speak in a restricted code - they use extensive metaphoric and 
condensed language that is meaningful only when a lot of common 
knowledge can be assumed, and only when tied to a particular social 
context. Borrowing loosely from Weber, restricted codes are more 
traditional (more inseparable from established social experience), 
and elaborated codes are more rational (explicit and context-free). 
Some studies of Western political ideologies make a similar distinc-
tion. Converse (1964), for example, characterizes elite beliefs as 
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more abstract and more logically coherent than the more context-
bound ideas of most people. Mann (1970), in a review of the litera-
ture, concurs wih Converse, and adds that workers usually express 
dissident values only where the issue is concrete and relevant to their 
lives. These works thus also point to a distinction between context-
bound ideas and more explicitly developed ideas abstracted from any 
immediate social context. 
Finally , the Soviet psychologist A. R. Luria ( 1976(1974]) contrasts 
the 'graphic-functional' (concrete and situational) thought of illit-
erate Uzbeki peasants, with the more abstract and discursive thought 
of individuals who worked on collective farms and who had a little 
formal education . The works of these authors are not strictly compar-
able; Weber is concerned with religion and the development of 
capitalism, Bernstein with language and education, Converse with 
political ideology, and Luria with cognitive development. Yet their 
similar conclusions suggest that all are addressing common under-
lying issues. All address the relation between thought and social 
experience, and all distinguish a more context-bound kind of thought 
from a more explicit kind of thought, which has been systematized 
and abstracted out of any specific social context. 
All also suffer from treating their distinctions as two separate 
structures of thought, rather than as two flexible styles of interpret-
ation, to which everyone may have (at least potential) access. Con-
verse (1964, p. 211) himself backs off from a claim that elite 
ideologies are more objective and logical, and Luria's informants 
were probably using a style of interpretation appropriate only to 
particular social contexts . Labov ( 1969) has criticized readings of 
Bernstein that consider middle class English superior to Black Eng-
lish, and Bernstein himself insists that both codes have the potential 
to express any ideas. It is not clear exactly what force words like 
rational or logical are supposed to have in these contexts, and I will 
not use them. The important difference between ideologized and 
pragmatic styles of interpretation lies in their relation to immediate 
social context, not in their inherent rationality. 
I also reject the notion that only certain people are capable of certain 
styles of interpretation. Pragmatic and ideologized interpretations 
characterize everyone, and are constantly developing into and out of 
each other. When I argue below that elites tended to develop more 
ideologized religious interpretations, I do not mean to imply that others 
are incapable of ideologized interpretations, or that structured ideolo-
gies are more rational than pragmatic interpretations. 
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Pragmatic and ideologized interpretations are two ways of giving 
meaning to experience, not two structured codes of thought. The 
distinction between the two clarifies the social basis of different 
interpretations. The chapters that follow emphasize the flexibility of 
interpretation as people remake their religion in changing social 
conditions. They also expand on the distinction between pragmatic 
and ideologized styles of interpretation by introducing new, cross-
cutting distinctions. 
Freedman praised what he considered a dormant sociological 
tradition that took a very broad view of Chinese religion, and that 
included DeGroot (1897), Granet (1975 [1922]) and Yang (1%1).6 I am 
indebted to all these works, and build on them here both ethnographi-
cally and theoretically. 7 I concentrate on religion within a single town-
ship in Taiwan, sacrificing some of the wide scope of the other 
studies for a more detailed ethnographic understanding. My scale is 
small by the standards of those works, but it is much larger than the 
scale of most anthropological studies of Taiwan. I approach these 
problems of unity and diversity primarily by analyzing a single ritual, 
the ghost-feeding ceremony (Universal Salvation festival, Pho To), 
from different points of view. Either Buddhists or Taoists can per-
form this major annual community ritual that attracts all classes of 
people. The argument throughout concentrates on diversities in style 
of interpretation, on flexibility in interpretation as social conditions 
change, and on the social roots and political implications of unity and 
diversity for Taiwanese religion . Although I concentrate on northern 
Taiwan, these concerns are also directly relevant to the study of late 
imperial and Republican China, and more broadly to the problems of 
ideology in any complex society. 
Sanxia Township 
The traditional anthropological emphasis on popular religion in 
Taiwan results in part from limiting ethnography to single villages. 
Villages usually lack just the kinds of informants who are essential for 
a broader understanding of religion: politicians, wealthy business-
men, college graduates and religious specialists. By concentrating on 
the town of Sanxia and its rural environs, I had available a range of 
informants and religious understandings much wider than is available 
to traditional village studies. I worked with people from a wide range 
of classes, occupations and educational backgrounds, attempting to 
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establish the relation between religion and various sociological and 
historical influences on individual experience. 11 
Sanxia Township consists primarily of the drainage basin of the 
Sanxia River, located at the southern end of the Taibei Basin.9 
Outside of the valleys created by the Sanxia River and its major 
tributary, the Hengxi , Sanxia is mountainous and sparsely populated. 
It includes a major town of about twenty thousand (also called 
Sanxia) , with several dozen villages scattered in the valleys. 
Like many rural areas in Taiwan , Sanxia Township now has many 
small factories that offer employment to many of its residents. Many 
others commute to factories in larger towns nearby or in Taibei . The 
valley areas of the township double-crop wet rice . The more moun-
tainous areas produce tea and tangerines. The mountains are also an 
important source of coal. 
Most of the early Chinese settlers in Sanxia originally came from 
Anxi County in Quanzhou Prefecture of Fujian Province . They 
brought with them the most important local god in Anxi, Co Su 
Kong. Sanxia first erected a temple to Co Su Kong in 1769, and it 
remains the ritual center of the township and some of the surround-
ing areas. Settlers from Meizhou (also in Fujian) were second in 
importance after the Anxi people, and they built a temple to their 
primary deity , Ma Co. Both temples are losing their identification 
with people from different areas of the mainland , and are now 
oriented more toward contemporary geographic communities (see 
Chapter 2). 
The Chinese ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Sanxia was one of the 
centers of spotty resistance to the Japanese in northern Taiwan. The 
Japanese took revenge by burning the Co Su Kong temple (along 
with much of the rest of Sanxia), although some residents managed to 
save the primary image of the god by removing it to an outlying 
village. The Japanese generally discouraged Taiwanese religious 
expressions for two reasons. First, they feared the congregations of 
people that large rituals create. Secondly , they wanted to promote 
Japanese Buddhism as a tool for the cultural unification of their 
planned pan-Asian empire. Buddhism was the most appropriate 
religion for this purpose because it was important in Japan , and 
because it existed in various forms in many of the nations of East and 
Southeast Asia. Chapters 3 and 5 expand on this period of Sanxia's 
history. 
The Japanese defeat in 1945 and the arrival of the Nationalist 
government brought political turmoil to Taiwan, but (after a few 
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difficult years) it also ended most of the religious repression. The 
residents of Sanxia survived the turmoil relatively unscathed. Those 
who held local power during the Japanese period remained important 
local figures. Sanxia's first township head under the Nationalists soon 
took charge of a major reconstruction of the Co Su Kong temple, and 
this grandiose project was still in progress while I lived in Sanxia 
thirty years later. 
After 1945, many Buddhist and Taoist clergy, including the Taoist 
Heavenly Master and several renowned Buddhist monks and nuns, 
moved to Taiwan from the mainland. The Buddhist influence has 
been especially strong in Taiwan because the immigrant clergy set up 
numerous schools; the young Buddhist monks and nuns of Taiwan 
are thus more firmly versed in Chinese Buddhist orthodoxy than were 
their local predecessors (see Chapter 4). Several young nuns in 
Sanxia have been educated in these new schools, and a monk who 
immigrated from the mainland after the civil war has also established 
a temple there. 10 
One portion of my research centered on a settlement in the Sanxia 
valley, providing an opportunity to examine the popular religious 
tradition within a small community. This settlement, called Kiu 
Kiong Kiou, consisted of only forty-one households while I was 
there, and is part of a larger administrative unit called Zhongpu Li . 
Kiu Kiong Kiou was settled late in Sanxia's history, in the mid-
nineteenth century, when the economy was becoming commercial-
ized and little land was available. Most of the residents have always 
been manual laborers; most are employed today in construction or in 
nearby factories. There is rapid population turnover as old residents 
move toward the town of Sanxia or toward Taibei, and more rural 
people move in as they abandon farm for factory. As in nearby 
Ploughshare (Harrell 1974b, 1982), there are no lineages, probably 
due to the late settlement and lack of land in the area. 
Kiu Kiong Kiou is a small, clearly defined community, and I could 
therefore interview every household in depth. Much of my research, 
however, took place outside Kiu Kiong Kiou, because the settlement 
does not represent the range of religious variation in Sanxia as a 
whole. Most people are poor, and no one could be considered very 
wealthy. Only one person had attended college. There are no Tao-
ists, although there is a small Buddhist temple . As a result, I spent 
much time surveying all the temples in Sanxia Township, talking to 
religious specialists, and interviewing a wider range of informants 
than was available in Kiu Kiong Kiou. Toward the end of my stay, I 
14 Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion 
also used a questionnaire that included items about the frequency of 
worship at various temples in Sanxia, and about participation in 
various types of rituals . 11 It included both open-ended and multiple-
choice questions about the efficacy, meaning and importance of 
particular religious acts. I interviewed 122 respondents with a wide 
variety of backgrounds . The sample was not random, and I will use 
the results primarily as a supplement to other kinds of data . 
Feeding the Ghosts 
On the first day of the seventh lunar month (usually sometime in 
August) , during the most oppressive period of Taiwan's muggy 
summers , all souls suffering in the underworld are released to enjoy a 
month of freedom . 12 During a series of small rituals throughout the 
month , and in one climactic ritual on the fifteenth of the month, the 
living provide the unfortunate souls with spiritual solace in the 
sermons of Buddhist and Taoist priests , and with material help in 
offerings of everything from baths to food to cigarettes. Everyone 
joins in this climactic ghost-feeding ritual. Specialists of all kinds take 
part, the entire spectrum of the community population prepares 
offerings, and low-level government officials help organize the cer-
emony. In late imperial times, even the local scholar-officials took 
part in the ritual (Gordon-Cumming, 1900, p. 219, Wieger , 1913, p. 
433). At least superficially , the ghost-feeding ritual is one of the 
unities of Taiwanese religion. This section is a glimpse of the most 
obviously shared part of the ritual - its physical performance . It 
begins to suggest the various ways that different kinds of participants 
experience and interpret the ritual, relying primarily on my attend-
ance at various ghost-feeding ceremonies in 1976, 1977 and 1978, on 
historical evidence about the ritual , and on interviews with partici-
pants. The succeeding chapters expand and interrelate the points of 
view of the major kinds of participants - the majority of ordinary 
worshippers , the religious specialists and the secular elite - clarifying 
how they understand and use the ritual, how it relates to pragmatic 
and ideologized styles of interpretation, and how it connects to social 
organization. 13 
The Popular Viewpoint 
The Co Su Kong temple , which is the ritual center for Sanxia 
Township and some of the surrounding areas, organizes the primary 
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performance of the ghost-feeding ritual. Planning for the ceremony 
begins several weeks before the actual performance . The temple 
management, which is tied to one of Sanxia's political factions, calls a 
meeting of all the village heads (li tiu:) - elected officials at the 
bottom of the political hierarchy. The temple announces the schedule 
of events for the ceremonies of the fourteenth and fifteenth, and it 
instructs the village heads to organize their constituents' offerings at 
the various altars that will be set up in the town . Discussion at the 
meeting demonstrates clearly the political importance of religion. 
Chapter 2 examines one such meeting in detail , including some bitter 
debates provoked by a pro-government faction's suggested changes 
in the ritual. 14 
On the day of the ceremony, representative village heads set up 
five altars at appointed places in Sanxia town. Four of the altars 
represent the Four Great Pillars (si tua thiau), a geographical division 
of the Sanxia valley into four units . The details of each altar are 
subject to the whim of the person in charge . Some have images of 
gods , others have scrolls of calligraphy; all have incense pots for the 
gods and offerings of fruit and candy. In front of each altar a row of 
tables stretches out for perhaps twenty meters to hold the offerings 
for the ghosts. A fifth altar occupies the Zhong Shan Tang (Sun 
Yat-sen Hall), an official community center. 
The evening of the lunar fourteenth sees the first major ritual that 
involves both the general public and the priests - the Release of the 
Water Lanterns (pang cui tieng) . Each water lantern is a little red and 
white paper house on a bamboo base , about one cubic foot in size . 
Sanxia uses eight of them- one for each of the Four Great Pillars that 
represent the Sanxia valley, one for the incense pot master who rep-
resents the whole community, and one for each of his three assistants. A 
lit candle flickers through the paper walls of each water lantern . Several 
dozen people, including the officiating priests, parade out from the 
temple. Some carry signs that announce the festival, others carry 
torches, and still others hold the water lanterns. They march up and 
down the main streets of the town, and then as many as can fit board a 
truck to more distant areas of the Sanxia valley.15 The parade winds up 
at the shore of a river. Here the priests conduct a quick ceremony to 
invoke the gods of the water, and to invite the drowned ghosts to the 
next day's ceremony. The people then gently release the lanterns into 
the water, where they drift downstream, signaling to the ghosts of the 
river that a feast is being prepared in their honor. 
The bustle increases throughout the next day. Everyone must 
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prepare food for their offerings to a whole host of spirits in addition 
to the ghosts. Like most feast days, the fifteenth of the seventh month 
includes worship of the Earth God, the ancestors, and the Lord of the 
Foundations (Te Ki Co). Chapter 2 will examine these beings, their 
offerings, and their relations to the ghosts. Many families also pre-
pare huge feasts for the living. Festive meals always follow major 
rituals. Often only the family takes part, but some people (often 
businessmen or politicians) may provide feasts for up to several 
hundred guests. Ghost rituals and huge feasts were traditionally 
scattered throughout the seventh month , and people with connec-
tions to maintain might attend feasts every few days during the 
month. Chapter 2 discusses the social implications of this pattern of 
feasting. 
Late in the afternoon of the fifteenth, th·e ghosts get their specific 
worship. Ghosts are always worshipped outside- at the altars set up 
in town, or in front of the house, or both . Ghosts normally eat fully 
prepared food, just like the ancestors or the living . In the seventh 
month, they also receive raw and cooked rice, raw noodles, un-
opened cans of food, unpeeled fruit (especially lichees and longans), 
rice wine and beer, various types of cakes, a platter of cooked, uncut 
meats (sieng le), cigarettes, and sometimes wash basins and towels.16 
Offerings at home or for smaller ceremonies elsewhere are slightly 
less elaborate , but include as a minimum a meat offering and individ-
ual sticks of incense stuck into each plate . By late afternoon, the 
enormous tables at the five temporary altars set up in the town are 
totally covered with offerings, and incense smoke obscures the front 
of each altar. 
The priests (whether Buddhist or Taoist) spend most of the late 
afternoon performing their rituals on a temporary altar that stands in 
the temple plaza. People are free to watch, but they generally do not 
know, or care about, the details of what the priests are doing. The 
climax of the ceremony, from the point of view of the people 
watching, comes near the end when the chief priest tosses buns, 
crackers, candy and rice into the watching crowd. This is ostensibly 
for the ghosts, but the living anxiously push and shove to catch the 
food for good luck. When I saw this ritual at the Co Su Kong temple, 
the crowd was relatively small - several dozen people - but at other 
ceremonies I witnessed and have heard described, the crowds were 
much larger and made violent attempts to get the thrown food. After 
the ritual, people burn paper spirit money to transfer it to the ghosts 
in the supernatural world . These bonfires are set along the shore of 
the river, because they are too large to allow in built-up areas. 17 
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, people made 
their offerings in a very different way. 
In front of the temple, in addition to the Pho To altar [to be 
discussed in the next section], they also build a ko pi: [lonely ghost 
frame] in order to present the 'lonely ghost rice' and other 
offerings . . . The ko pi: is about three to six meters high, six 
meters wide.. and it is covered with wooden boards to make a 
platform of about ten or twenty mats [six to twelve square meters]. 
The goods offered by every household totally cover the · 'frame' 
. . . A bamboo pole over three meters high is raised in the center of 
the ko pi:, and from its top are hung gold medals and three large, red, 
triangular flags. (Wu, 1975, p. 23) 
After the priests had finished their rituals, mobs of young men 
would storm the ko pi:. They trampled over each other to take the 
ghosts' offerings for themselves (chiu: ko, 'robbing the lonely 
ghosts'). Injuries were common, and deaths were not unknown at 
these annual semi-riots. The change from this organized violence to 
the modern form, where an often elderly and generally good natured 
crowd elbows and shoves to grab the food thrown to the ghosts, 
forms a key to the pragmatic interpretation of ghosts in the popular 
tradition. Chapter 3 examines how the treatment of ghosts at the 
festival has changed, even though the food, incense and other offer-
ings have not. The unchanged symbolic structure of offerings sets the 
parameters for possible meanings of ghosts, but real performances in 
the changing material conditions of Taiwan influence the particular 
interpretations people make . 
The ghost festival itself exists both in the contexts of its actual 
performances, and in its contrast to other rituals for other types of 
beings. Chapters 2 and 3 examine popular ritual in detail. Chapter 2 
emphasizes the piecemeal, pragmatic character of popular interpreta-
tions behind our usual understanding of the gods, ghosts and ances-
tors of the popular religious tradition. Chapter 3 follows changes in 
the popular interpretation of the Universal Salvation in Taiwan as the 
political economy has changed over the last century. 
Specialist Viewpoints 
Religious specialists of all kinds share this ritual with ordinary wor-
shippers; they help people organize their offerings, and they conduct 
the rituals that form the core of the festival. The priests carry out 
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their rituals throughout most of the lunar fourteenth and fifteenth. 
Few laymen watch them intone their rituals, and even. those who do 
have no way to understand the mumbled texts. For the priests, 
however, each ritual has an important function, as explained in the 
text itself, and in the priests' professional training. Their access to the 
ritual texts , to traditions of textual interpretation, and to a wide body 
of other rituals gives specialists their own independent views of the 
ghost festival. 
Either Buddhists or Taoists can do the ritual, but at Sanxia's Co Su 
Kong temple a third kind of specialist, locally c:dled 'black-headed' 
priests (o thau sai kong), always feeds the ghosts. Black-headed 
priests in Sanxia specialize in funeral ritual, and use primarily 
Buddhist texts. 18 No matter what kind of specialist takes charge, 
however, the visible performances of the ritual are nearly identical 
(see Plate 1.1). There is thus a superficial unity across types of 
specialists: Chapter 4 examines the actual unities and diversities in 
their interpretations of the ritual, and the social conditions that 
influence those interpretations . 
The priests construct a series of altars at which they conduct their 
rituals . These altars are equally the backdrop for popular participa-
tion in the ritual, but in general, only the priests can provide very 
detailed interpretations of them. Just in front of the temple, the 
priests raise three bamboo poles (tieng ko) about seven meters high . 
One carries seven lanterns, another holds a single lantern, and the 
third holds a banner calling down the Protectors of the Dharma (a 
pair of Bodhisattvas who will control the ghosts). The lanterns signal 
the ghosts to congregate for the ritual offerings . At their foot stands a 
little bamboo and paper hut that serves as a washroom for the ghosts 
to cleanse themselves before the ritual. Its two doors are carefully 
marked 'men' and 'women', to help keep things orderly. 
A number of larger bamboo and paper structures stand directly in 
front of the temple . Two human-sized images guard the temple 
doors, and thus the purity of the temple. The Earth God rides his 
tiger on the left, and the Mountain God rides his lion on the right. 
Both are brightly colored, with fearsome faces. The priests also hang 
a purifying charm over the entrance for further protection. 
A black paper 'mountain' stands in the middle of the temple plaza. 
Various paper deities stand on the mountain to oversee the events. 
These include Kuan Im (the Bodhisattva of Mercy), the Protectors of 
th,e Dharma again, the Earth God, the Mountain God, and some 
characters from historical fiction - Monkey. Tripitaka, and their 
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companions on the trip to India for Buddhist scriptures are especially 
popular. In the center of the mountain, overseeing the entire field of 
ghosts , stands Tai Su Ia, the blue-faced, red-tongued, demonic 
transformation of Kuan lm. Some temples attract so many ghosts (by 
raising their lanterns on especially high poles) that a human-sized 
image of Tai Su Ia replaces the paper mountain; he guards the temple 
gates and keeps the ghosts under control (see Plate 1.2). Two paper 
houses flank the mountain ; they resemble the houses burnt for the 
dead at funerals . The house at the stage-left side of the temple (the 
superior side) is the more ornate . It is reserved for the ghosts of 
literati and officials, who would not want to mix with less sophisti-
cated ghosts. The door is appropriately labelled 'Hanlin Academy' -
the highest institution of learning in traditional China. 19 The house at 
the inferior, stage-right side is less pretentious; it will shelter the 
ordinary ghosts. 
Inside the temple itself, the specialists set up more altars for rituals 
that will attract little public attention. They mark off a new ritual 
space by unrolling and hanging a series of scrolls depicting their 
deities. This temple within a temple reduces the usual temple deities 
to spectators, and places its own special deities in the position of 
honor. These inner altars are nearly identical, no matter what kind of 
specialist conducts the ritual. Buddhists and Taoists may nevertheless 
understand their altars in different ways. Chapter 4 returns to these 
altars , to the rituals conducted in them, and to the unities and 
diversities in specialist interpretations of them. 
The climax for priests and laymen alike occurs when they feed the 
ghosts on the afternoon of the fifteenth. As the altar tables fill with food 
and the streets of Sanxia fill with people, the priests make a round of the 
five altars, inviting the lonely ghosts to follow them back to the temple 
to enjoy the impending feast. Meanwhile, the two paper houses and the 
god mountain in the temple plaza have been turned around to face the 
temple. A new altar has been constructed just in front of the temple, 
and sacks of raw rice are placed along the temple doors. The new altar 
consists of a table of offerings and ritual equipment, and seats for the 
musicians and the five priests involved. This is the 'Pho To altar' 
mentioned in the quote in the previous section. 
As the priests return from their parade, they stop briefly in front of 
the paper houses, but soon mount the altar, Nonspecialists have only 
a vague idea of what the subsequent performance means: the cos-
tumes worn by the priests are colorful and rarely seen, the chief priest 
sits in a meditational posture , and he performs a long series of 
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complex hand movements (mudras) while reciting religious texts to 
music; the two- or three-hour performance multiplies the amount of 
food offered so that it will suffice to feed the hordes of hungry ghosts 
who have come . Specialist interpretations of the ritual differ system-
atically from most people's understandings. Chapter 4 ties the spe-
cialists' more systematized, ideologized interpretations of Buddhism 
and Taoism to the institutionalized social relations of the people in-
volved, and contrasts them with the more piecemeal interpretations of 
the popular tradition. 
Elite Viewpoints 
The immediately visible participation of the modern elite in the 
Universal Salvation festival differs little from the participation of the 
general population. Sanxia's elite- the most educated and the most 
powerful citizens - contribute to the ritual, attend the ceremonies, 
and worship the ghosts, much like the rest of the lay population. 
Unified participation, however, need not imply unified interpreta-
tions, and Chapter 5 shows systematic elite reinterpretations of 
shared rituals. 
The various governments of Taiwan have been attempting to 
discourage or manipulate the festival for at least a century, but they 
have been only partially successful. In late imperial times, for exam-
ple, the government pressed its attempt to control the festival by 
making an alternative ghost worship part of its official state cult. The 
current government in Taiwan is trying to discourage the ghost 
festival entirely. Most major community temples now conduct their 
ceremonies on the fifteenth of the month, at the government's 
request. This campaign has been partially successful. Most people in 
Sanxia now worship on the same day, and all the feasts thus occur 
simultaneously, making it impossible to attract as many guests as 
previously. Within each _area, however, smaller temples continue to 
stagger their ceremonies throughout the seventh month. Reciprocal 
feasting in Sanxia still follows the older pattern in the first lunar 
month, when Co Su Kong celebrates his birthday. Thus, rotating 
feasts (and their high costs, which the government finds so objection-
able) still occur, but on a smaller scale than before . 
Chapter 5 will thus address two related issues: (1) the nature of 
elite interpretations of religion, and the ways those interpretations 
require expansion of the pragmatic/ideologized distinction; and 
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(2) the successes and failures of the elite attempt to bend religion to 
its political purposes (illustrated both by the traditional state cult and 
by elite reinterpretations of the popular ceremony). 
The ghost-feeding ritual is one starting point for an analysis of 
religious unity and diversity in Taiwan. The ritual is widely shared 
across groups, and traditionally across China. Yet specific under-
standings of ghosts vary from one group or informant to another. The 
chapters that follow will introduce some informants who fear the 
ghosts, others who pity them, and still others who do not believe in 
them. Some people worship to propitiate the ghosts who might 
otherwise make them sick; others worship just to impress their 
neighbors, who might otherwise think them poverty stricken; still 
othe_rs worship because it is fun . Some people disapprove of the ritual 
because it is expensive; others approve because it is the custom to 
worship ghosts in the seventh month . Everyone , for all the variation, 
takes part. The chapters that follow analyze how people shape these 
ideas in varying social conditions to create different styles of interpret-
ation. 
2 Ancestors and Gods, 
Family and Politics 
The popular beliefs are the least ideologized part of Taiwanese 
religion. Although some aspects of popular beliefs are consciously 
systematized and explicit , they form at best a partial ideology in 
comparison to Buddhism, Taoism or the state cult . One of the 
primary goals of this chapter and the next will be to show how much 
of the popular beliefs exists only in pragmatic, context-bound inter-
pretation. This holds for all aspects of the beliefs, but especially 
strongly for the ghosts, whom I address in Chapter 3. A second goal 
of these chapters is to ask why only certain aspects of popular ritual 
precipitate into a partial ideology, while many others remain in 
solution. In general , I will argue that ideologies occur where the 
ritual changes little across social contexts and over time, and es-
pecially where many different groups (including the state and local 
elites) reinforce popular interpretations of rituals . Pragmatic inter-
pretation remains more likely instead where the contexts in which a 
ritual is interpreted have changed rapidly, and where elites try to 
discourage those interpretations . 
Many anthropologists who study Taiwan now generally agree that 
the popular pantheon consists of three primary types of beings -
gods, ghosts, and ancestors - which closely reflect the social world 
(Feuchtwang, 1974a; Jordan, 1972; Wolf, 1974b). Wolf (1974b, p. 
175), for example, writes: 
The conception of the supernatural found in Sanhsia [Sanxia) is 
thus a detailed reflection of the social landscape of traditional 
China as viewed from a small village . Prominent in this landscape 
were first the mandarins, representing the emperor and the em-
pire; second the family and the lineage; and third, the more 
heterogeneous category of the stranger and the outsider, the 
bandit and the beggar. The mandarins became the gods; the senior 
members of the line and the lineage, the ancestors; while the 
stranger was preserved in the form of the dangerous and despised 
ghosts. 
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This parallel between the social and supernatural worlds is the 
most ideologized part of the popular worship. It rests in part on 
explicit informant statements, and in part on an implicitly structural 
argument that builds meaning out of a code of symbolic contrasts: a 
three-way structure of symbols encodes the structure of society. Wolf 
(following the explicitly structuralist analysis in Feuchtwang, 1974a) 
sees this symbolic structure in a set of ritual dichotomies: 
Gods are contrasted with ghosts and ancestors; ghosts are con-
trasted with gods and ancestors; and ancestors are contrasted with 
gods and ghosts. For example, gods are offered uncooked (or 
whole) food, ghosts and ancestors are offered cooked food; ghosts 
are worshipped outside homes and temples , gods and ancestors are 
worshipped inside; ancestors are given an even number of incense 
sticks, ghosts and gods are given an odd number of sticks. (Wolf, 
1974a, p. 7) 
According to this type of analysis, ghosts are meaningful because of 
their structural relationship to gods on the one hand, and to ancestors 
on the other; the variable details of specific social contexts are not 
taken into account. 20 Many recent studies of Chinese religion have 
been influenced by structuralism, although the theoretical apparatus 
is consistent and explicit only for some (e.g., Baity, 1975; Feuchtwang, 
1974a, 1974b). Freedman's (1974, p. 21) assertion that the religious 
ideas and forms of the various levels of Chinese society are basically 
'reflections, perhaps misshapen reflections, or idiomatic translations 
of one another' , also assumes an underlying structural code. 
People do indeed understand incense, food, and the other ritual 
media partially in relation to an abstract code of symbolic contrasts , 
and it is no accident that the structure of the ritual media meshes with 
informants' explicit comparisons of ancestors, gods and ghosts to 
kinsmen, bureaucrats and outsiders. The ritual media are one of the 
experiences that remain consistent and widely shared across all 
contexts of worship, and the simplicity of their three-way structure 
lets them remain broadly relevant even to changing social experi-
ence. Religious specialists further encourage consistent use of the 
ritual media. 
Yet a concentration on structural codes and explicit, ideologized 
statements does not account for the full range and flexibility of 
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people's interpretations; it does not address pragmatic interpretation 
in social context. Wolf (1974a, p. 8) himself recognizes this when he 
insists that 'the study of Chinese religion must begin with the social 
and economic history of particular communities' . A full clarification 
of the Universal Salvation rites, or any other aspect of Taiwanese 
popular religion, thus requires exploration of both the ideologized 
(including the structure of ritual media) and the pragmatic interpreta-
tions of the cosmology. The ghosts of the festival communicate social 
messages partly through their structural contrast to ancestors (as 
marginal to kinship) and gods (as marginal to politics), and partly 
through the political and economic contexts in which they appear. 
The more pragmatic interpretations occur largely where the material 
experience of kinship and community is quite variable, and where 
local elites and specialists do not share popular pragmatic interpreta-
tions of that experience. 
This chapter addresses the popular tradition as a whole, concen-
trating especially on its most respectable objects of worship - the 
gods and ancestors. It will examine the structural codes of symbols 
that help to define these beings in contrast to ghosts, and to create a 
partially ideologized interpretation of family and community. It will 
also address the more variable social conditions that gods and ances-
tors can index, building on the insights of Wolf and other anthropol-
ogists of Taiwan, but with special emphasis on the pragmatic flexi-
bility of interpretation, even when it departs from more ideologized 
interpretations. After this analysis of the popular tradition, Chapter 3 
can return to actual interpretations of the Universal Salvation rites .2 1 
Ancestors, Kinsmen and Domestic Worship 
Ancestors are the key actors in the relation betwen kinship and 
ritual, although the analysis of the domestic cult will also have to 
consider rituals besides ancestor worship. 22 These rituals do not 
simply reflect a kinship system, but instead relate to contradictions 
within the kinship system and changes of the system over time. The 
domestic cult ideologizes ancestors into a model of kinship. Each 
aspect of the cult reiterates family solidarity and filial piety - the 
aspects of kinship that informants state explicitly most often. These 
features are, in fact, one of the most unified aspects of Taiwanese 
religion. Yet actual realizations of domestic worship also allow prag-
matic interpretations of less ideal aspects of kinship. 
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Ideally in Taiwan, each family is the momentary expression of an 
eternal patriline, and each line forms a solidary unit, independent of 
all other patrilines . Even though marriage invariably compromises 
the ideal, families and patrilineages are nevertheless important com-
ponents of productive and social relations. Families carefully manage 
their human and natural resources to create a communal, often 
diversified, economy (see, for example, Cohen, 1976). Lineages, 
where they exist , often center on communally-owned plots of land 
(Pasternak, 1969; Potter, 1970). The income from this land fre-
quently goes to support lineage ritual; to the upkeep of the elaborate 
halls that lineages and their segments construct; to the education of 
promising lineage children; and to the welfare of needy members. 
When this critical mass of land disappears (through sale or land 
reform, for example), the lineage organization itself usually weakens 
(see Gallin and Gallin , 1982, for example). 
When informants interpret ancestor worship, they emphasize pre-
cisely this idealized patriline , whose living representatives form a 
united family responsible for worshipping past generations and cre-
ating future generations. Both ancestor worship and procreation are 
filial acts of gratitude toward parents and other (ideally patrilineal) 
forebears. Family solidarity and filial piety toward the patriline form 
the most ideologized treatments of domestic worship; they are its 
most explicit , consciously thought out and easily expressed features . 
Yet when we move beyond descriptive statements to actual perform-
ance of domestic ritual , the major themes of solidarity and filial piety 
are compromised by ties to the social position of the ·family and to 
the tensions within the family . The following analysis of the rituals 
emphasizes first the ideology of solidarity and filial piety, but then 
also addresses how variation in wealth, competition between brothers, 
tensions among households related by marriage, and the difficult posi-
tion of a bride in her husband's family create pragmatic countercurrents 
to the ideology. 
Filial Piety and Family Solidarity 
The center of the domestic cult is an altar (ang ke touq) that domi-
nates the main room of nearly every household in Sanxia. All 
domestic altars hold an incense pot at the stage-left side (the position 
of honor) for the gods, and the ancestor tablets with their incense pot 
at the stage-right side. Most of the altars have a backdrop depicting 
some of the more popular deities. The newer, more prestigious 
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backdrops are painted on glass in bright colors and glitter. Some 
households may add one or more carved god images on the stage-left 
side, each with its own incense pot. Varying amounts of religious 
miscellanea, including written charms and souvenirs of visits to 
temples, also often decorate the altar. Domestic altars are very public 
-many are visible from the street, and guests usually sit in front of 
them. They represent the solidarity of the family and its filial piety to 
the outside world and to the family members themselves. The physi-
cal presence of the altar also represents the family as a well-knit, 
integrated unit. A house with two altars contains two families; a 
household with no altar usually considers itself part of another 
family, and will return there for important rituals. 
The ideology of family solidarity disguises one of the basic tensions 
internal to Taiwanese families - the tension between brothers . 
Brothers inherit equal portions of the estate, but they may choose to 
divide the estate before their father's death, after his death, or not at 
all. The pressure to divide varies with the economic interests of the 
family (see Cohen, 1976, p. 216-25), but it often begins with the 
death of the father as, for example, a childless younger brother 
resents his income going toward the education of an older brother's 
child, or as he wants to declare his economic independence from his 
father. Domestic altars hide these tensions because they cannot react 
to them. They represent only ancestors, not the living. This situation 
changes only when the family divides formally, and each branch 
establishes its own altar. 
Family division may take place gradually. Separation of pooled 
economic resources may occur first, then the new families may begin 
to cook at separate stoves. The religious center of the family is 
usually the last to divide. This is partly because new altars are 
expensive, but also because the shared domestic altar is the most 
public display of family integrity. Altars maintain the pretence of 
solidarity even after brothers have effectively divided. New altars 
again claim solidarity for their new families, but they are also evi-
dence of past divisions. Domestic altars thus support explicit, ideol-
ogized statements about family solidarity, covering up less desirable 
realities like the eventual break-up of extended families. Family 
solidarity is more successfully ideologized than the tension between 
brothers because families do not want their problems exposed in 
public, and because the older generation (which controls the altar) 
nearly always opposes division. 
In strong lineages, the ancestor tablets themselves affirm the ideol-
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ogized picture of the Chinese family as a patrilineal, virilocal kinship 
unit that commemorates its immediate patrilineal forebears (and 
their wives) with ancestor tablets. The lineage of such a family may 
also own an ancestral hall housing the tablets of more distant fore-
bears. If a family must worship ancestors of another surname (as a 
result, for example, of an uxorilocal marriage) , they will not place the 
tablets on the lineage or domestic altars; people with the wrong 
surname are relegated to dark corners of back rooms, where they will 
not detract from the appearance of patrilineal unity that the altars 
create. The communal halls of Qinan Village (Ahern, 1973) provide 
an extreme case of the ideologized patrilineal model. Each of Qinan's 
four lineages shares a common altar, as if the lineage were an 
enormous extended family ; as a rule there are no separate household 
altars. Tablets for ancestors with other surnames, which often be-
come important in uxorilocal marriages and adoptions, are not per-
mitted on these altars. The tablets ideologize surname solidarity 
especially where a strong lineage leadership promotes that view, as in 
Qinan. 
Various acts of worship reaffirm solidarity and filial piety - the 
explicit, ideologized interpretations of the domestic cult. Worship at 
the domestic altar, for example, takes place every day for most 
families in Sanxia (84 per cent of the sample interviewed, see Table 
2.1). A representative of the family, usually one of the older women, 
bums three sticks of incense there . One stick goes in the ancestors' 
incense pot, another is for the gods, and the third goes outside the 
front door. Informants explain worship inside as filial respect toward 
the ancestors of the family . This use of incense treats the family as 
solidary, and ignores internal tensions until the eternally solidary 
family has split into two or more new, eternally solidary families. 
Not everyone in Taiwan takes part in the domestic cult to the same 
extent. The distinctive roles of the elite and religious specialists in 
this cult, for example, will be discussed separately in the chapters that 
follow. Age, however, also affects how much people worship. In 
general , the old worship more than the young. This may always have 
been true in China, and it is no great surprise in modern Taiwan 
where the young have been exposed systematically to a Western 
education. Yet there is no significant difference between young and 
old in the extent of their daily worship at the domestic altar, exclud-
ing other kinds of worship (see Table 2.2). 23 Daily worship of ances-
tors is one of the most widespread ritual acts in Taiwan. 
People also commemorate the death days of their closer ancestors. 
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Table 2.1 Frequency of Performance for Selected Rituals 
1. Daily worship at domestic altar 
2. 1st and 15th (2nd and 16th) 
3. New Year 
4. Universal Salvation 
5. Thau ge/be ge 
6. Thi: Kong's birthday 
7. Kuan 1m's birthday 
8. Kim Bo's birthday 
9. Dividing the incense (kua hiu:) 
10. Gathering the frights (siu kia:) 
11. .Pacifying the year demon (an thai sui) 
12. Worshipping the peck (an tau) 
13. Covering the soul (kham hun) 
14. Pacifying the womb spirit (an thai sin) 





























Note: Kim Bo is a deity almost unknown in Sanxia. and was added to the 
questionnaire as a check on the quality of the answers. 
The number of these will vary; some families may remember only 
one or two death days, while others may commemorate more than a 
dozen every year. The ancestors get more than incense on these 
occasions. Their descendants serve them full meals, complete with 
bowls and chopsticks, rice and noodles, and some of their favorite 
dishes. In this context, people treat ancestors almost as if they were 
still living kinsmen. The family eats the food after the ancestors have 
finished. Ancestors who are no longer remembered as individuals are 
worshipped as a group in the same way on the ninth day of the ninth 
lunar month. Ancestors also receive offerings during major festivals 
for the gods (discussed in the following section). The domestic 
ancestral cult thus comes to life both in daily worship and on numer-
ous special occasions throughout the year, reminding people of filial 
piety, as everyone constantly explains in Taiwan. 
Funerals also closely involve kinship and family life, marking the 
ideology of solidarity and filial piety. Mourning dress is one of the 
most important expressions of the boundaries and internal structure 
of families. The various colors and types of cloth make fine distinc-
tions among the descendants of the deceased. Color, for example, 
codes how many generations separate the mourner from the de-
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Table 2.2 Relation Between Age and Frequency of Worship 
Done Done 
by in Not 
self family done 
All<45 32 32 12 
Daily worship" 
All~45 25 14 18 
All<45 202 396 390 
All other worshiph 
All~45 244 149 218 
• i = 1.98, n.s. 
b. t = 80.1, p < 0.001 
ceased. People of generational rank equal or higher than the de-
ceased, as well as very close friends, wear white. Affines also wear 
white, but with distinctive hats showing how they are linked to the 
deceased (Wolf, 1970). Affines are also specially marked at funerals 
(and at weddings) by the deferential ritual behavior they command 
(Ahern, 1974). Sons and unmarried daughters of the deceased wear a 
coarse, undyed burlap called mua: po, grandsons wear a finer cloth 
called te-a po, their children wear blue cloth and so on (Wolf, 1970). 
Combinations of colors represent unusual kin relationships. Mourn-
ing dress shows explicitly who owes a debt of filial piety (and who 
thus also has a claim to inherit): white robes deny the debt, while 
undyed or colored robes acknowledge it. 
Families enter the domestic cult most fully at the lunar New Year. 
Most people have a long vacation at this time, and if at all possible, 
they return home. The entire family worships the ancestors at the 
New Year, although not with the pomp of elite families . In contrast 
to most of the major ritual events of the year, the feast on New 
Year's Eve is purely a family event ; one does not ordinarily invite 
guests. The lunar New Year is the clearest expression of the social 
and ritual position of the family, and informants often cite it as a 
celebration of family solidarity and wholeness. 
Worship of gods can also express kin relations. The Stove God 
(Cau Kun), while not especially important in Sanxia, is the most 
obvious example. Every household has its own Stove God. He 
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appears in most households as a piece of red paper with his name 
written on it , pasted over the stove. Other parts of China use a 
multicolored print of him instead. Just before the new lunar year, the 
Stove God returns to the heavens to report to the highest deity, Thi: 
Kong, on the family's activities. His departure occurs when each 
family burns his image or his name, thus transporting him to the spirit 
world (Wolf, 1974b, p. 133) . A new image pasted over the stove 
marks his return , some days later. The Stove God , like the stove 
itself, is closely tied to the family as a social unit. 
Domestic worship of other gods occurs, for most families, on the 
first and fifteenth of every lunar month (that is, at the new moon and 
the full moon) . Businesses usually stay open on the first and fifteenth 
to take advantage of the extra activity, so businessmen conduct these 
rituals instead on the lunar second and sixteenth. Even families who 
do not worship every day ordinarily carry out these rituals (93 per 
cent of the sample interviewed) . The Earth God (Tho Te Kong) is 
associated with neighborhoods, and receives offerings in front of the 
household altar or, for some, at his local temple . The offerings 
include three sticks of incense, gold spirit money (hok kim and kua 
kim) , and three kinds of cooked but uncut meat (sieng le) . After-
wards, people set up a table at the door with its own candles and 
incense pot. They cut up and fully prepare the meat from the Earth 
God ritual, and offer it again accompanied by cooked rice. Most 
people explain that this portion of the ritual, called kho kun (reward-
ing the troops) , is for the spirit soldiers who guard the town of 
Sanxia. The food , with its spiritual essence now removed, is then 
eaten in a dinner much more elaborate than usual. Many people, 
mostly older women, worship in each of the major temples in their 
area on these days. Individuals conduct most of the rituals, but they 
are not acting simply as individuals; they are representing their 
families . 
Ancestors and the Problems of Kinship 
Ancestor altars , daily worship, mourning dress, and many other 
ritual acts help reinforce the partial kinship ideology that stresses 
filial piety and family solidarity. This ideology is widely shared across 
classes and consistent over time in Taiwan. Literature and education 
further reinforce it. Real kinship, however, may not always match 
the ideology - children may be unfilial, families always divide, and 
relations among kinsmen (especially between brothers and between 
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affines) may be inherently tense. These problems often do not mesh 
with the ideology, and tend to appear in popular worship only in 
some contexts. People tend to leave them as pragmatic interpreta-
tions, dealing with them in context, but not generalizing broadly 
about them. 
Some ancestor altars, for example, compromise family solidarity 
by worshipping tablets of many surnames. The altars in several 
Sanxia villages differ strongly from Qinan's solidary altars, although 
they are only a few kilometers apart. Ploughshare Village (Harrell, 
1976), for example, has no lineages. Most of the population are 
landless laborers, and the lack of potential communal land makes it 
difficult to support lineages (Harrell, 1982, pp. 117-28). Here, where 
lineage ties are weak and people are poor, ties through marriage 
become an especially important social resource, and village endo-
gamy increases. Commemorating nonagnatic relatives on the domes-
tic altar is one way to help cement those ties, and Ploughshare has a 
large number of altars that commemorate more than one surname. 
Kiu Kiong KioJ.I is very similar to Ploughshare. Residents of both 
villages settled late in Sanxia's history in areas where little rice land 
was available. The people are relatively mobile, there are no lin-
eages, and uxorilocal marriages are common. Over half of the altars 
in Kiu Kiong Kiou worship two or more surnames; altars with three 
or even four surnames are not rare . 
The difference between the altars in a village like Qinan and in one 
like Ploughshare or Kiu Kiong Kiou relates as much to varying social 
context as to an abstract symbolic code or an ideology of solidarity; 
altars indirectly index wealth and local economic ties. There is always 
a tension between a lineage and its affines in Taiwan, because affines 
threaten and interfere with the unity of the patriline, even while they 
provide the line with valuable allies. Villages like Qinan disguise this 
tension on their altars because their strong lineages allow more 
independence from affines, and because a strong lineage leadership 
can promote ritual solidarity. Ploughshare and Kiu Kiong Kiou rely 
more heavily on their affines, and they have no lineage leadership; 
the result shows clearly on their altars (see also Weller, 1984). All 
these villagers share a partial ideology of family solidarity and filial 
piety, but the particular conditions of some villages also promote a 
pragmatic countercurrent, especially where lack of lineages leads to a 
stronger position for the problematic affines. 
Altars can also depart from the ideology as contextual expressions 
of wealth. Wealthy families buy large, expensive and ornately carved 
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altar tables, complemented by gaudy, glittering backdrops. In poor 
households, however, the domestic altar may simply be a decora-
tively painted shelf attached to one wall. Although solidarity and 
filial piety are uppermost in people's minds, every altar also reveals 
the wealth of its family. Domestic religion from the beginning ties 
pragmati<,:ally into the external social relations of the family, even 
though most domestic ritual itself is directed at an internal family 
audience. 
Funerals can also question the ideology. especially where patrilin-
eal family solidarity is in question . One funeral in Kiu Kiong Kiou, 
for example, was dominated by young men and women dressed in the 
blue cloth of great-grandchildren. They were the daughter's daugh-
ter's children of the deceased. This flaunted rejection of patriliny 
resulted from successive uxorilocal marriages. It could occur very 
easily in a village like Kiu Kiong Kiou, where people may worship 
relatives of three or four surnames; it would be very unusual in a 
village with strong lineages. The meaning of mourning dress, as of 
ancestor tablets, relates to lineage strength, and thus also to wealth 
and local social relations. 
Mourning dress can also show the divided loyalties of a virilocally 
married woman. Wolf's (1970, pp. 202-3) informants disagreed 
about what kind of dress such a woman should wear for her natal 
parents: 
Whereas some people are willing to accept the fact that a married 
daughter belongs to her husband and prescribe te-a-po as the 
proper mourning dress, others claim that a married daughter's 
head is still theirs and prescribe a headdress of mua:-po. Still 
others compromise by prescribing a headdress of mua:-po with a 
patch of te-a-po 'to show that the woman is married.' 
Wolf (1970, p. 203) gives other examples of disagreement over 
correct mourning dress, and concludes that 'the only way to avoid 
variation in mourning dress without imposing an arbitrary code 
would be to resolve the conflicts that it reflects'. When people 
actually attend funerals, of course, they must commit themselves to 
one 'Or another of the variant possibilities. The alternative they 
choose is a statement about family loyalties and about property 
rights; controversial choices may lead to arguments (Wolf, 1970, p. 
205). Funeral dress relates to the local importance of lineages and to 
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the contradictory loyalties of a wife, as well as to its more explicitly 
ideologized expression of filial piety and family solidarity. 
The descendants always hire a professional to bury the coffin 
according to the divinatory system called geomancy (hong sui or te 
li), which allows the deceased to funnel good (or bad) influences from 
the landscape into his or her descendants (see Chapter 6 and Appen-
dix A). Ideologically, geomancy unifies the family by dividing the 
patrilineal descendants of the deceased (who benefit or suffer from 
the geomantic influence) from all other relatives (who are unaf-
fected). Yet pragmatically, geomancy also expresses dissension 
within the ranks of the descendants; it is especially sensitive to 
competition among brothers. Some graves help or harm all descend-
ants equally, while others are sited to affect each branch of the 
family differently. Geomancy thus provides a flexible idiom with 
which to express various social relations (see also Freedman, 1966, 
ch. 5) . 
Weddings: An Example 
The ideology of filial piety and solidarity that informants use to 
explain their kinship ritual is not sufficient. Understanding the ritual 
also requires exploring pragmatic interpretations based on problem-
atic aspects of kinship. These are not explicitly developed like the 
ideology; they are more bound to particular realizations of rituals 
where , for example , the tensions between affines, between brothers, 
or between a daughter-in-law and her husband's family come to the 
forefront. Weddings provide a clear example of both ideologized and 
pragmatic interpretations, because they intend to develop new links 
of filial piety and family solidarity , while at the same time they create 
a new set of troublesome affines and a potentially threatening 
daughter-in-law. Relations between affines are friendly and reci-
procal, yet simultaneously formal and tense ; the bride is a welcome 
new member of her husband's household, yet simultaneously a 
dangerous threat who is tied to outsiders. These rites are complex 
and contradictory because they speak directly about the problematic 
ties they create and they involve direct practical contact with the new 
affines; the affinal problem is unavoidable . 
The major message of the ceremony (described fully in Suzuki 
1978[1934] or Cohen , 1976, ch . 6) fits the ideology. It illustrates the 
apparently unequivocal transfer of the bride from her natal family to 
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her husband's family. This begins on the day of betrothal when the 
groom's mother places a ring on the hand of her future daughter-in-
law. It continues on the wedding day when the bride is transferred to 
her husband's house in a typical rite of passage; she and her dowry 
are ritually cleansed; now in a liminal state, she is ritually transferred 
to a waiting taxi; she undergoes the supernaturally dangerous jour-
ney to her husband's house; she is ritually cleansed again; and she is 
finally reintegrated into her husband's family by worshipping the 
gods and by worshipping his ancestors (Freedman, 1967, pp. 265-8). 
Several stages of the ceremony also include hopes that the bride will 
soon bear sons. 
Several traditional manuals explain how the rituals ought to be 
performed, and they describe the etiquette of these rituals in detail. 
Lii (1975[1880], pp. 106--71), for example, includes extensive discus-
sion of the proper form for invitations, the places everyone should 
take at the ceremonies, and the proper order of the rites. He never 
departs from a prescription for idealized kinship; he does not address 
the contradictions that the marriage creates. These ritual manuals 
were written by the traditional elite, and they ideologize kinship 
consistently. 
All this represents the ideal, benevolent aspect of the bride- the 
new mother who will guarantee continuation of the line. The rites, 
however, also contain a pragmatic counterpoint that indicates the 
more dangerous aspects of the bride as an outsider who may break up 
the family. The specifics of this counterpoint vary from place to 
place; they are not as standardized as the ideologized rite of passage, 
nor are they approved by the marriage manuals. Each example shows 
the pragmatic complexities of kinship in action, as future affines 
negotiate over their coming rights and roles: (1) When the groom's 
mother puts the ring on the bride's finger, the bride may bend her 
second joint to prevent her mother-in-law from getting the ring all 
the way on. If the bride succeeds, her mother-in-law will not domi-
nate her in the future (Ahern, 1974, p. 283; Wolf, 1972. p. 125). 
(2) Freedman (1967 , p. 268) reports a belief that whoever enters the 
wedding chamber first - the bride or the groom - will dominate the 
relationship. (3) There is another belief that the groom must place his 
robe over his wife's in order to be dominant in the future (Freedman, 
1967, pp. 268--9; Lin, 1948, p. 44; Suzuki, 1978[1934], p. 197). (4) If 
the bride steps on the groom's shoes on the wedding night, she will 
dominate (Suzuki , 1978[1934], p. 197) . Some other unofficial rituals 
indicate the continuing ties of the bride to her natal family: ( 1) during 
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a feast at the bride's house, the groom is served a soft-boiled egg. 
Breaking the yolk indicates breaking the bride's natal ties. Brides' 
mothers are sometimes said to hard-boil the eggs, thus retaining their 
ties with their daughters (Wolf, 1972, p. 135). (2) 'It is said of one 
area that when the girl leaves her natal home she drops a lock on the 
ground which is then attached half open to the door to signify that 
while she has been sent away the house is not completely closed to 
her' (Freedman, 1967, p. 271). This counterpoint shows what the 
major theme of the wedding disguises- the bride is not fully detached 
from her natal family, and she thus creates a threat to the solidarity of 
her husband's family. Where affines are socially unimportant, this 
counterpoint of pragmatic kinship may not be as strong. When brides 
marry into the powerful Hong Kong Teng lineage, for example, their 
brothers do not give ambiguous messages about leaving the door 
unlocked, but instead give the bridal sedan chair an unambiguous 
kick out of her natal household (Watson, 1981, p. 600). 
Weddings also address a second problem in marriage- the benefits 
and threats of an alliance between two groups. Before the wedding, 
the two families about to be united engage in a complex dialogue of 
gifts and countergifts. Although the ritual presets the occasions for 
giving and the approximate content of the gifts. the two sets of affines 
must negotiate the quality and quantity of each gift, and their 
negotiations in such applied kinship often become tense and acrimoni-
ous (Fei, 1939, p. 43; Gallin. 1966, p. 179; Wolf 1972, pp. 119-24). 
These gifts are thus simultaneous acts of friendly reciprocity and 
battles for prestige and profit; they illustrate the problems in the 
long-term relationship to come - an idealized alliance superimposed 
on a practical manipulation of the tie. Suzuki (1978[1934], p. 173) 
gives a ritual example of this combined reciprocity and conflict: the 
groom's family includes in the bridewealth several symbols of its 
prosperity (including a chicken, a duck and dried Iongan fruit); these 
must be returned to the groom's family immediately. or else the 
bride's family is thought to be trying to steal the prosperity of their 
future affines. Gift exchanges thus publicize the reciprocity of the 
idealized affine tie, yet the actual tensions of affinal kinship can 
compromise ideal weddings through acrimonious negotiation and 
through symbolism that recognizes the threat in the new bride. 
Weddings also involve the affines of the senior generation: the 
mother's brother and father's mother's brother of the groom must sit 
at the table of honor at the marriage feast, along with the bride's 
father or brother. In addition, grooms in some areas had their 
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mother's brothers brought to the wedding in a sedan chair (Chiu, 
1966, p. 8), and in other places they worshipped at the ancestral 
altars of their mother's father and their father's mother's father on 
the day before the marriage (Cohen, 1976, p. 153). These are all 
displays of ideologized kinship. 
Once again, however, the problems of marriage come into play 
unofficially. Ahern (1974, pp. 292-3) cites several examples of pres-
tige battles involving the treatment of affines at marriage and other 
ritual feasts. In one case, for instance, a mother's brother did not get 
along with his sister's son, so he sent his young son to a feast instead 
of coming himself. The sister's son reciprocated by not giving the boy 
the seat of highest honor, and the boy countered by taking food 
reserved for the guest of honor (Ahern, 1974, p. 293). Ritual feasts 
show the life-long dilemma of affinal relationships: affines are hon-
ored guests, yet at the same time they are interfering meddlers. 
Watson's (1981) analysis of the Hong Kong Teng again shows how 
the existence of a powerful lineage, where affines are not socially 
important to most people, may discourage pragmatic interpretation 
of kinship at weddings. Male affines do not attend wedding feasts, 
and female affines are not placed in seats of honor. Even here, 
however, the practical results of negotiation over marriage payments 
lead to differences between rich and poor within the lineage, and 
compromise the idealized unity of the lineage. Watson (1981, p. 609) 
states: 
\ 
In relation to the ideology of fraternal unity. affinity was seen by 
the Teng as a divisive force. It was divisive not only because ties to 
affines could lead to potentially disruptive contacts with outsiders, 
but also because affinity highlighted economic and social differ-
ences within the lineage. In Ha Tsuen [the Teng village] the 
uniform set of marriage rites denied that there were differences 
between agnates, while marriage payments and affinal behavior 
highlighted and enhanced these differences. 
Wedding ritual thus presents both an idealized family, and simulta-
neously interacts with the real strains of domestic kinship. Affines 
exchange gifts and attend feasts as friendly, equal. and independent 
allies; yet both the exchanges and the feasts reflect real underlying 
tensions between relatives by marriage. Ritual transfer of the bride to 
the groom's house shows her to be fully integrated into her husband's 
lineage; yet many secondary rituals show the underlying tension in 
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her lack of full loyalty to her new lineage, and her remaining ties to 
her natal family . 
The domestic cult and its explicit messages about family solidarity 
are so widely shared because people at all levels of the society 
experience the primary importance of the family defined through 
worship. Yet the full pragmatic interpretation of the domestic cult 
goes beyond solidarity and filial piety by indexing other social rela-
tions , including wealth (in the quality of the altar, and indirectly in 
the limitation of nonpatrilineal relatives' tablets on the altar or 
wearing mourning dress) , the competition between brothers (es-
pecially in geomancy), the tension between affines (in gift exchanges 
and ritual feasts) , and the conflicting loyalties of a wife (in wedding 
ritual and mourning dress). The cult offers a pragmatic interpretation 
closely tied to real experiences of family solidarity, and of the 
tensions that lie beneath that solidarity. Pragmatic interpretations 
occur especially strongly where the real experience of kinship offers 
challenges to the ideology (as when affines are powerful) and where 
there is no mechanism (like a lineage elite) to promote a particular 
interpretation. 
Gods, Bureaucrats and Community Temples 
Just as people explicitly explain the ancestral cult as based on soli-
darity and filial piety, informants at all levels of society explain god 
worship as a metaphor for politics . Gods are bureaucrats who rule 
communities . Just as does ancestor worship. however. gods tie into 
many of the changes and contradictions in local politics . Pragmatic 
interpretations of gods go beyond fixed political hierarchies to reflect 
heterodox power, ethnicity, regional opposition to national control , 
and local political maneuvering. This section begins with the more 
explicitly recognized and clearly ideologized relation between gods 
and communities, and moves on to the more flexible realization of 
god worship. 
Temple and Community 
Temples provide an important method to express changing com-
munity allegiances and boundaries. 
The individuality of a village is inseparable from the particular 
configuration of gods who guide its policy, and its conflicts with 
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other villages necessarily entail conflicts between the divinities that 
each side is able to muster. Accordingly, alliances between men 
and gods are a common idiom in which historical events are 
recounted. (Jordan, 1972, p. 42) 
There are four main types of temples in Sanxia: Earth God temples 
(tho te biou), temples for major popular deities, Buddhist 'vegetarian 
halls' (chai tng), and ghost temples (iu ieng kong biou) . Table 2.3 
shows frequency of worship at a selection of Sanxia's major temples. 
Table 2.3 Frequency of Worship for Selected Temples 
1115 or 
Daily 2116 Occasionally Never 
Tho Te Kong 12 19 57 12 
Co Su Kong 6 23 60 12 
MaCo 1 20 61 19 
En Cu Kong 0 0 77 24 
Siong Te Kong 1 8 33 59 
Sian Kong 0 3 58 41 
Iu Ieng Kong 0 0 42 58 
Earth God temples tie closely to neighborhoods. Each god governs 
a small community, and moving into a new community means wor-
shipping a new Earth God. Their areas are mutually exclusive: no 
one worships at more than one Earth God temple. 24 The boundaries 
of the area they govern closely follow social divisions, and do not 
always coincide with administrative boundaries. Changes in com-
munity structure or in community alliances can result in building new 
Earth God temples that reflect the new social situation (see Wang, 
1974, Ahern , 1973, pp. 64--6). Many neighborhoods in rural Taiwan 
have recently built new Earth God temples or renovated old ones. 
These communities are advertising their wealth, competing with 
other nearby communities, and , at least apparently, showing their 
loyalty to Taiwanese traditions in the face of government attempts to 
discourage large expenses on popular religion (see also Ahern , 
1981a). 
Zhongpu Village, for example, has two shiny new Earth God 
temples, one at each end of the village . Although Zhongpu is barely 
large enough to meet the 200-household minimum for an official 
administrative village (li) , it nevertheless includes two separate com-
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munities- Kiu Kiong Kiou and Tiong Pho. Relations between the 
two communities had been getting worse, and when the village head 
began to renovate the temple in his neighborhood, Kiu Kiong Kiou, 
saying that he wanted to make a more impressive symbol for the 
whole community, the people of Tiong Pho responded by renovating 
their own temple. The village head's claim to be uniting the entire 
village was read as an attempt to strengthen his part of the adminis-
trative village at the expense of the other part. 
Responsibility for worship of the Earth God may accompany a 
plaque that circulates daily among the households of the community. 
The cyclic path of this plaque thus traces the boundaries of a socially 
defined neighbourhood . Earth Gods govern neighborhoods, but 
unlike earthly bureaucrats, the boundaries of their territories alter 
flexibly as social relations on the ground change. 
People worship more often at Earth God temples than at any other 
kind of temple. These temples vary in size from simple roadside 
shrines to small buildings capable of holding up to about a dozen 
people. Unlike most of the temples to higher ranking gods, Earth 
God temples rarely have special keepers (biou kong) in charge of 
them. There are also several iconographic markers of their lower 
status: door gods, for example, are not permitted on Earth God 
temples, and Earth Gods often wear the costume of local gentry, 
rather than the official court dress of most of the higher gods. 
Temples to the popular gods are most important in the large-scale 
organization of the community. In Sanxia, the largest and most 
spectacular of these is the temple dedicated to Co Su Kong (see Plate 
2.1) . According to the official temple history (QSZS), Co Su Kong 
was a military figure in the Song Dynasty who, fleeing south with the 
defeated dynasty, established himself as a Buddhist monk in Anxi 
County of Fujian Province (the place of origin for most of Sanxia's 
inhabitants). 
The Co Su Kong temple in Sanxia was completed in 1769. It was 
destroyed and rebuilt after an earthquake in 1822. When the Japan-
ese began their fifty-year occupation of Taiwan in 1895, Sanxia was 
one of the few pockets of resistance in northern Taiwan. The temple 
was an organizing center for the resistance, and the Japanese burnt it 
down in retribution. It was rebuilt again in 1899. The Japanese 
departed in 1945, and Sanxia began to collect funds for yet another 
reconstruction of the temple, this time on a much more grandiose 
scale than ever before. 
It is difficult to clarify the details of the history of this period, 
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because it saw major political upheavals in Taiwan, and it is not easy 
to discuss the period with informants, even now. The ambitious 
temple reconstruction project was apparently in part a reaction to 
religious repression towards the end of the Japanese occupation, and 
in part an attempt by one of Sanxia's political factions to substitute 
the temple, as an informal power base, for the official power they had 
lost . Reconstruction of the temple still continues, more than thirty 
years after it began. The extraordinarily ornate wood and stone 
carving is all being done by hand, and the temple has become an 
important center for the few craftsmen capable of doing this kind of 
work. The temple is one of the most impressive in Taiwan , but the 
slowness and the expense of the project have angered many resi-
dents. 
The temple was originally the center of worship for all of Sanxia, 
and parts of the neighboring towns of Shulin, Dingpu, Yingge and 
their hinterlands. Dingpu now has its own temple to Co Su Kong, and 
parts of Shulin have now joined local cults (Wang, 1974). Neverthe-
less, the catchment area of the temple still exceeds the political 
boundaries of Sanxia township. 
The Co Su Kong temple is the scene of Sanxia 's most important 
rituals . The biggest ritual takes place in the first lunar month of each 
year, to celebrate Co Su Kong's birthday . Everyone in the temple's 
catchment area makes offerings, and there are numerous feasts in the 
weeks before and after the birthday. On the day of the birthday itself, 
enormous crowds gather to worship and to admire the gaudily decor-
ated pigs offered to Co Su Kong. The mob of onlookers, the peddlers 
lining the main street, and an occasional lion or tiger dance combine 
to block traffic throughout the town. This festival is the major event 
of the year in Sanxia, and even people who have left for Taibei or 
other areas usually give at least monetary support. 
The organization of this ritual clarifies the central role of the 
temple in defining the larger social community of Sanxia. For the 
birthday celebration, the temple divides Sanxia into seven 'inner 
shares' and twelve 'outer shares'. The outer shares are the com-
munities outside the basic area of Sanxia and Yingge (the next 
township to the north) that take part in the ritual. The seven inner 
shares are much more important, and their representatives are re-
sponsible for administration of the temple. With one exception, 
surname defines these seven shares. Five of the shares are for the five 
most populous surnames, one is for people of miscellaneous sur-
p.ame, and the exceptional share consists of people from a small area 
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called Zhongzhuang. The god's image was supposedly stored in 
Zhongzhuang before the original temple was built, and these people 
were thus granted the privilege of constituting their own share. 25 
In addition to appointing people to the temple committee, each 
share is responsible on a rotating schedule for raising pigs to offer to 
Co Su Kong on his birthday. Thus, the opportunity to kill a pig for Co 
Su Kong comes to each family only once every seven years. The 
twelve families who raise the most obese pigs each year have the 
privilege of offering them in front of the temple on the morning of Co 
Su Kong's birthday. 
Each year, the temple chooses a lo cu (incense pot master) and 
three assistants (hu lo cu). The lo cu is reponsible for the annual 
birthday celebration for Co Su Kong; he is the religious representative 
of Sanxia as a whole . The temple chooses a new lo cu each year by 
divination, and thus, technically, anyone is eligible. In fact, however, 
only a few people who are wealthy enough to shoulder the burden of 
subsidizing the ritual will submit their names. 
Sanxia also devotes several weeks at this time to special worship of 
Co Su Kong in each individual community. This begins in the 'outer 
shares', then moves to the villages of the Hengxi valley, followed by 
Yingge , and finally the Sanxia valley. Images are taken fro!Jl the 
temple and paraded out in sedan chairs to the area involved, ac-
companied by traditional music and sometimes also by men dressed 
in ten-foot tall costumes representing low-ranking deities. On reach-
ing his destination, still more offerings (including a kho kun offering 
for his troops), more operas, and, of course, more feasts greet Co Su 
Kong (see Harrell, 1982, p. 189 for a map of the rotation). 
The ghost-feeding ritual, the Universal Salvation rite described at 
the end of the preceding chapter, is the temple's second most impor-
tant festival. This ritual organizes a smaller area than the celebration 
of Co Su Kong's birthday; it involves only the Sanxia River valley. In 
contrast to the organization by surnames for the birthday ritual, the 
ghost-feeding organization is entirely geographical. Only the inner 
Sanxia valley is involved- the very center of the temple's catchment 
area (see Map 2.1). The villages of this area combine into the 'four 
great pillars' (si tua thiau), each of which is theoretically responsible 
for a different aspect of the event: (1) the cu hue, chairman of the 
committee , is responsible for money collection and accounting; 
(2) the cu tua:, chairman of the altars, is responsible for preparation 
of the altars and hiring an opera troupe; (3) the cu ciou, chairman of 
the ciou, is responsible for the ceremony itself; and (4) the cu pho, 
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chairman of the PhoTo (ghost-feeding ritual), is responsible for the 
offerings. As the titles indicate, the same organization would be used 
if Sanxia were to hold a ciou , a major ceremony to be discussed 
below. Each 'great pillar' consists of two or three administrative 
villages , and a few of the largest villages are divided into two or three 
neighborhoods for this purpose, to make the distribution more equit-
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able . Within each 'pillar' responsibility rotates annually from one 
section to the next. When a section, which usually consists of an 
administrative village, includes more than one social community, the 
communities share responsibility, but make a symbolic expression of 
their separate identities. For example, when Zhongpu Village was 
the representative for its 'pillar' , the village head set up a single altar , 
but the members of the two constituent communities kept their 
offerings separate: Kiu Kiang Kiou kept its offerings at the rear of the 
altar table, and Tiong Pho kept its at the front. The- ghost-feeding 
offerings thus clearly mark both the administrative and social territo-
ries within the Sanxia valley . 
The division of labor among the four pillars, however, is only 
theoretical. The actual responsibility of the village head in charge of 
each pillar is to set up an altar in an appointed place in the town of 
Sanxia , and to make sure the people of his village bring offerings on 
the day of the ceremony. The man responsible for organizing that 
year's birthday offering for Co Su Kong (the /o cu) also sets up an 
altar to represent the entire area . This altar always stands in the 
Zhong Shan Tang, a government sponsored meeting hall that exists 
in every town. 
Large religious ceremonies like the Universal Salvation rites are 
expensive. Voluntary donations fund most ritual functions of the 
temple , including the festive birthday celebration for Co Su Kong. 
The ghost-feeding ritual, however , is unique . The village heads 
collect a tax from every household; in return they give as receipts 
paper charms (hu-a) printed by the temple. The rate varies from year 
to year. In 1978 it was set at NT$50 (about US $1.40) for every 
household. Unlike real taxes, of course, the temple cannot force 
everyone to pay this fee . Nevertheless, nearly every family contrib-
utes . By assuming the power to tax, the temple again takes a mani-
festly political role. 
The Co Su Kong temple thus organizes the community in several 
ways. The birthday celebration divides Sanxia by surname for its 
broadest organization, and by geographical area in the rotating feasts 
held by each community. The cycle of feasts distinguishes the three 
main geographic sections of the temple catchment area (Yingge, the 
Hengxi valley and the Sanxia valley) , and also distinguishes the 
smaller communities within each section. The Universal Salvation 
festival organizes only the Sanxia valley, dividing it into four geographi-
cally defined regions, which are in turn broken up into smaller geo-
graphical units . 
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A number of other rituals also take place at the Co Su Kong 
temple, although none have such important roles in community 
organization. The pai to, for example, involves continuous recital of 
sutras for a week in the tenth lunar month. This is for the benefit of 
people who have purchased a tau (peck measure) filled with raw rice 
and various symbolic paraphernalia for good luck and long life. 
Several hundred of these tau are placed on the temple altar during 
the ritual, and afterwards the family eats the rice (see Baity. 1975. for 
a fuller description). 
Four Taoist priests alternate the responsibility of performing po un 
(repairing the fate) rituals for people each morning. On the first and 
fifteenth of each lunar month, which are the most popular days for 
this ritual, all four are present. This rotation was set up recently 
because several of the priests had been squabbling over customers. 
The ritual itself involves the priest reading a petition to Co Su Kong 
on behalf of his client, and then stamping some article of the client's 
clothing with Co Su Kong's seal. Although the temple takes a cut of 
the profits, the only real relationship is between the Taoist and his 
client. 
Sanxia's temple dedicated to the goddess Ma Co follows the Co Su 
Kong temple in importance. Like many of the smaller temples in 
Sanxia, the Ma Co temple has a small local clientele, most of whom 
consider it secondary to the Co Su Kong temple. The annual celebra-
tion for Ma Co's birthday is smaller than that for Co Su Kong. The 
Ma Co temple performs neither the pai to nor the ghost-feeding. but 
the man formerly in charge could perform po un rituals and various 
types of divination. Tan Kim-thian, an ambitious village head, has 
recently replaced this man as official head of the temple. Tan is a 
retired businessman. and a member of the Nationalist Party. His 
political loyalties, his election to village office, his take-over of the 
Ma Co temple, and his availability as an expert to lead families 
through funeral ritual suggest that he has a two-pronged strategy to 
create a political base. Tan is working along ordinary political lines 
(through Party and office). and also along religious lines (by becom-
ing a religious authority in charge of a major temple). Tan needs to 
make the Ma Co temple more prominent, to expand its clientele and 
thus his own power base. He is planning to rebuild it on a larger scale, 
and will solicit funds as he gets permission from the government. 
The third most important temple in Sanxia. and the last that I will 
mention separately here is in a rural area called Peq-ke, and is 
dedicated to En Cu Kong (more commonly called Kuan Kong). This 
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is one of three temples in northern Taiwan built by a coal mine owner 
to express his thanks to Kuan Kong for helping him to rise from poor 
pedlar to wealthy capitalist. It is one of the newer temples in Sanxia . 
Shortly after his death, a special altar was built for the founder, and 
many people now worship him at this temple or at his grave. The 
three En Cu Kong temples are not entirely ordinary, because they 
are the centers for a special cult whose members are vegetarians . 
Members are easily distinguished by the blue robes they wear at 
temple rituals . 
In the past, temples to Kuan Kong were sometimes considered 
Confucian and made part of the state cult. While the state religion no 
longer exists (except in a token annual ritual for Confucius), this 
temple apparently claims to inherit its prestige. Like a temple to 
Confucius, its doors have 108 raised yellow bumps on a red back-
ground instead of c.oor gods. Furthermore, the birthday ritual is 
clearly modelled on the one that takes place each year at Taibei's 
temple to Confucius. 
To most people, however, it is just an ordinary temple with two 
unexplained restrictions: one never offers meat nor burns paper spirit 
money.26 The temple offers the same range of rituals as the Co Su 
Kong temple, and its po un is considered especially efficacious. The 
people of Sanxia clearly see this temple as less important than the Co 
Su Kong temple . It is similar in its functions to the Ma Co temple or 
any of the other temples to popular deities . Outside of Sanxia, 
however, the temple has a reputation as a tourist attraction, partly 
because of its association with its two sister temples and the fame of 
its cult, and partly because of its beautiful setting. 
There are sixteen other temples in the Sanxia area dedicated to 
popular deities and large enough to employ a temple keeper. All 
have birthday celebrations (although none compare to Co Su Kong's), 
many have pai to , and a few have people who can po un. To my 
knowledge, only one has a Universal Salvation festival. Two of them 
also have regular spirit medium (tang-ki) sessions. These temples (in-
cluding the Ma Co and En Cu Kong temples) divide the area into rough 
and overlapping geographical segments. The popularity of each relates 
both to its reputation and to the convenience of access to it. Only the Co 
Su Kong temple serves a large and unified community. 
In addition , there are five Buddhist vegetarian halls (chai tng) in 
the Sanxia area. Three of these house ordained Buddhist monks or 
nuns; the fourth has a large number of male and female lay Buddhists 
belonging to the Xian Tian sect. This last temple is located, along 
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with several other temples, on top of Longevity Mountain, which is 
another of Sanxia's better-known scenic areas. One old man there is 
a famous fortune-teller, and the temple also supports a sutra singing 
group that _can be hired out to chant at funerals. 
Another of these temples is in Kiu Kiong Kiou itself. It houses 
three nuns and, unlike many vegetarian halls, has close ties with the 
people of the area. The main reason for this is that the nun in charge 
grew up there, her family still lives there, and she thus has many close 
ties with the people of Kiu Kiong Kiou. 
A Pure Land monk, who came over from the mainland after the 
Communist victory, runs one of the others. He is primarily concerned 
with Buddhist education, and runs periodic study groups in various 
sutras. Because he is unable to speak Hokkien, he appeals primarily 
to young intellectuals, who feel comfortable speaking Mandarin. The 
last chai tng is isolated far up in the mountains of Sanxia. The monk 
at this temple belongs to the Chan (Zen) sect, and his primary ties are 
to the intelligentsia of Taibei. He has little contact with the people of 
Sanxia. Both of these last two temples typify the new influx of 
mainland Buddhism into Taiwan after 1949. 
Vegetarian halls offer one service not found in other types of 
temples: they will take responsibility for worship of the tablets of 
deceased relatives (see Baity, 1975). Some (although not in Sanxia) 
also store ashes from cremations. There is an annual service for these 
souls that includes a ghost-feeding ritual. They also celebrate the 
ghost-feeding ritual in the seventh lunar month, along with the 
birthdays of certain Buddhist deities. especially Sakyamuni and Kuan 
Im. Many will also do po un rituals . 
With the exception of the Buddhist temples. worship of gods ties 
very closely to the social boundaries of communities, and to local 
politics: the Co Su Kong temple can call a meeting of local elected 
officials, it can collect taxes, it served as a base for political mobiliza-
tion against the Japanese, and both it and the Ma Co temple cur-
rently serve as bases for local political groups. The gods thus lend 
themselves to an ideology that emphasizes the close ties that bind 
together community. politics and religion. 
Sangren (1979, ch . 6) has discussed the relation between the 
religious, economic and administrative regions. Temple areas for 
gods higher than the Earth God differ from the discrete adminis-
trative regions: like economic regions, temple areas have fuzzy 
boundaries, and some neighborhoods may be loyal to more than one 
territory. The extent of a temple's area depends in part on its 
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reputation for efficacy, but also on its economic situation. Temple 
areas resemble economic regions in part because they are economic 
enterprises. The temple must make enough money to support itself 
and its staff. 
This is no problem for a major community temple like the Co Su 
Kong temple, but Sanxia's many smaller temples rely on attracting a 
steady clientele that will invest in the temple, buy incense and spirit 
money to burn, or purchase minor ritual services. Areas that are too 
sparsely settled cannot support a temple, even if they are unified 
communities. Areas with little community solidarity may support 
several temples, especially where they are convenient to major roads 
and a potential tourist trade. Map 2.2 shows, for example, that very 
few temples occur in the more inaccessible parts of Sanxia. On the 
other ·.hand, temples may concentrate along main roads where they 
can attract members of other communities. Three temples with no 
real community following, for example, depend primarily on 
weekend tourists from Taibei, Sanxia, and the surrounding towns. 
These three temples (Map 2.2, numbers 12-14) cluster on Longevity 
Mountain; they require an invigorating, but not especially taxing, 
climb up from the side of the major road connecting Sanxia and 
Taibei. The Co Su Kong temple itself is trying to take advantage of 
the growing tourist and pilgrimage trade to attract income. Temples 
thus reflect both local community solidarity and opportunities to 
generate income from non-residents. 
The striking parallels between gods and traditional bureaucrats 
add to the ideologized connection between temples and com-
munities. The many analogies between gods and bureaucrats have 
been discussed often (e.g., Feuchtwang, 1974a; Jordan, 1972; Wolf 
1974b). Temple architecture provides one of the clearest analogies. 
Temples are explicitly modelled on yamens, the traditional resi-
dences of government officials. Traditional sumptuary laws limited 
use of the colorfully decorated and sharply curved roof typical of 
temples to the houses of official degree-holders. Temple architecture 
also distinguishes the relative rank of various gods by the amount of 
roof decoration or by the type of door gods. The Earth God, for 
example, is too low to merit any door gods at all, and his roof has few 
decorations. The Co Su Kong temple, on the other hand, has four 
bronze guardians at its doors, and the roof is covered with dragons, 
phoenixes and other traditional motifs. 
Iconography also underlines the political, bureaucratic ideology of 
gods. Most gods sit in a dignified posture, wearing the robes of 
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traditional civil or military officials. The bureaucratic iconography is 
most explicit for the City God, who rules in every administrative 
capital, and who is always depicted with a full panoply of scribes, 
runners, guards and all the other necessities of managing a magis-
trate's office. 
People's behavior toward gods provides still more evidence for the 
bureaucratic analogy. People make important requests to both secu-
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lar and heavenly bureaucrats by hiring an appropriate expert to write 
a formal petition. Petitions to the gods work in exactly the same ways 
as documents intended for the secular government (Ahern, 1981b, 
ch. 2). Even in ordinary acts of worship, people must identify 
themselves with full name, address and birthday to allow the god to 
locate their file properly. Acts of respect toward gods are similar to 
acts of respect toward secular superiors (Ahern 198lb, ch. 3). Fi-
nally, a superior official must appoint (hong) gods to office. If gods 
fail to perform their duties properly they can be removed from office, 
just like secular officials. 
Many informants also make an explicit analogy between the gods 
and the government. The Jade Emperor, they say, is like President 
Jiang, Co Su Kong is like a governor, the Earth God is like a 
policeman, and so on. The detailed parallel between theieligious and 
secular bureaucracies meant that the popular pantheon could not 
easily question the general system of bureaucratic authority. 27 One 
could replace a particular god, just as one could replace a particular 
magistrate (though not easily in either case) by taking drastic action. 
Yet the system as a whole would remain intact in both cases. The 
celestial bureaucracy confirmed the secular political hierarchy as an 
inevitable, natural order. 
The analogies that unite deities, yamens and local elites into a 
social and symbolic whole are central to Chinese religion. Both elites 
and common people share an experience of the ritual importance of 
community, which makes the connection between gods and com-
munities easy to ideologize. Yet local communities and politics can 
take many different, sometimes problematic forms. The state played 
down these problems, ideologizing the analogy further by amplifying 
the bureaucratic details of the Heavenly pantheon, and by stressing 
each temple's proper place in an administrative hierarchy that culmi-
nated in the divine Jade Emperor and the secular Emperor, the Son 
of Heaven (see Chapter 5). The popular religion, however, often 
treated the pantheon more pragmatically, adjusting and manipulat-
ing it in relation to the local political economy. The rest of this 
chapter analyzes the less ideologized relation of the gods to the 
changes and contradictions of local social relations. 
Goddesses 
Many deities do not fit the model of a secular magistrate. For 
example, Kuan Kong, who is one of the most important gods in 
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Taiwan, is a military figure . Yet the bureaucratic model can easily 
expand to fit cases like Kuan Kong; traditional China had parallel 
military and civil hierarchies , and both were important .for the anal-
ogy between the secular and supernatural hierarchies. 
Goddesses are a much more troublesome discrepancy . Several of 
the most important deities in Taiwan are female, and they are thus 
completely detached from the bureaucratic hierarchy. There are 
three primary goddesses in Taiwan: (1) Ma Co is the object of a 
major cult, and her temples are often community-based like those of 
the 'magistrate' deities. She is particularly known for saving seafarers 
in distress. (2) Cu Si: Nia:-nia: (Goddess Who Aids Birth) usually 
holds a baby; women worship her to guarantee the birth of a son , or 
for help in labor generally. (3) Kuan Im was originally Buddhist. Like 
Cu Si: Nia:-nia:, images sometimes depict her holding a baby and 
helping in childbirth; like Ma Co (with whom she is sometimes 
confused in Taiwan), she is famous especially for helping people in 
desperate straits. Each goddess emphasizes the nurturing and repro-
ductive roles of women. Taiwanese religion thus has a female under-
current that stresses compassion and birth, rather than the bureau-
cratic order of the male deities (Sangren, 1979, pp. 371-5). This female 
undercurrent relates back to the idealized role of a woman in her family: 
it stresses her role as nurturing, lineage-reproducing mother. 
This cosmology idealizes the political system and the position of 
women in the family. Yet a few goddesses stray from their idealized 
kin roles. The most important of these is the Eternal Venerable 
Mother (Wu-sheng Lao-mu) . The Venerable Mother is the chief 
deity in some of the major heterodox sects, including the White 
Lotus and. its offshoots, which rebelled frequently during the last 
dynasty (Naquin , 1976), and in the Religion of Unity (Yi Guan Dao ), 
which is currently outlawed in Taiwan (Jordan, 1982). Her infinite 
compassion makes her similar to a Bodhisattva like Kuan Im, while 
her creation of the world and control over all heaven and earth make 
her superior to anything in the orthodox , male-dominated cos-
mology . 
These female deities can become a metaphor for unofficial power. 
They are especially popular among women in Taiwan . They can be 
seen as the nurturing counterpart of the male deities, but as the 
Venerable Mother shows, they also have the potential to oppose the 
gods and their bureaucracy. People rarely ideologize this aspect of 
the pantheon , largely because it conflicts with the male-centered 
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bureaucracy that the state and most community temples provide. 
Female deities make the cosmology a much more flexible index of 
social relations than the male gods alone suggest. They allow the 
cosmology to fit the experience of women, and of potentially rebel-
lious groups. 
Gods and Ethnicity 
Traditional religious ideology associated gods with the units of the 
administrative hierarchy , but specific localities often reinterpreted 
gods and temples according to the particular social relations of the 
area. In Taiwan, there has been a steady change from an association 
of temples with ethnic groups (people with a common point of origin 
on the mainland), to an association with geographical areas. This has 
accompanied the decreasing importance of this kind of ethnicity in 
Taiwan. The Japanese stopped the ethnic battles over land and water 
rights in the nineteenth century, and many young people today do 
not know their ancestors' place of origin . 
Co Su Kong is the patron of people from Anxi County in Fujian, 
from which the ancestors of most of Sanxia's residents emigrated. 
The Co Su Kong temple was originally an ethnic temple, serving only 
people with Anxi origins. As place of origin in the mainland lost its 
significance for the Taiwanese , however, the organizational base of 
the temple changed from ethnic group to geographical area. zx The 
division of Sanxia by surname is a remnant of the time when the 
temple was less concerned with Sanxia as a geographic entity, and 
more concerned with Anxi origins as the basis for social alliances. 
The Universal Salvation is strictly geographically organized because 
the arrangement is more recent than the seven surname-shares; it was 
created when the temple was already more geographically oriented. 
This change is typical of temples in Taiwan. Wang Shih-ch'ing (1974), 
for example, has described the same process for Shulin , a township 
near Sanxia. 
The Ma Co temple has a similar history. It originally represented 
! Sanxia residents with ancestors from Meizhou, also in Fujian Prov-
ince. Like the Co Su Kong temple , the Ma Co temple has a seven-
share rotation based on surname for its annual birthday celeb-
ration. The people involved all have Meizhou ancestry, and do not 
take part in the birthday celebration for Co Su Kong. These people 
are a small minority of the population of Sanxia, however, and Ma 
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Co's birthday is not a major event. Aside from the birthday celebra-
tion , the Ma Co temple is now simply a small local temple with no 
particular ethnic affiliations. Even the Meizhou residents now con-
sider Co Su Kong their most important deity. 
The most important ethnic distinction in Taiwan today is between 
the original Chinese inhabitants, and the mainlanders who arrived 
after 1945, and who soon dominated the political and economic 
structures of power. Religion is again a part of this new system of 
social relations. Many mainlanders (but only about 2 per cent of the 
Taiwanese) are Christian, and almost no mainlanders take part in the 
major festivals of Taiwanese popular religion. Ahern (1981a) has 
suggested that the current abundance of popular religious activity. 
and especially the huge pig sacrifices (as at Co Su Kong's birthday) 
express Taiwanese ethnicity in the face of mainlander opposition. 
Gates (1982) suggests further that the current resurgence of popular 
religion is part of a strategy by the traditional Taiwanese petty 
bourgeoisie to claim support from Taiwanese local communities 
against the larger economy. Pragmatic interpretations of the tie 
between temple and community may thus be changing again , in ways 
do not mesh simply with the ideology of gods as bureaucrats. 
Region and Nation 
The use of gods to support various ethnic or geographic groups 
against one another fits one part of the ideologized bureaucratic 
analogy: gods are the supernatural representatives of social com-
munities. Yet community solidarity in China existed often only at the 
expense of national solidarity . There has been a constant conflict in 
Chinese history between the central government and the divisive 
forces of regional independence. The central government made many 
attempts to control these forces: officials were not allowed to serve in 
their home areas and were frequently rotated (Ch'u, 1962, pp. 21-2), 
political boundaries were sometimes drawn to cross-cut natural re-
gions (Skinner, 1976, pp. 341-4) , and so on . The rise ofwarlordism in 
the early twentieth century occurred because the government was no 
longer able to prevent regions from becoming autonomous. The 
process that led up to this began in the Taiping Rebellion. which the 
government defeated only by allowing high-level members of the 
elite to set up military units in their own native areas (Kuhn, 1970). 
Religion often became a tool for these divisive forces. The Qing 
government was aware of this and outlawed large pilgrimages. In the 
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eighteenth century, even large rituals like birthday celebrations for 
gods were banned because they often resulted in disturbances 
(Hsiao, 1960, p. 231) . Similar fears partially motivate the Nationalist 
government's discouragement of large-scale religious activities in 
Taiwan. 
Gods and temples reflect local social communities, but the specific 
content of that reflection changes as social relations change. Earth 
God temples appear and disappear as neighborhoods come and go. 
Large temples emphasize ethnicity or geography as the bases of 
community organization chang~. Community solidarity opposes or 
supports national solidarity as the national political situation im-
proves or worsens. Temples and their gods react to such -contextual 
changes in the role of community, but those reactions tend to be less 
ideologized than the relation between god and community, which is 
less context-bound and more acceptable to the state. 
Co Su Kong illustrates many of these themes. The temple manage-
ment puts out an ideologized version of Co Su Kong's life that fits 
nicely with the nationalist concerns of the govenment, and confirms 
Co Su Kong as a loyal member of the administration . The official 
story relates how Co Su Kong was a military official who fought for 
the Song Dynasty in its losing battle against non-Chinese invaders 
(QSZS). He fled south with the defeated dynasty, and settled in Anxi 
County to perfect himself spiritually. His followers in Anxi resisted 
the foreign Yuan Dynasty, and supported the Chinese Ming who 
finally retook the throne. Co Su Kong was first officially deified by a 
Ming Emperor. The entire story can be read as a thinly disguised 
analogy for Sun Yat-sen's resistance and final victory over the Man-
churian Qing Dynasty, or for the Chinese victory over the Japanese 
after a long occupation. Either reading fits well with the goals and 
public image of the government. 
Yet this story is not very important to anyone beyond the temple 
management and the tourists who read the literature printed up by 
the temple. The people of Sanxia speak instead of the help Co Su 
Kong has given them as members of the community, but not as heroic 
nationalists. He used to appear in the ethnic battles of the nineteenth 
century, which the government was powerless to prevent in Taiwan. 
This was the period when the temple was tied to local ethnicity. He 
also helped Sanxia's soldiers in the Japanese army during the Second 
World War. He did not aid the cause of the Japanese or any other 
national government. His only concern was to save the lives of 
Sanxia's soldiers. People tell stories of how he helped them avoid 
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attack, but not how he helped them win victory for (or against) the 
Japanese. Co Su Kong was protecting the local community, with no 
loyalties to any higher political unit. He apparently has the same 
goals under the Nationalists; a young draftee explained that Co Su 
Kong helped get easy assignments for draftees from Sanxia . He is 
protecting his citizens, but possibly at the expense of the national 
government. Co Su Kong is closely tied to the community; his larger 
loyalties change as social alliances and political conditions change. 
These pragmatic interpretations show local gods to be potentially 
much more troublesome to the state than the more general ideology 
of god-bureaucrats. 
Gods and Elites 
Temples help create local community unity. and Co Su Kong is 
equally the patron of everyone in Sanxia. Yet some of the actual uses 
of religion belie this superficial equality within the community. San-
xia's religious center, the Co Su Kong temple, ties closely with the old 
political elite. The man in charge of the temple's reconstruction, for 
example, served both as head of the township and on the township 
council in the early postwar years. The chairman of the temple 
committee is a physician, and by far the most educated man of his 
generation in that area. Both men are part of a political faction that 
began to redevelop the temple after losing political office during the 
murky political period in Sanxia after the Japanese departed. While 
the temple may serve such people in part as a retreat from politics, 
their very presence nevertheless makes it an informal locus of power. 
Tan Kim-thian, the village head and Nationalist Party member who 
took over the Ma Co temple, is trying to use that temple to create a 
similar power base for himself. Such relations between temples and 
politics are common in many parts of Taiwan (Baity, 1975; Seaman, 
1978), where major community temples often serve as unofficial 
bases for local powerholders; they are the symbolic centers of the 
community, they are usually also major centers of informal social 
activity, and they tend to control relatively large budgets . 
Another source of the Co Su Kong temple's power is its current 
reconstruction, which has made it an important economic hub. In an 
area with few large factories (but many small ones), the craftsmen 
and staff hired by the temple make it a significant employer. The 
scale of the temple reconstruction in Sanxia has made the temple an 
even larger employer and solicitor of funds than most community 
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temples. More important, as construction progresses, the temple is 
becoming a well-known tourist attraction on the island, and the 
income from the tourist trade is potentially very important to Sanxia. 
Ritual feasting also has political uses. All of the major temple 
festivals are accompanied by domestic feasting on a large scale. The 
most important occasions for this in Sanxia are the birthday of Co Su 
Kong, the birthday of Ang Kong (another deity), and the Universal 
Salvation festival. Large feasts also accompany engagements, wed-
dings and funerals. In addition, for people in appropriate occupa-
tions, the first and last of the semi-monthly rituals for the Earth God 
(thau ge and be ge) also have feasts given by employers for their 
workers. 
Food is inevitably provided for these feasts, including many ornate 
courses with unlimited wine and beer. The largest may feed 500-600 
guests, and their great expense makes them an object of constant 
criticism from the government. The government campaign has had 
some effect: instead of rotating from one neighborhood to the next 
over a period of several weeks, many festivals are now celebrated on 
only a single day. In Sanxia, although the gigantic birthday celebra-
tion for Co Su Kong continues unabated, both the Ang Kong birth-
day and the Universal Salvation festival now involve only a few days. 
Nevertheless, hosting one of these feasts is an important op-
portunity for the families involved to display themselves in public. 
In all, the average person may attend five to ten of these feasts each 
year, and host one himself only once in several years. 
This pattern of conspicuous consumption in feasts has several 
important uses, and this helps to explain the limited success of 
government programs against large religious expenditures. These 
feasts express, first of all, wealth and power. A family that serves an 
expensive meal for 500 guests has established itself as an important 
social force. Feasts also give everyone, but especially elites, the 
chance to create bonds of reciprocity. Such occasions are therefore 
particularly crucial for businessmen and politicians. During particu-
larly busy times of the year, businessmen and politicians (and the 
occasional anthropologist), all anxious to maintain their contacts, can 
be seen going from feast to feast, stopping at each only long enough 
to consume the glasses of wine that courtesy requires before stagger-
ing off to the next. 
At the same time, however, feasts provide no overt recognition of 
class distinctions - the system looks as if everyone were capable of 
the same thing. Yang (1961, p. 79) writes that 'while Chinese religion 
56 Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion 
took a hand in trying to mitigate the oppressiveness of the rich by 
giving supernatural sanction to moral qualities like righteousness and 
generosity, it did not condemn the acquisition of wealth as such'. In 
fact, it did more than simply 'not condemn' wealth; it tacitly sup-
ported the wealthy through the unequal benefits of the pattern of 
feasts and festivals. 
The choice of a lo cu, the 'incense pot master' who takes charge of 
a temple's rituals for a year, also reveals inequality beneath a surface 
of equality. Choice of a lo cu for a local Earth God temple is 
egalitarian; each household is registered on a list, and a randomizing 
divination device (puaq pue, throwing 'moonblocks') allows 'divine' 
selection of a lo cu. Ideally, major community temples choose lo cu 
for their major festivals in the same way. There are, however, too 
many households in Sanxia to give each one a chance each year. The 
temple instead registers a list of people who volunteer to compete for 
lo cu each year. Like throwing a feast for five hundred people, 
anyone can in principle volunteer, but in fact only the rich can afford 
this expression of religious devotion. Being lo cu for the Earth God is 
a minor responsibility, but the lo cu for a major community ritual has 
both an important social position and major expenses. The theoreti-
cal equality of families before Co Su Kong cannot override basic 
distinctions of wealth. 
People's interpretations of gods come not simply from the ideol-
ogized analogy with bureaucrats governing a unified area, but also 
from pragmatic dealings with gods and temples. Gods defined ethnic 
communities in the nineteenth century and geographic communities 
in the twentieth, as the important social divisions in Taiwan changed. 
The ideological incorporation of local areas within a nationwide 
political system was questioned by an emphasis on local indepen-
dence. The ideologized rule of male bureaucrats was questioned by 
an emphasis on a mothering goddess. The ideologized equality within 
local areas was questioned by a reflection of real differences in 
wealth, and so on. 
The Temple in Action 
A meeting that took place at the Co Su Kong temple on August 3, 
1978, illustrates many of these cleavages. The meeting takes place 
annually about two weeks before the Universal Salvation festival. 
The temple leadership calls together all the village heads and all of 
the people in charge of the next birthday celebration to discuss plans 
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for the upcoming ritual. The temple's authority to summon govern-
ment officials illustrates its genuine political power. 
The meeting began when Professor Li Meishu, who is in charge of 
the reconstruction and the most powerful man in the temple, gave a 
brief history of the temple and its reconstruction. After some ap-
plause a temple employee was directed to read a tentative schedule of 
events for the ritual. As he announced where the Four Great Pillars 
would place their altars, Li interrupted. He suggested that it would 
be simpler to put all the altars in the plaza in front of the temple, 
rather than scattered throughout the town. Furthermore, he felt that 
each pillar should supply only a single meat offering, with everyone 
else bringing only fruit. He was clearly echoing the government's 
constant efforts to persuade people to stop wasting so much money 
on rituals. The Taibei government had in fact been pressuring Li to 
cut down on ritual expenses on pain having his application for certain 
aspects of the reconstruction turned down. The government frowned 
on the expense of the project, and on the ritual expenses in which the 
people of Sanxia indulge. Li reacted by stressing national rather than 
local loyalties. He respected the government campaign for quieter 
rituals, and he emphasized the artistic merit of the reconstruction 
over its religious value . 
Tan Kim-thian, the man who controls the Ma Co temple, and who 
is a Nationalist Party member, stood up to support Li's opinion. As 
village heads, he said, they were responsible to represent the govern-
ment's point of view. An old man disagreed vehemently. He said it 
would be wrong to change because: first, the ghosts only eat meat, 
not fruit; secondly, the people have been preparing meat to sacrifice 
(especially pigs) all year, and cannot be asked not to at the last 
minute; and thirdly, the traditions of their ancestors should not be 
tampered with. Tan then softened his original position, saying that 
they should urge people to bring fruit instead of the more standard 
meat offering, although they could not force anyone. The topic was 
dropped and, in fact, everyone brought meat as usual. Li and Tan's 
attempt to use religion to support the central government failed . 
At this point another man stood up and said that he was old and 
wanted to see a ciou before he died. A ciou is the largest ceremony a 
community can put on, and serves to renew its cosmic mandate (see 
Liu, 1967; Saso, 1972). None will be performed until the temple is 
completed, and none has been performed in Sanxia within living 
memory. 29 The slowness of the reconstruction and the lack of a ciou 
have fueled increasing hostility between Li and the community in 
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recent years. Li became very angry at this point, and made a long 
speech, denying that he had misused funds, and emphasizing the 
temple's position as an artistic treasury and as a tourist attraction. 
Tan, after several unsuccessful attempts to interrupt, again supported 
him, and tried to cut off discussion of this topic. Feelings apparently 
ran too strong, however, as several more people urged a quick end to 
the reconstruction. The main argument is over the funds controlled 
by the temple. Li wanted to maintain control, and to continue his 
constant elicitation of donations for his project, but others wanted an 
end to the economic demands of the temple. 
In the interstices of the argument, several of the village heads 
suggested revisions in the organization of the Four Great Pillars, 
claiming that they had a disproportionate amount of responsibility 
relative to their population . These revisions would have relieved 
their constituencies of some of the work and costs of the festival, and 
thus probably would have helped the village heads in future elec-
tions. 
When lunch arrived, all these discussions were dropped, and the 
meeting was soon adjourned. Although no major decisions were 
made, a number of features of the meeting illustrate the political 
importance of religion , and the difficulty of promoting an ideology. 
First of all, no other organization outside the township government 
had the power to summon the village heads. Secondly, the argument 
about the reconstruction of the temple stemmed primarily from the 
huge sums of money that pass through the temple and the constant 
donations that it requests. Thirdly, the requests for readjustments in 
the Four Great Pillars showed that the temple's community organiza-
tion is important enough to warrant the concern of the village heads. 
Fourthly, the political importance of the temple leadership appeared 
in Tan Kim-thian 's constant support of Li Meishu . Tan, ever since his 
retirement, had been trying to become a major community leader. 
His first step was to get elected village head . The constant currying of 
favor with Li Meishu was part of the same process, which recently led 
him to take over the Ma Co temple as well. Finally the support for 
simpler rituals from both Li and Tan, and the arguments about 
having a ciou, illustrated the tension between local and national 
loyalties, and the failure of the temple and political leaders to impose 
their own interpretations . The extent and complexity of the real ties 
between temple and community make it very difficult to maintain a 
unified ideology. 
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Both the ancestral cult and god worship include relatively explicit, 
ideologized interpretations that match our usual anthropological 
understanding of the popular tradition (filial piety, the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, and so forth) . Yet both also have a wide range of flexible , 
pragmatic ties to more complex tensions and contradictions within 
the society, which appear primarily where the experience of kinship 
and community is complex and changeable over time and place, and 
where local leaders cannot impose an interpretation. Such conditions 
encourage people to remake their pragmatic religious interpret-
ations. 
3 Pragmatic Ghosts 
Ghosts contrast with ancestors and gods. The preceding chapter 
showed how ancestors and gods are complex, pragmatic categories, 
only partially ideologized. This chapter discusses how interpretations 
of ghosts in the popular tradition occur only partially within the 
structural contrast with ancestors and gods. The contrasts with ances-
tors and gods lead to two inconsistent readings of ghosts: ghosts as 
marginal ancestors are pitiful, and ghosts as marginal gods are 
dangerous. Pragmatic interpretations of ghosts in the Universal Sal-
vation rites have resolved this inconsistency in different ways as social 
relations have changed over time in Taiwan. The ideologized, struc-
tural contrasts of gods/ghosts/ancestors set the parameters for popu-
lar treatment of ghosts, but those contrasts do not determine this 
treatment. The pragmatic ghosts help clarify the limits to ideology in 
Chinese popular religion. 
Ghosts are the souls of people who died in the wrong way or at the 
wrong time. Only old people with many sons and grandsons, who 
support them while alive and worship them after they die, are able to 
have a proper death. Unfortunately, many people die violently -
through accident, suicide, or war- and many people die before they 
have had children or, perhaps worse, with unfilial children who will 
not worship them. Ghosts are thus souls who do not occupy the 
fOrrect position of the dead in the social structure. They are socially 
marginal beings who lack both the political standing of the gods and 
the kinship standing of the ancestors. 
According to many informants, the dead must pass through an 
underworld that consists of ten bureaucratic courts. A spirit bureau-
crat runs each court; he controls a staff of demonic scribes and 
runners who mete out the various tortures (see Figure 3.1). There is a 
punishment to fit each crime. In a printed tour of the underworld 
available in many temples, for example, an underworld official ex-
plains the suffering of one ghost: 
This criminal spirit had no proper occupation when she was alive; 
she specialized in striptease acts and lascivious songs and dances, 
customarily ruining good men. In life she did not like to wear 
clothes; in death, she has thus been sentenced to the Frozen Hell, 
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Figure 3.1 The Disintegrator Carriage Hell, Ninth Level of the 
Underworld 
Source: DYYJ: 11 
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forced to search for clothes to hide from the cold, but unable to 
find them. Crime has its punishment. (DYYJ , p. 53) 
Most souls avoid the worst horrors of the underworld. The living 
save them by hiring priests who know how to bribe the appropriate 
underworld officials. The socially marginal ghosts , however, have no 
one to perform these rituals, and thus never make it through the 
complexities of the underworld . Often buried without ceremony, 
they must undergo lengthy punishment from which funeral ritual has 
released more fortunate souls. Unworshipped, they have neither 
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food to eat nor money to spend in the underworld. Many thus remain 
in the world of the living to take what they can. The ghosts of people 
who died by drowning are especially dangerous: they remain in the 
water, hoping to regain their freedom by drowning another victim to 
replace them. Coal mines, military bases, old battle sites and other 
areas of frequent violent death also have a high concentration of 
ghosts. In the seventh lunar month, all ghosts are released from the 
underworld to enjoy a month of feasting offered by the living. 
Wolf (1974b) argues that ghosts must be propitiated (ce) in con-
trast to gods and ancestors who are honored (pai). His argument is 
essentially that ghosts are metaphors for people who do not occupy 
proper positions in the social structure. Thus, like the beggars, 
thieves and strangers they represent, ghosts are dangerous and must 
be paid protection money. 'Although people in Sanhsia [Sanxia) 
differ on how one should deal with these malevolent creatures, they 
agree that dealing with a ghost is like dealing with lo-mua:, the gangs 
of young toughs who use threats of violence as a means of extortion.' 
(Wolf, 1974b, p. 170) Later, discussing the pre-Japanese period, 
Wolf (1974b, p. 175) writes: 
The world beyond the bamboo walls that encircled each com-
munity was dangerous because it was inhabited by strangers, and 
strangers were feared because they were represented in experience 
by bandits and beggars. The ghosts are the product of this experi-
ence. They are dangerous because they are strangers, and strangers 
are dangerous because experience has proved them dangerous. 
Ghosts are thus dangerous because they are the souls of people 
who fall into the interstices of the system of social categories. Asking 
informants to explain the ritual, however, led to some unexpected 
answers. I asked a broad range of questionnaire respondents two 
open-ended questions about the ghost-feeding ritual: 'Why do you 
worship the good brothers [ghosts) in the seventh month?' and 'If you 
did not worship them, what would happen?' For purposes of tabula-
tion, I classed each set of answers into three groups, following the 
natural groupings of answers. The totals from the two questions did 
not match exactly because a few people gave more than one answer 
(see Table 3.1). 
The first type of answer to why people worship ghosts was to ask 
for a peaceful life (kiu pieng an) . Pieng an is a frequently-stated goal 
of religious worship. Literally 'smooth and peaceful', it means free-
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Table 3.1 Questions about the Universal Salvation Festival 
1. 'Why do you worship the good brothers in the seventh month?' 


























dam from all types of misfortune . The second category covered a 
wider ranger of answers, but all carried some implication that the 
worshipper was doing an act of kindness for the ghosts. Especially 
common was to say that they worship in order to chia: lang kheq for 
the ghosts (have them as company) because no one else will feed 
them. Others said that it was to worship them, or to help them ; all 
implied that they were acting generously toward the pitiful ghosts. A 
large number of people said they worship because it is the Chinese 
tradition, and some were unable to give any answer at all. 
The categories for the second question are similar. but not entirely 
identical. Some people felt that misfortune would result from not 
worshipping: accidents , illness and loss of money were mentioned 
specifically. Another set thought they would feel uncomfortable (sim 
bue an ; literally 'with an unpeaceful heart') if they failed to perform 
this ritual. This answer may include two separate types of feelings: 
one is discomfort at having broken with tradition, the other is 
discomfort at failing to be generous to the unfortunate . A few people 
said they would lose face if they did not worship, not for religious 
reasons, but because their neighbors would think they were too poor 
to make the offerings. The largest group thought nothing at all would 
happen if they did not worship, or they simply could not imagine such 
a situation; they told me that everyone always worships. and refused 
to speculate about impossible situations. 
Many of these answers provide no explanation at all. For the first 
question , those who do not worship, do not know why they worship, 
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or worship only because it is 'traditional' form a category of people 
who articulate no explanation for the ghost-feeding ritual. These 
people add up to 44.5 per cent of the total. Even more remarkably, 
80 per cent of the replies to the second question involve no interpret-
ation of the ritual. 
These results provide little support for the usual contention that 
ghosts are malevolent, at least in the context of the Universal Salva-
tion festival. Why did only 9.9 per cent of the respondents say that 
misfortune would result from failure to worship? Why did only 10.9 
per cent say they worship in order to maintain a peaceful life without 
mishap? If the association between the malevolence and the margin-
ality of ghosts were complete, the percentages should have been 
much higher. People may not have wanted to give 'superstitious' 
answers, or to antagonize the ghosts. Yet these questions were asked 
much later in the year, when ghosts were not considered such a 
threat, and people seemed to take the questions in a very relaxed 
way. Furthermore, answering that misfortune would follow from not 
worshipping is not the sort of thing that would normally antagonize 
ghosts. People were also generally honest about their religious be-
liefs, and very few seemed to think it necessary to play down their 
religious involvement. Nearly everyone, for example, insists that 
they perform the ritual. 
In looking for exegesis of rituals, it is easy to gravitate toward a few 
especially articulate informants. Often, in Taiwan, this is the only 
way to get coherent explanations of religion . However, this pro-
cedure can lead us to ignore the great mass of people who have no 
ready explanations. It is unsafe to assume that the few people who 
have given more thought to their rituals are expressing ideas common 
to everyone. The very fact that many people have no easily verbal-
ized explanations is in itself significant. 
One unspoken reason to take part in the ritual is simply aesthetic. 
The seventh month is one of the big events of the year. It is second 
only to Co Su Kong's birthday in the first month . There are many 
feasts, a constant progression of operas and puppet shows, a night-
time parade complete with lanterns and torches, and a particularly 
colorful ritual. 
The entire month, and especially the events of the fifteenth, are 
very /au ziat. Lau ziat, literally 'noisy and hot', is a popular aesthetic 
ideal in Taiwan. In art it refers, for example, to the colorful, daz-
zlingly complex and crowded carvings that cover more admired 
temples. Similarly, in festivals it refers to those with great crowds, 
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lots of operas, and a constant coming and going of people and rituals. 
The ghost-feeding ritual is very lau ziat, giving people yet another 
reason to participate. 
It is also possible, however, to go beyond aesthetics to explain the 
lack of an established exegesis for the ghost-feeding ritual. People 
have no ready explanation of ghosts because ghosts are even less 
ideologized than ancestors or gods; the meaning lies instead in 
pragmatic interpretations of ghosts. The absence of an ideology of 
ghosts (beyond the very general structural contrast with gods and 
ancestors) stems from the variable experience of marginality across 
time and society. The following sections expand on Wolf's associa-
tion of ghosts with socially marginal bandits and beggars by separat-
ing two types of marginality: ghosts as bandits are malevolent and 
opposed to the orthodox political order; ghosts as beggars are pitiful 
and should be treated with sympathy and guaranteed subsistence. 
Separation of these two attitudes will help clarify the different social 
and historical conditions that have shaped the changing pragmatic 
intepretations of ghosts. Ghosts do not exist simply in contrast with 
ancestors and gods. Sometimes they are understood in relation to 
ancestors alone (the more pitiful reading), and sometimes in relation 
to gods alone (the more malevolent reading) . 
Marginal Ancestors and Marginal Gods 
Ghosts' similarity to ancestors is clear in some informant state-
ments. People will not ordinarily say it, but if the right questions are 
asked, they will define ghosts as everyone else's ancestors. The souls 
of all dead are essentially alike, and the key to the division between 
ghosts and ancestors is the presence or absence of a kinship tie. 
Ghosts are strangers; ancestors are relatives. Other people's ances-
tors, however, like most strangers, are harmless. The problematic 
ghosts are really no one's ancestors. Abandoned, and therefore 
pitiful, these marginal ancestors form one core of the category 
'ghosts' . 
Other ghosts are more like marginal gods than marginal ancestors. 
Small temples are sometimes built for ghosts; some contain the bones 
of people who died in battle, and others house unidentified bones 
found by accident. Some of the larger ones allow people to add the 
bones of unworshipped relatives- usually children or childless adults. 
These temples have a number of names: many carry the slogan iu kiu 
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pit ieng (all requests will be answered), and are thus known as iu ieng 
kong temples (Temples of the Lord Who Answers All Requests) . 
Because iu ieng kong temples meet all pleas for help without regard 
for their morality , they are especially popular among prostitutes, 
gamblers and other people whose needs are not the sort for which 
gods, the guardians of traditional morality, would show much sym-
pathy. Most people, if they go to these temples at all, will go only 
once a year during the seventh lunar month (see Table 2.3). The 
actual day varies from one temple to another. A few such temples are 
very active during the seventh month, and many people may sponsor 
operas or puppet shows to take place there. Over time, some of these 
temples may gradually develop into temples to gods, their ghostly 
origins forgotten (Harrell, 1974a; Baity, 1975; Jordan 1972, pp. 
170-1). 
The following sections expand on these two possible interpreta-
tions of ghosts. The two interpretations are not equally important for 
all participants, nor do they necessarily form a single clearly organ-
ized system. The structure of gods, ancestors and ghosts forms the 
backdrop for Taiwanese religion, but the interpretative values people 
put on that structure cannot be isolated from the pragmatic complex-
ity and flexibility of everyday life. 
Beggars and Marginal Ancestors 
In one sense , ghosts provide a negative definition of kinship. As 
marginal kin - primarily deceased children and unmarried adults -
ghosts clarify proper kin. Spirits of marginal kinsmen can lose their 
ghostly status only by becoming proper kin through spirit marriage or 
spirit adoption. For example, in 1978 a young man killed a young 
woman in a traffic accident in Sanxia. The informal settlement he 
reached with the woman's family included a requirement that he 
marry the dead woman. He would go through a marriage ceremony, 
substituting a picture for the living bride ; in the future he would take 
responsibility for worshipping her spirit . The young man would 
remain free to marry a living wife; the young woman would be saved 
from being a ghost by being brought into an orthodox kinship 
position (see Jordan, 1972, pp. 140-55 for further examples) . The 
ghost/ancestor boundary is permeable. 
Ghosts are thus marginal kinsmen who lead a pitiful life. In this 
context, people worship ghosts out of sympathy, not out of fear. just 
as they feel pity, not terror, toward the living who occupy marginal 
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kinship positions. Orphans and maiden aunts need not be pro-
pitiated, but they should be supported and helped. Borrowing Wolfs 
terms, they are more like beggars than bandits. Frequent and empha-
tic informant statements support this reading of ghosts. When asked 
why they worship in the seventh month, a plurality of informants 
replied that they worship ghosts out of sympathy and a desire to 
make the ghosts more comfortable (see Table 3.1). They say they 
worship ghosts because everyone ignores them throughout the rest of 
the year, or because the ghosts are starving. A few said that they 
worship without believing in the existence of ghosts; the ritual ex-
presses good moral sentiments, especially respect for the dead. 
People who replied that they would be uncomfortable if they failed to 
worship also seemed to be implying that they would feel guilty about 
not expressing these moral values. Apparently, a number of inform-
ants who said nothing would happen if they failed to worship felt 
similarly. One such informant answered my questions saying: 'It's 
tradition. We express our respect for the dead whom no one else 
worships . . . It doesn't matter if you don't- there aren't really any 
ghosts.' And another said: 'We invite the ghosts to a meal once each 
year, because they are wild ghosts, living a bitter life in the under-
world. It doesn't matter if you don't worship. Asking people to 
dinner is just a courtesy; without this feeling of courtesy, there's no 
point having company.' 
Some of the offerings to ghosts also show them as pitiful beggars, 
not fearsome bandits. Ghosts normally receive fully prepared food, 
including, most likely, some favorite dishes of the worshipping fam-
ily. This is the same kind of food offering that ancestors receive , and 
emphasizes their similarity to living humans, especially kinsmen. This 
theme is carried into the seventh month rituals by offering the ghosts 
cigarettes, canned delicacies , and a wash basin- their basic humanity 
is remembered. Gods, in contrast, usually get a standardized offering 
of three or five kinds of cooked but uncut and unseasoned meat 
(sieng /e) . Offerings to the gods are more standardized than those to 
ancestors or ghosts because gods do not have the special human 
preferences of ghosts and ancestors. Indeed, the higher ranking the 
god , the less like human food are the offerings. The highest god in the 
popular pantheon (Thi: Kong) receives whole, raw pigs, partially 
plucked chickens, and live (unless the ritual goes on too long) fish. 
Rawer, less processed food goes with more distant and powerful 
beings (Ahern, 1973, pp. 167-70). 
In the seventh month , however, none of the food offerings for the 
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ghosts are fully prepared; they are given sieng /e, which is normally 
reserved for the gods. People do this in part to stress the impersonal 
nature of ghosts in the seventh month; ghosts in other contexts 
appear more as individual personalities, and thus receive food more 
suitable for humans. People also do this in part to express special 
respect for the ghosts on this occasion. Like the use of a higher grade 
of spirit money to honor the gods at the New Year (Ahern, 1981a, p. 
402), or the use of higher generation kin terms to honor certain 
relatives (Weller, 1981), people show special courtesy to the ghosts in 
the seventh month by offering them only partly prepared food. The 
use of two types of offerings shows the interstitial nature of ghosts: 
they are somewhat like gods, and somewhat like ancestors. The 
offerings bring out the humanity of ghosts and can be seen as 
generous alms as easily as the propitiatory bribes described by WolL 
The use of paper spirit money, the currency of the underworld, 
clearly associates ghosts with beggars. Gods, in general, receive gold 
money, and ancestors receive a large and a small size of silver money. 
Ghosts, at the seventh month ghost-feeding ritual as on all other 
occasions, receive only the smaller size of silver money and a type of 
paper with articles of clothing and some common utensils printed on 
it (kieng i). Here, they are clearly associated with the souls of the 
dead in general, but in a lower position than the ancestors (larger 
sizes of spirit money are more respectful). The gift of clothing, like 
the offering of a wash basin and towel, clearly associates the ghosts 
with beggars: ancestors, having households of their own in the 
underworld, have no need for such objects. In contrast to Wolf's 
suggestion, generosity may well be a stronger motivation than fear in 
offering such gifts to ghosts. 
Some people may identify directly with ghosts, rather than seeing 
them as either beggars or bandits. This is especially true for the old; 
abandonment is a great source of anxiety for the old in Taiwan, and 
the Universal Salvation festival is a guarantee of support for the 
abandoned. A metaphoric identification with the 'lonely souls' re-
assures the anxious worshippers that they can never be truly aban-
doned. Thus, the power of the idea of ghosts is not only related to 
fear of those outside normal structures, but also exists because the 
childless, abandoned ghost represents a source of anxiety, especially 
for older people who are increasingly dependent on others for their 
support. The ritual expression of the identity between ghosts and 
worshipper is clearest at the point in the ceremony where people try 
to catch the food thrown by the priest. An old woman said that when 
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she was young, the yang aspect of the world was not so strong, and it 
was easier to see ghosts. Anyone, if bold enough, could see them by 
looking under the sleeves of a priest performing the ghost-feeding 
ritual. Some were gory and held their heads, cut off in long forgotten 
battles with aborigines, in their arms. No matter what their physical 
condition, all alike were crowding around the priest, each trying to 
reach the food in front of him and catch it as he threw it. Her 
description sounded exactly like the behavior of the living at several 
of the ceremonies I witnessed. 
There is also some linguistic evidence for the identity of ghosts and 
people. None of it is decisive, but all of it is relevant. First, a number 
of informants described the offerings for ghosts as being determined 
by what the family wants for dinner. This, added to the offering of a 
wash basin and paper clothing, shows that ghosts have the same 
tastes and needs as living people. Secondly, the phrase 'to be a lonely 
ghost' (cue ko) describes a man eating voraciously. Finally, many 
informants told me that the purpose of the Universal Salvation 
festival is to chia: lang kheq for the ghosts. This phrase means to have 
company, and is used also for human guests. In fact, the food offered 
the ghosts serves human company later on. 
People who make offerings to ghosts on the fifteenth personalize 
them by marking their dishes of food with individual sticks of incense 
and with red flags bearing their names. This practice contrasts with all 
other rituals, in which people place incense into a common incense 
pot. They are, in a sense, making a public show of generosity to the 
ghosts, and by the same token, staking an implicit claim to such 
generosity if they themselves are ever in need. 
Some aspects of the ritual reinforce social categories and accepted 
moral values - for example, thieves are dangerous because they are 
outside the social structure, and generosity is highly valued - and 
people generally find these aspects of the ritual easy to express. 
Other aspects, however, like the ones discussed here, may express 
the darker side of people's views of the world. No informants, except 
with the intention to insult, would ever purposely imply that the 
living are like ghosts. Yet children are not always filial, and parents 
are sometimes dishonored and abandoned. The ritual may be import-
ant precisely because it says these things that could never be said 
directly; such pragmatic interpretations remain possible even when 
people would find an explicit, ideologized version unacceptable. 
This view of the Universal Salvation festival is thus partially similar 
to Geertz's analysis of the Balinese cockfight: 
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In the normal course of things, the Balinese are shy to the point of 
obsessiveness of open conflict. Oblique, cautious, subdued, con-
trolled, masters of indirection and dissimulation - what they call 
a/us, 'polished,' 'smooth' - they rarely face what they can turn 
away from, rarely resist what they can evade. But here they 
portray themselves as wild and murderous, with manic explosions 
of instinctual cruelty. A powerful rendering of life as the Balinese 
most deeply do not want it (to adapt a phrase Frye has used of 
Gloucester's blinding) is set in the context of a sample of it as they do 
in fact have it. And, because the context suggests that the rendering if 
less than a straightforward description, is nonetheless more than an 
idle fancy; it is here that the disquietfulness- the disquietfulness of 
the .fight, not (or anyway not necessarily) its patrons, who seem in 
fact rather thoroughly to enjoy it - emerges. The slaughter in the 
cock ring is not a depiction of how things literally are among men, 
but, what is almost worse, of how, from a particular angle, they 
imaginatively are. (Geertz, 1972, p. 446) 
The Universal Salvation rites, however, do more than display dis-
quietfulness. For the moment, at least , the ritual relieves people's 
anxiety. The Universal Salvation rites not only let people know how 
it feels to be alone, abandoned and hungry, but they promise relief. 
This evidence suggests that some Taiwanese have now carried the 
'beggar' metaphor to an extreme, seeing themselves, at least poten-
tially, as abandoned beggars. This interpretation rests on a contrast 
between comfortable, cared-for ancestors, and miserable, aban-
doned ghosts. In other contexts, however, the contrast between gods 
and ghosts leads to a very different pragmatic interpretation of the 
ghost-feeding ritual. 
Bandits and Marginal Gods 
Considerable evidence also supports the more standard position that 
ghosts are like bandits - violent and dangerous outsiders who are 
marginal to the social and political system. People observe a number 
of precautions against ghostly malevolence in the seventh month. 
First, they put off felicitous ceremonies like weddings until a safer 
date. Second, po un (Repair of Fate) ceremonies are cancelled. 
Taoists normally offer this ceremony every morning at the Co Su 
Kong temple for people with minor problems. Finally, although some 
people hesitate to use the word at any time, everyone (even Kiu 
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Kiong Kiou's only college graduate) tries to avoid saying the word 
kui ('ghosts') during the seventh month. The word has insulting 
connotations: troublesome children are 'little ghosts' , drunks are 
'alcohol ghosts' , and foreigners in some parts of China are 'foreign 
ghosts (devils)' . Ghosts hearing themselves called kui might take 
offense, so people usually substitute the euphemism hou hia: ti ('good 
brothers') . Ghosts can be dangerous creatures: malicious ghosts will 
make people sick, drowned ghosts will pull new victims into the water 
to take their place, and disfigured ghosts are simply terrifying. Sanxia 
seems to have a lot of headless ghosts - men whose arms cradle their 
own bleeding heads, lopped off by the non-Chinese aboriginal popu-
lation of Taiwan in nineteenth-century raids. 
A performance at the end of the Universal Salvation rite - an 
exorcism by the legendary demon-killer Zhong Kui - also indicates 
the ghosts' malevolent aspect (see Plate 3.1). Zhong Kui is portrayed 
by an opera actor in dramatic black and white make-up. He begins by 
setting out a row of bowls, each containing a little pork, by the side of 
the temple. Then, accompanied by two musicians and carrying a 
<;word, he begins the ritual by reading a document announcing his 
purposes . He then takes up a big stack of lit incense stiCks and hurls 
them over the bowls of meat. This is followed by emptying a bottle of 
rice wine over them, all done in a flamboyant and operatic style . He 
then uses a duck to write magical charms in the air (thiek aq); the 
word for duck is a pun on a word meaning to control demons. An 
assistant mean-while lights two large stacks of paper money on either 
side of Zhong Kui. Zhong Kui takes up a rolled-up bamboo mat and , 
lighting both ends, waves it around like a cudgel. The document that 
was read at the beginning of the ceremony is then burnt in the flames 
and the ceremony is over. The ritual is typical of Chinese exorcisms 
(see Chiu, 1978; Keupers, 1977). In spite of its dramatic appeal, very 
few people watch this ceremony. They fear attacks by the malignant 
ghosts that the ceremony aims to exorcise. 
Ghosts are also malevolent outside the seventh month. Offended 
ghosts, for example , may make people sick. Priests exorcise them by 
expelling them from the community and preventing them from re-
entering. They use techniques similar to the methods for dispelling 
inhuman demons, like the fire spirit, from the community. Ghosts are 
social outsiders in these rituals, marginal to the world of gods and 
politics, but irrelevant to kinship (Jordan, 1972, p. 128-33). 
The place of worship and the use of incense also show ghosts to be 
outside the orthodox political structure. Gods and ancestors are 
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usually worshipped inside a house or temple; ghosts are fed outside 
the door. On Co Su Kong's birthday, for instance, the people of 
Sanxia all worship together at his temple. The organization into 
seven shares defined by surname unites Sanxia (the administrative 
unit governed by Co Su Kong as magistrate) on this day by cross-
cutting internal geographic divisions. The surname groupings play 
down more salient social differences among geographical areas. 
During the ghost-feeding festival, however, organization by village 
instead stresses the area's more salient internal divisions. The use of 
several different altars, none of which are at the temple (in contrast 
to a unified altar at the temple for the birthday festival) splits up the 
geographic subdivisions of Sanxia. They may even be finer divisions 
within each of the four great pillars, as when the people of Tiong Pho 
all put their offerings at the front of Zhongpu's altar table, and those 
from Kiu Kiong Kiou all used the back. Gods, like governments, 
unite communities, just as ancestors unite families. Ghosts, however, 
are outside this structure - they unify nothing, and this is shown by 
the way they are worshipped. 
The use of incense at the Universal Salvation festival splits the 
offerings up even more finely. Instead of being united in a single 
incense pot, like the offerings for gods or ancestors, each stick of 
incense marks each individual offering (see Plate 3.2). Again, this 
custom stresses the divisive properties of ghosts as opposed to gods 
and ancestors. It serves, along with the use of red flags identifying the 
donor of each dish of food, to break the community down beyond the 
level of the neighborhood to the level of individuals. Ghosts, like 
bandits, can thus be seen as threats to orthodox political and kinship 
struct1,1res. 
The lowest levels of the supernatural bureaucracy are often very 
ghostly. They are often evil doers who now faithfully serve the god 
that vanquished them. Others, like many of the ghosts of the seventh 
month, are the souls of good people who died by violence. These 
spirits are the equivalent of the yamen runners - corrupt and un-
reliable employees who were the most direct link between a magis-
trate and the people of his district . They are at the margins of 
respectable politics, and at the margins of the supernatural hierarchy; 
ghostly spirits are thus fitting players for the part. Gods who parade 
through their territories on a festival day (following the model of a 
magistrate's tour), for example, often bring along such assistants in 
the guise of humans in costume. The most popular pair in Sanxia are 
Pueq Ia (Grandfather Eight), a squat black figure whose eyes roll as 
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he walks, and Chit Ia (Grandfather Seven), a very tall white figure 
with a lolling red tongue (see Plate 3.3). During their lifetimes, the 
pair were yamen runners known for their loyalty to each other. One 
day they had an appointment to meet each other. Short Grandfather 
Eight arrived first, but Grandfather Seven was delayed . Just at that 
time, there was a huge rainstorm and a flood, drowning Grandfather 
Eight (and turning him black) . Grandfather Seven finally arrived and 
found the body of his friend. He was overcome with guilt- he was so 
tall, he could have saved his friend if only he had arrived on time. He 
hung himself in remorse (and thus has a lolling tongue). As a suicide 
and a drowning victim, they are standard ghosts. Their loyalty got 
them into the godly bureaucracy, but only at the lowest, most 
ambiguous level. 
The troops of the gods never appear as clearly as Grandfathers 
Seven and Eight. They are even more marginal to the bureaucracy; 
like traditional armies, they may protect an area, but they may also 
devastate it, especially if not properly propitiated. Just as the line 
between bandits and armies was not always easy to draw in tradi-
tional times, the line between ghosts and godly troops is not always 
easy to draw in the religion. People worship the troops as part of the 
offerings on the first and fifteenth (or second and sixteenth for 
businessmen) of every lunar month. They burn the gold spirit money 
appropriate to low gods (kua kim and hok kim), but the offerings 
resemble offerings to the ghosts: meat for the troops is always placed 
outside the front door, it is cut up, and it is served with cooked rice. 
In fact , a few people say that this offering is really for the ghosts. 
Ghosts in this context are thus marginal to the gods and to the 
orthodox political system. 
I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter how iu ieng kong 
temples also show the permeability of the god/ghost contrast. The 
amoral ghosts in these temples may gradually become gods if they 
successfully grant all requests. Prostitutes and gamblers frequent 
these temples because ghostly deities will grant any request; they are 
not yet bound by the morality of the gods. These temples sometimes 
evolve into full-fledged god temples, just as bandit chiefs may tradi-
tionally sometimes have become local gentry. One of these temples 
in Sanxia was renovated during my stay there (see Plate 3.4). A 
well-known gambler initiated the work and made the largest contri-
bution. His generosity did not simply thank the ghosts; it also 
represented an attempt to establish legitimacy in the community. 
I have tried to stress how the pragmatics of popular religion in 
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Taiwan move us outside a structure of contrasts into interpretations 
within a social context. The rebuilding of this ghost temple is another 
example of how the particular situation - the social maneuv-
ers of a gambler looking for respectability - influenced the specific 
realization of ghosts on that occasion. Yet the structure of contrasts 
remains important to such interpretations. One woman who attended 
the celebration for the new temple showed the importance of one of 
these symbolic contrasts very clearly. She was confused about 
whether she should offer one stick of incense or two sticks. One stick 
(or three sticks to be more respectful) is appropriate for the gods, two 
sticks are for the dead . The meaning of these ghosts for her could not 
come solely out of this specific social situation; it had to be supple-
mented by placement into a set of structural contrasts for ancestors, 
gods and ghosts. She asked her friends what to do, and after discus-
sion, decided to burn a single stick of incense, appropriate for a ghost 
becoming a god, or a gambler becoming respectable. The structure of 
offerings is always relevant to the interpretation of ghosts, but it is 
. never sufficient. 
From Bandit to Beggar 
Ritual offerings and people's general ideas identify two readings of 
ghosts: a dangerous political marginality. and a pitiful kinship mar-
ginality. Both intertwine, and both are present whenever people 
worship ghosts . The ritual offerings that encode these two types of 
marginality have not changed in the last century, and yet actual 
performances of the Universal Salvation rites have changed a great 
deal. These two types of marginality, and their associated ritual 
codes, thus form the backdrop for any discussion of the meaning of 
ghost worship, but they are not sufficient by themselves to explain the 
changes that have taken place. The ease with which pragmatic 
interpretations of ghosts have changed has helped prevent them from 
becoming even as ideologized an ancestors and gods. 
Popular performances of the Universal Salvation festival divide 
roughly into two periods. The period from 1860 to about 1945 saw the 
rise and fall of violent performances that emphasized political mar-
ginality and the bandit metaphor. The period after the Second World 
War has seen a resurgence of the festival, except" for a few short 
periods of government repression. Violent performances of the festi-
val no longer occur in the modern period; the pitiful beggar metaphor 
has replaced the bandit metaphor. 
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Violent Ghosts, 1860-1945 
Changes in the popular performance of the Universal Salvation 
festival occurred primarily in the most violent part of the ceremony-
robbing the lonely ghosts ( chiu: ko, sometimes also translated as 
'pillaging the scaffolding'). Except for simply bringing food offerings, 
this was the only part of the ceremony in which people directly took 
part. This part of the festival reached its peak of popularity and 
violence in northern Taiwan in the last half of the nineteenth century. 
A nineteenth-century Presbyterian missionary provides one of the 
fullest descriptions: 
The most elaborate and hideous scene I ever witnessed was the 
'Seven Moon Feast' . . . The custom prevailed in all the cities and 
towns in north Formosa of erecting, in an open space of several 
acres, great cone-like structures of bamboo poles, from five to ten 
feet in diameter at the base, and sometimes fifty or sixty feet high. 
Around these cones, from bottom to top, immense quantities of 
food, offered to the spirits, were tied in rows . .. Meanwhile a 
very unspiritual mob - thousands and thousands of hungry beg-
gars, tramps, blacklegs, desperadoes of all sorts, from the country 
towns, the city slums, or venturing under cover of night from their 
hiding-places among the hills - surged and swelled in every part of 
the open space .. . At length the spirits were satisfied, and the 
gong was sounded once more. That was the signal for the mob; and 
scarcely had the first stroke fallen when that whole scene was one 
mass of arms and legs and tongues. Screaming, cursing, howling, 
like demons of the pit, they all joined in the onset . .. In one wild 
scramble, groaning and yelling all the while, trampling on those 
who had lost their footing or were smothered by the falling cones, 
fighting and tearing one another like mad dogs, they all made for 
the coveted food. It was a very bedlam, and the wildness of the 
scene was enhanced by the irregular explosion of firecrackers and 
the death-groan of someone worsted in the fray. (Mackay, 1895, 
pp. 129-31) 
A contemporary gazetteer warns that, 'With the sound of a gong, 
the masses begin to battle; this is called "robbing the lonely ghosts." 
All civil and military officials must travel to the area to repress it' 
(DSTZ, p. 460). The situation was so difficult for local magistrates 
that Liu Ming-chuan, the first Chinese governor of Taiwan, made 
robbing the lonely ghosts illegal in 1889 (TWSZ, 12, p. 18). The new 
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law had little immediate effect, however, and performances of the 
ritual continued well into the Japanese occupation of 1895-1945. 
Robbing the lonely ghosts began to occur less often under the 
Japanese, but when it was performed, it retained its violent flavor. A 
Japanese anthropologist describes performances he saw in northern 
Taiwan in the 1920s: 
On the day for the chiu: ko, they first set up a ko pi: about three 
meters wide and twenty meters high. The poles for this must be at 
least five centimeters in diameter, for the top will be completely 
covered with offerings. A 'storehouse' platform was set about six 
or seven meters up the ko pi:. On it, the offerings were piled up 
like a mountain, with pork, chicken and duck hanging down, and 
at its very top, a red flag was inserted. Because chiu: ko is a 
dangerous affair, policemen were sent to maintain order .. . The 
chiu: ko took place at 6.30 p.m., and the start was signaled by a 
puff of smoke, when everyone began their enthusiastic plunder. 
The sounds of assault and murder pierced heaven ... At least 
thirty or forty thousand watched or participated in the chiu: ko, all 
forming a chaotic mass. As soon as the time arrived and the smoke 
was released, hordes of people began to climb the ko pi:, each 
anxious to stay ahead of the others . In the blink of an eye, the 
three flags had been taken. By this time, the ko pi: was filled with 
people, each enthusiastically stealing the offerings, pushing and 
screaming, and robbing each other. Some people were thus pushed 
down the platform. They say that with the ghosts' protection they 
will not be hurt, but in fact large numbers are always hurt and killed. 
(Suzuki, 1978[1934], p. 473) 
Other sources from the early twentieth century also described the 
violence of the ceremony (e.g., Shikagane, 1902), although there was 
general agreement that fewer communities performed this part of the 
ceremony as the twentieth century wore on (TWSZ, 12, pp. 18-19) . 
After about 1930, robbing the lonely ghosts is rarely mentioned as a 
living custom, although the Universal Salvation festival continued. 
Descriptions of the festival from most other areas in China do not 
mention the violent robbing of the lonely ghosts, nor did early 
descriptions from Taiwan describe a violent ceremony. The Taiwan 
Prefecture Gazetteer (TWFZ, p. 618) mentioned only setting minia-
ture rafts out to sea in the eighteenth century; each raft contained a 
Mexican silver dollar, and fishermen in their boats tried to collect the 
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rafts to gain good luck for the coming year. There was no mention of 
violence or of a lonely ghost platform, and the compiler of the 
gazetteer avoided the condemnations of the ceremony that typified 
late nineteenth-century descriptions. 
The large scale and the violence of the ceremony appeared only in 
later nineteenth-century descriptions from Taiwan (primarily north-
ern Taiwan) and from Amoy, the highly commercialized treaty port 
on the mainland that was a point of embarkation for many Taiwanese 
immigrants and a point of transfer for Taiwanese goods headed to 
foreign markets (DeGroot, 1885, pp. 8~91; 1886, pp. 403-35). 
Descriptions from other times and other places paint a much more 
placid picture of the ceremonies, in which people give alms to the 
miserable ghosts , and often also to real beggars. Hunger and alms, 
not violence and propitiation, form the basis of the ceremony. 
Why did this period between about 1860 and 1945 in northern 
Taiwan see so many violent performances of the ritual, which did not 
characterize earlier performances, and which disappeared again in 
later periods? The answer does not lie within the symbolic structure 
of the ritual itself, which continued to use the same types of food 
offerings, the same kinds of spirit money, and the same number of 
sticks of incense. The change occurred instead because, beginning 
around 1860, a rapid commercialization of the economy, and the 
uprooting of the labor force shaped new pragmatic interpretations. 
These developments relied on access to new world markets for 
Taiwanese rice, tea and camphor.30 
In the late nineteenth century northern Taiwan commercialized 
rapidly. In rice agriculture, for example , the sale prices of usufruct 
rights tripled between 1850 and 1900, shorter leases and more fre-
quent changes of tenant developed as competition for land increased, 
and the deposits required to gain cultivation rights increased as 
landlords felt an increasingly pressing need for cash (Wickberg, 1981, 
pp. 21~21). 
New foreign markets for tea and camphor were even more import-
ant than rice in northern Taiwan, however. The United States be-
came a major buyer of Formosa Oolong tea in the last half of the 
nineteenth century. As the new market opened up, Chinese in the 
foothills of northern Taiwan began to cultivate and process tea on a 
large scale . The many small tea farms created new demands for 
labor. Experienced tea workers from areas in Fujian Province , es-
pecially from Anxi County (the place of origin for most of Sanxia's 
population) flowed into the area. Tea required tedious, labor-
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intensive harvesting, after which it underwent several stages of pro-
cessing, some in the countryside, and some in the commercial centers 
of Taibei. Processing demanded wage labor, and picking and sorting 
the tea required especially large new inputs of labor. Davidson (1903, 
p. 385) reports that 12,000 girls were brought to Taibei from the 
countryside seasonally to work as tea sorters. Lin (1976, p. 3) 
estimates that 300,000 workers were employed in the tea industry in 
an average year during this period. Tea thus helped to commercialize 
the economy in northern Taiwan by bringing in an immigrant labor 
force , by creating a new class of wage laborers, and by involving 
much of the population in the world market for tea. 
The third major commercial product in northern Taiwan was 
camphor. It involved fewer workers than the other commodities, but 
it had extensive social consequences. Camphor trees grow in the 
northern and central depths of the massive mountain range that 
dominates Taiwan. Merchants in the late nineteenth century hired 
workers to build camphor stills up in the mountains, where they 
felled trees and gradually fed them into the stills. Merchants sent 
expeditions up into the mountains to collect the product and trans-
port it to the coastal markets from which it was shipped abroad. 
Camphor was a government monopoly for much of the late nine-
teenth century, but government control was too weak to prevent 
large-scale smuggling (Davidson, 1903, p. 402). Qing registration of 
camphor stills was spotty at best, and the most useful statistics come 
from Japanese registration of stills in 1899 (Davidson, 1903, p. 415). 
At that time, the Japanese were discouraging camphor production by 
keeping the price artificially low, in order to stimulate the camphor 
industry in Japan. As a result, the number of stills in 1899 was 
considerably lower than it had been earlier. In addition, some stills 
surely went unregistered. There were 2057 registered stills (241 in 
Sanxia) in 1899, almost all of them in the mountains of northern 
Taiwan. 
Although the total number of camphor workers, even in earlier 
years, did not rival the tea industry, the camphor industry was 
politically important. So-called 'raw' aborigines inhabited the cam-
phor forests of Taiwan's mountains. They had always met the Chi-
nese with violence, and their attacks on the Chinese became more 
frequent and vehement as their home territory was directly invaded. 
The late nineteenth century saw a major escalation of violence in 
northern Taiwan, as the Chinese met the aborigines with armed 
vigilantes of their own. These miniature armies help explain the 
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success of smugglers, and also the frequency of battles between 
different Chinese ethnic groups in the camphor fields (e.g., Wang, 
1976). Camphor work was dangerous, and it attracted young men 
without strong ties to home or family. Camphor helped to commer-
cialize the economy by creating a second wage labor force and 
another group of people tied to the world market through the 
commodities they produced. Politically, it helped to reinforce local 
armed forces independent of the government. Sanxia's close ties 
to the camphor industry may help to explain why the missionary 
Mackay (1895, p. 159) described it as 'the most lawless region in 
north Formosa', where the townspeople sometimes conspired to 
protect 'a large band of ruffians and highwaymen' from official 
interference. 
The political economy of late nineteenth-century northern Taiwan 
was thus shaped by an influx of new workers, by increasing commer-
cialization, land scarcity and dependence on world markets, and by 
weak state power with extensive reliance on unofficial power. The 
new political economy cut off a large, new population from tradi-
tional ties to agricultural communities, and thrust them into an 
uncertain labor market. The state remained weak, and these people 
found themselves outside orthodox political and community controls. 
The Japanese occupation of Taiwan brought important political 
changes. The most striking change was a general pacification of the 
countryside; the Japanese ended feuding among the Chinese, and 
after a few years they also ended battles between Chinese and 
aborigines. At the same time, changes in world demand for northern 
Taiwan's commodities altered some features of the economy. The tea 
boom decreased after the turn of the century, and the camphor 
market collapsed entirely with the invention of man-made substi-
tutes. Coal became a major commodity, and the economy continued 
to commercialize slowly in the first few decades of Japanese rule. Yet 
the upheavals in the labor force, and the existence of a marginal 
group largely uncontrolled by the government, ended in the twen-
tieth century with the introduction of a strong state and a routinely 
commercial economy. There was a steady improvement in the stan-
dard of living, but there were few major social changes until the 
1930s, when Japan began to prepare for war, and when the changes 
the Japanese had made in Taiwanese education and infrastructure 
began to have a major effect (Wickberg, 1981, pp. 231-2). 
The period after about 1930 saw major social transformations in 
Taiwan. The transportation and education systems that the Japanese 
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had constructed began to bear fruit as the first generation of gradu-
ates from a system of modern education emerged, and as new 
industries and new techniques were able to move to a pacified, 
accessible countryside. At the same time, the Japanese were gearing 
up for the war, and they began to encourage industrial production in 
Taiwan. There was a technological revolution in agriculture, the coal 
industry took off, and industrial employment became a widespread 
alternative to farm work. Per capita income and household consump-
tion rose more rapidly than they had in the preceding decades (Wolf 
and Huang, 1980, pp. 45-59). Although the years of the Second 
World War were difficult in Taiwan, the social changes of the period 
set the stage for the increasing prosperity and industrialization of 
modern Taiwan. 
This background in the political and economic changes between 
1860 and 1945 clarifies why violent expressions of the Universal 
Salvation rites waxed and waned during this period. The 'blacklegs 
and desperadoes' who robbed the lonely ghosts in the late nineteenth 
century probably came primarily from the new class of wage laborers. 
These people saw themselves as marginal to the settled communities. 
Like the politically marginal ghosts, they were not under orthodox 
political control, they were dangerous in their own right , and they 
required propitiation. Community temples took responsibility for 
warding off these ghostly people . Local elites generally controlled 
large community temples, and the temples sometimes served as 
centers of secular political organization. Sanxia's temple to Co Su 
Kong, for example, organized local resistance to the Japanese occu-
pation of Taiwan (see Wang, 1967). The Universal Salvation festival 
emphasized this political role of the local temple. In propitiating 
politically marginal ghosts at the Universal Salvation, a local temple 
arrogated to itself the functions of the government: it collected a tax 
through elected officials to raise 'protection money' that could protect 
the community from marginal elements beyond that community's politi-
cal control. 
The political and economic conditions of the late nineteenth cen-
tury thus conditioned the unusually large and violent performances of 
the Universal Salvation festival in northern Taiwan. Temples and 
local elites wielded authority with some independence from the weak 
state, while new, and sometimes dangerous, economic opportunities 
created a class of politically marginal wage laborers . Violent per-
formances of the festival allowed local elites and their communities to 
propitiate this new marginal class, even as the new class acted out its 
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ghostly condition in this annual riot. The local communities made no 
claim to control the marginal population, but only to soothe it 
enough to protect themselves. 
Violent performances of the festival decreased under the Japanese, 
and apparently ended by about 1930. Violent performances ended 
for two reasons: the political economy that fostered the violence 
changed, and the Japanese attempted to repress the festival. The 
more important reason was the change in political and economic 
conditions. The camphor industry and its associated violence died 
out. Other aspects of commercialization became routinized, and 
wage laborers no longer formed a marginal group. By 1930, Taiwan 
had been transformed from an agricultural frontier in the throes of 
commercialization, into an economy with a modern industrial foot-
ing. Violent performances of the Universal Salvation festival were 
pragmatic realizations of this transformation. The politically mar-
ginal population of the late nineteenth century took the role of 
bandit-ghosts; no longer marginal by the 1930s, they no longer added 
their violent near-riots at the end of the Universal Salvation festival. 
Structural expressions of ghosts in ritual media had not changed, but 
pragmatic interpretations had. 
The secondary reason encouraging the demise of 'robbing the 
lonely ghosts' was that the Japanese government discouraged the 
festival more effectively than had the traditional Chinese govern-
ment. Yet the Japanese repression was neither systematic nor long-
term. It peaked in the 1890s, when the Japanese burnt down many 
temples (including Sanxia's temple to Co Su Kong) in retribution for 
harassment of Japanese troops. It peaked again after 1937. when the 
Japanese invaded the Chinese mainland. The government backed off 
fairly quickly in both cases, and it never succeeded in ending the 
Universal Salvation festival. The repression did, however, lead to an 
odd variation on robbing the lonely ghosts. Under the Japanese the 
ceremony sometimes took the form of an athletic or agricultural 
competition. In the early days of the Japanese occupation, for exam-
ple, the people who robbed the lonely ghosts in some performances 
were no longer a crowd of rowdies, but had been organized into 
village teams that competed to seize valuable prizes among the 
offerings (Yao and Kaye, 1976, informant statements in Sanxia). 
These village teams are symbolic nonsense: if ghosts are marginal, 
individual outsiders according to the ritual offerings, organized vil-
lage teams should not be able to replace them in the festival. The 
substitution makes more sense, however, as part of a general strategy 
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that local temples used to maintain control over their rituals in the 
face of government opposition . Competitions to raise the most obese 
pig for the gods apparently began in the Japanese period as a way to 
legitimize food offerings as agricultural competition ( Sangren, 1979, 
p. 131). At least one temple used the same strategy to offer pigs to 
the ghosts when the newly arrived Nationalist government banned 
the festival in 1948 (XSB, 19 September, 1948), and another temple 
tried to revive the robbing of the lonely ghosts in the 1970s by calling 
it a greased pole climbing contest, in which village teams competed 
against each other. Disguising the festival as athletic or agricultural 
competition is one way to maintain it against official pressure . It is 
very similar to the Taiwanese ethnic uses of temple worship dis~ 
cussed in Chapter 2. In this case, it was strategy of local and ethnic 
Chinese defense against the Japanese government. Yet the meta-
phorical substitution of village teams for wild ghosts remained sym-
bolic nonsense, at odds with the ideologized contrast of ghosts with 
gods and ancestors , which stresses ghosts as marginal, anomie beings, 
not village communities. Team competition thus remained a rela-
tively unpopular and short-lived version of the festival. Robbing the 
lonely ghosts had lost its earlier content when the marginal class 
behind the violence became unimportant; it appeared in this altered 
form only occasionally as a means of protest against Japanese govern-
ment interference. Its occurrence makes sense only in relation to the 
political economy, and its relative failure makes sense only in 
relation to the ritual codes that contrast ghosts with gods and ances-
tors. 
Pitiful Ghosts, 1945-1980 
Popular religion suffered during the Second World War, and during 
the first years of Nationalist rule, while the new government was 
involved with the civil war on the mainland and with creating a strong 
base of control in Taiwan. By 1950, however, the Universal Salvation 
festival was again widespread in Taiwan. There was no more robbing 
of the lonely ghosts, but the rest of the festival remained one of the 
most important annual events everywhere on the island. The last 
three decades have brought an increasing interest and increasing 
investment in popular religion of all kinds. Many new temples have 
been built, and many old ones have been refurbished at great ex-
pense. Festivals like the Universal Salvation rites or a god's birthday 
are opportunities for the wealthy to invest in the local community. 
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The investment is public, as most temples post the names and 
contributions of their patrons at the ritual for their god's birthday. 
The ritual texts and ritual offerings for the Universal Salvation rites 
are unchanged. The old robbing of the lonely ghosts, however, has 
been transformed. At the end of the modern ceremony, the chief 
priest tosses into the air a series of buns, candies and grains of rice, 
symbolically feeding the ghosts. A crowd of children and old people 
stand in front of the altar, pushing and shoving to catch the thrown 
food. The crowd may be large and enthusiastic on some occasions, 
but it never matches the violence of earlier times. One ceremony I 
witnessed at a small Buddhist temple, for example, drew a crowd of 
well-dressed, prim, middle-class old ladies who were regular devo-
tees of the temple. As the priest prepared to throw the buns to the 
ghosts, this very proper crowd suddenly got unruly. They clambered 
over each other to catch the buns, and finally mobbed the altar, 
snatching buns out from in front of the priest even before he threw 
them. My tape recorder was an early casualty, and it was soon 
followed by the drums. The entire ceremony had to stop while the 
drummer pulled himself and his drums back together. A final plate of 
offerings is supposed to be saved for distribution to special devotees 
of the temple after the ceremony. The rampaging ladies, however, 
immediately swamped the young nun who was trying to carry these 
buns to a back room, and the platter was empty well before she 
reached safety. The behavior of these women looked to me exactly 
like their descriptions of what the ghosts were doing at the same time: 
pushing and shoving, twisting and turning, trying desperately to 
snatch some scrap of food to ease their ravenous hunger. These 
middle-class old women have replaced the earlier 'bandits and des-
peradoes' as metaphorical ghosts (although they would never discuss 
it this way for reasons I outlined at the beginning of this chapter). 
What caused this change in the realization of the ceremony? 
These informants play down the violent threat of ghosts. While late 
nineteenth-century statements emphasized the need to propitiate 
ghosts. the modern informant statements I discussed earlier empha-
size instead the pitifulness of ghosts. This change in the realization of 
ghosts at the Universal Salvation festival did not require a change in 
the symbolic structure of the ceremony. The ritual offerings that code 
ghosts have the potential for either the political/dangerous or 
the kinship/pitiful reading. The pragmatic interpretation of that code 
has changed because there is no longer a class of politically marginal 
camphor workers or uprooted tea laborers. and they have been 
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replaced by a new group that is marginal in a different way- the old. 
The major social changes that occurred in Taiwan after about 1930 
had an important effect on old people. Some of the most useful 
information on this problem comes from Margery Wolf's (1975) 
discussion of changing suicide rates. In 1905, according to Wolf's 
analysis of Japanese household records, suicide rates for women in 
their early twenties were extremely high (57.4 per 100,000). At that 
time, the rate dropped off sharply for older women until it rose 
again for women in their sixties (to about 20 per 100,000). By 1935, 
however, there had been a dramatic change. The rate for women in 
their sixties is nearly double the rate for women in their twenties by 
this time. The suicide rates for old men also increase sharply between 
these two dates, although there is no corresponding change in the 
rates for young men. Wolf, concerned primarily with female suicides, 
attributes the change to developments in family structure: 
In generations past an emotional tie between husband and wife 
came later in life, if at all, and was not expected in the young 
strangers who were married at their parents' convenience. A young 
wife who enters as her husband's choice has emotional and sexual 
advantages over her mother-in-law from the outset. When the 
apparently inevitable conflicts arise between mother-in-law and 
daughter-in-law and the son intervenes on his wife's behalf, the 
effect on the older woman is stunning. All the old anxieties about 
physical welfare in her now near old age return . Even worse, all 
the years of struggle and sacrifice seem to be negated, lost to the 
wiles of an ignorant young woman. In despair over her powerless-
ness or in a fit of revengeful fury at her fickle son, the aging mother 
contemplates, threatens, and in some cases commits suicide. (Wolf, 
1975 , p. 127) 
This period also coincides with what Arthur Wolf and Chieh-shan 
Huang (1980, pp. 193--201) have called the 'revolt of the young' in 
Taiwan - when young people began to refuse child betrothals. and 
parents began to lose their total authority over a child's marriage. 
Not only have changing marriage patterns weakened the position of 
the old in Taiwan, but new wage-earning opportunities for both 
young men and women have further increased their independence 
from their parents. 31 As a result, the old are losing the control they 
once exercised, and clearly realize their vulnerability. 
The only suicide I was aware of while in Sanxia occurred. appropri-
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ately, on the fifteenth of the seventh month. An old woman, who had 
been upset with her unfilial son and daughter-in-law for a long time, 
quarelled with her daughter-in-law on the morning of the fifteenth. 
The immediate cause was the girl's refusal to bother worshipping the 
ghosts. After an argument, the old woman drowned herself in the 
Sanxia River. 
Kinship marginality has thus replaced political marginality in the 
Universal Salvation rites, because an increasingly insecure elderly 
population has replaced the commercialized population, which is no 
longer insecure, as the main metaphorical reference for ghosts. The 
structure of the ritual codes for ghosts has not changed over this 
period, nor has it had to change. The ritual and its offerings. ab-
stracted from any particular political and economic context, allow 
equally for either type of marginality. The ritual offerings code a very 
general, adaptable and easily ideologized structure of kinsmen/ 
bureaucrats/outsiders. People have not changed these offerings be-
cause they continue to make sense of experience. Yet the meaning of 
ghosts is not entirely contained in the symbolic structure; it has 
shifted pragmatically with changing political and economic experi-
ence. 
Popular Religion and Pragmatic Interpretation 
This chapter and the preceding one have clarified how ghosts tie 
partly into an abstract symbolic structure in which they contrast with 
both gods and ancestors. Attempts to define ghosts in ways that 
conflict with that structure have proved short-lived at best. Thus the 
popular substitution of village teams to rob the lonely ghosts could 
never be more than a temporary feint directed against the Japanese; 
ghosts are marginal outsiders according to the ritual offerings - they 
cannot be village communities. 
Yet the interpretation of ghosts goes far beyond a set of ritual 
contrasts or a symbolic code. Those contrasts have not changed over 
the years, but the interpretations of today differ from those of the late 
nineteenth century. The move from dangerous political ghosts to 
pitiful kinship ghosts occurred because the marginal group in the 
population underwent a parallel change . The uprooted workers of 
the last century have become the insecure old of today. A change in 
the political economy of Taiwan has changed the daily experiences 
that inspire specific interpretations of the Universal Salvation rites. 
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These interpretations never precipitated into an explicit ideology, 
and there has never been any social mechanism to separate orthodox 
interpretations from heterodoxy, or to propagate 'correct' beliefs. 
The meeting at Sanxia's community temple (discussed in the preced-
ing chapter) illustrates that even local popular temples did not have 
this authority; they had no mechanism with which to require people 
to bring certain offerings. 
There is thus no explicit, self-conscious, institutionally propagated 
interpretation of ghosts. The structure of ritual offerings is the closest 
thing to such an explicit system of meanings, but it is open to various 
interpretations. There is, in other words, no very developed religious 
ideology that includes ghosts. Buddhists and Taoists do maintain 
such ideologies (Chapter 4), but they make little attempt to convince 
outsiders of them. Local temples provide institutional sponsorship of 
the ceremonies, but they cannot control popular interpretations and 
actions. In the absence of some socially organized ideology that could 
impose an abstract interpretation of ghosts, people are free to inter-
pret and reinterpret ghosts in light of political and economic experi-
ence. People make their interpretations out of experience within the 
structural framework of gods, ghosts and ancestors; they do not 
simply act out established systems of meaning. 
The preceding chapter showed much the same relationship be-
tween symbolic structure and ties to social context and political 
economy. The domestic cult, for example, reflects and supports the 
important position of the family, and it affirms the need for filial 
behavior even after the death of a parent. Within this framework, 
however, popular religion ties to specific social relations that some-
times contradict the ideals of family solidarity and filial piety: it shows 
distinctions of wealth in domestic altars and ancestor tablets, frater-
nal competition in geomancy, affinal tensions in weddings, and so on. 
The god cult idealizes the importance of community solidarity, and 
above all, the naturalness of control by a bureaucratically organized 
government . Yet worship of gods can also provide a flexible indicator 
of economic position, of local opposition to central authority, of 
ethnic tensions, and of personal political ambition. The abstract 
structure of ancestors/gods/ghosts sets the parameters for specific 
realizations of the popular tradition, but it remains open to new 
interpretations as social relations change. 
Many features of ghosts appear only in the seventh month; they are 
not carried over into the rest of the year. Ghosts outside the seventh 
month are generally social aberrations who pose a violent threat to 
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the living. No taxes are collected outside the seventh month and 
there is no analogy with care for the poor; no food is thrown and 
there is no connection to the loneliness of old age. Ghosts outside the 
seventh month are propitiated, not pitied. Ghosts in these contexts 
are often identifiable individuals who bring attention to themselves 
by causing sickness or misfortune. They differ from the nameless 
mass of suffering dead worshipped at the Universal Salvation rites. 
Time of year thus provides another context for varying interpreta-
tions of ghosts. 
The location of the soul after death poses a similar problem of 
context and structure. The popular tradition represents the soul as 
residing permanently in the grave in some contexts, in the ancestral 
tablet in other contexts, in the underworld in others, in a reincar-
nated form in still others, and so on. This apparent inconsistency 
could be resolved with a concept of multiple souls, but none of my 
non-specialist informants ever suggested such a concept. The soul is 
not precipitated out of the particular contexts in which people deal 
with souls. Religious experts, however, do generalize across contexts 
to create an ideologized interpretation. Taoists solve the problem 
with an explicit multiple soul concept, and Buddhists solve it by 
pinpointing the exact location of the soul. 
Harrell concludes in his analysis of the soul concept in Taiwan that , 
'the perspective of the Confucian and Taoist traditions is analytical: 
reality must be explained. The perspective of folk religion, in con-
trast, is fundamentally active; believers experience religious reality 
directly through purposely behavior, especially ritual' (1979, p. 520). 
The following chapter shows how the pragmatic interpretation of 
ghosts in the popular religion is less relevant to the analytic concerns 
of religious specialists. 
The specific set of social relations at a given time influences how 
the abstract structure ancestors/gods/ghosts is realized. The symbolic 
structure itself is not at all irrelevant. Ritual media like incense , food 
offerings, spirit money, and place of worship clearly code the relation 
between ancestors and kin , gods and bureaucrats, and ghosts and 
outsiders; many informants can also articulate them clearly. In worship-
ping at Sanxia's temple to Co Su Kong, for example, the bureau-
cratic analogy is obvious in informant statements, in how people 
address the god, and in the iconography of the temple. I have dis-
cussed how it can also tie pragmatically into Anxi origin, or local 
solidarity against the central government, or Taiwanese ethnic identity. 
Yet these relations to context are much less explicit and ideologized 
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that the structural features . There are no symbols in the temple 
that show the Anxi origins of the god's followers , or Taiwanese 
solidarity. 
Tlie symbolic contrasts that code ancestors/gods/ghosts are thus 
more ideologized than the pragmatic features of the popular religion . 
They are defined through a set of structural, context-free contrasts, 
and they are more readily explicit than the contextual features . The 
ancestors:kin ; gods: bureaucrats; ghosts:outsiders interpretation is 
difficult to call an ideology proper; the Buddhist, Taoist and official 
beliefs that I discuss in the following chapters are much more com-
plete ideologies - elaborately structured and thoroughly explicit. 
Yet the ancestors/kin; gods/bureaucrats; ghosts/outsiders interpre-
tation remains the most ideologized part of the popular religion. 
Why? For one thing, this three-way model of the social world is a 
very simple, general scheme that easily reflects and shapes everyday 
experience. The simple distinction family/government/outsider re-
mains sensible even when social relations change as fast as they have 
in Taiwan. It is easy to abstract out of its particular ritual realizations 
into a general scheme because it is so simple, and so widely appli-
cable. The more pragmatic aspects of popular religion are by defini-
tion more fully tied to specific social relations: they cannot easily be 
generalized, because they change as the situation changes. Thus only 
the most easily generalized relations of ancestors to kinship, gods to 
politics, and ghosts as the residual category become explicit and 
abstractly structured.32 In addition , the three-way scheme is also 
widely shared in Taiwan outside the popular beliefs. Taoists , edu-
cated informants, and the traditional government all shared the 
system. These groups constantly interacted with popular ritual and 
encouraged certain aspects of it. Major local temples, for example, 
are normally controlled by the local elite. They influence the sorts of 
symbolic statements that temples could make. The most idealized 
views of ancestors as forebears of unified patrilineages occur primar-
ily in large lineages, which were also controlled by the elite . Groups 
outside the popular beliefs encouraged symbolic expression of the 
ancestors/gods/ghosts code because it fit the vision of the world they 
wanted to emphasize. We will return to these problems of ideologiza-
tion in more detail , after looking more closely at Buddhist, Taoist 
and elite ideologies of religion in the following chapter. 
The popular beliefs are open to flexible interpretations within the 
basically conservative frame of ancestors, gods and ghosts. They 
never challenge, for example, the primacy of filial behavior, but they 
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can indicate changing family boundaries or variant lineage organiza-
tions. They never challenge the validity of bureaucratic government 
in general, but they can oppose specific bureaucracies or be used for 
personal political manipulation. New interpretations, however, could 
question even this fundamental structure of gods, ancestors, and 
ghosts. No system of beliefs is immune from radically new interpreta-
tions and uses; Protestant reinterpretations of the Bible are an 
obvious example. In the Chinese case, however, these basic assump-
tions of the popular religion were rarely questioned within the 
framework of the religion . Instead, people who questioned such 
fundamental features of their society tended to turn to entirely 
alternative beliefs, especially those related to Buddhism (which I 
include in the following chapter). 
4 Specialist Ghosts 
Both Buddhist and Taoist performances of the Universal Salvation 
rites feature active, concrete beings, similar to those in the popular 
tradition. Yet specialist performances differ from popular interpret-
ations in important ways: they draw heavily on ideologized styles of 
interpretation, and they rely strongly on training people to interpret 
religious texts and the oral traditions that accompany them. This 
chapter will concentrate on how specialist organization of religious 
knowledge differs from the more context-bound interpretations of 
the popular tradition. Although it concentrates on northern Taiwan, 
the analysis should be broadly relevant to all of Taiwan and to late 
imperial China. 
Buddhism first gained strong influence in China in the late Han 
Dynasty (second and third centuries AD). It differed from earlier 
Chinese beliefs in important ways: it renounced the world as a place 
of dust and illusion caught in cycles of reincarnation, it promoted 
withdrawal from ordinary social life as a way of transcending that 
world, it added new worlds of heavens and hells populated by very 
human spirits, and it fostered a celibate (and thus by definition not 
filially pious) clergy. Many of these ideas spread throughout China, 
even as they remained controversial. By the late imperial period, 
Buddhist monasteries - many small and poor, a few large and 
powerful landowners- covered China. The clergy varied widely in its 
skill at Buddhist philosophy, although some went through a complex 
education leading to ordination. Monks and nqns were the main 
bearers of the tradition, and they are the focus of this chapter. There 
were also, however, some lay Buddhists who were at least partially 
educated in Buddhism; in Taiwan they usually join sutra-singing 
groups. 33 
Taoism is indigenous to China, and has a much longer history 
there. The roots of modern Taiwanese Taoism, however, lie less in 
the early philosophers like Laozi and Zhuangzi than in the creation of 
a religious Taoism at the end of the Han. This later Taoism, like 
Buddhism, featured a huge pantheon of gods, which the Taoists 
modelled after the political bureaucracy of the time. Unlike the 
Buddhists, however, the Taoists did not deny the everyday world, 
and advocated living in harmony with the world, not denouncing it. 
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This meant coming to know the world-shaping Dao (path) through 
ritual and meditation. Taoism had a monastic tradition, but priests 
could also be 'fire-dwelling', living at home and raising families. All 
Taoists in Taiwan are fire-dwelling; there was no monastic tradition 
there, and priests wishing ordination went to the mainland. Taoists in 
most of Taiwan divide into 'black-headed priests' (o thau sai kong) 
and 'red-headed priests' (ang thau sai kong). In general, black-
headed priests control more prestigious ritual texts, especially for the 
most important Taoist ritual - the community renewing ciou. They 
also perform funerals. 
Sanxia is exceptional, however, because the only Taoists are red-
headed priests, and they control prestigious ciou texts (but do not 
perform funerals). Sanxia also has so-called black-headed priests who 
perform funerals, but they do not describe themselves as Taoists. 
They use only Buddhist texts, and wear Buddhist robes. People 
sometimes refer to them as Buddhist monks (he-siu:), although they 
have never taken Buddhist vows. The annual Universal Salvation 
rites at Sanxia's temple to Co Su Kong always use Sanxia's version of 
black-headed priests, reading Buddhist texts. 
The structures of Buddhist or Taoist performances of the Universal 
Salvation rites, and even of their ritual texts, are remarkably similar, 
so much so that most laymen consider them identical. Some of the 
the similarities exist because the Taoist ceremony was modelled after 
the Buddhist original (Pang, 1977, pp. 95-6; Yoshioka, 1959, pp. 
369--411). I begin by analyzing the two versions together, although I 
will separate them again below to analyze the underlying differences 
between the two systems. The ritual I describe here is based on 
performances by Sanxia's version of black-headed priests, and differs 
only slightly from the outward performances by both Taoist or more 
strictly Buddhist experts. 
In the Universal Salvation rites the priests supervise construction 
of the outer altar- the long bamboo poles that invite the ghosts to the 
performance (tieng ko), and the various paper houses and god images 
that stand in front of the temple (see Chapter 1). They also construct 
an inner alter within the temple itself. In theory, this altar should 
move the temple's gods from the front of the temple (the position of 
honor) to the back, where they become spectators. The highest 
deities of the specialists replace them at the front altar. In Sanxia, 
however, because the temple is still undergoing reconstruction, the 
priests set up their altar in an adjoining workshop. The inner altar 
forms a large square, and the rituals take place in its center. The 
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black-headed priests set up paintings of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. 
At the superior end, ideally the front altar of the temple, they place a 
painting of Sakyamuni (the historical Buddha). In front of this image 
stand five rice pecks (tau) filled with ritual paraphernalia. These are 
the same as the pecks used in the pai to ritual I mentioned in Chapter 
2; they earn good luck and long life for their sponsors. 34 In this case 
one rice peck represents each of the Four Great Pillars (that is, each 
of the four geographical divisions of the Sanxia Valley), and the fifth 
represents the lo cu (that is, the temple catchment area as a whole). 
In front of the rice pecks stands an altar table holding more images 
of Buddhas, offerings, and some of the paraphernalia to be used in 
the rituals. Scrolls of Manjusri and Samantabhadra, two Bodhisattvas 
associated with Sakyamuni, flank the altar table. Next to these 
scrolls, forming the remainder of the left and right sides of the 
square, stand two images of the Protectors of the Dharma; these two 
figures accompany nearly every Buddhist altar in Taiwan. Finally, a 
table for the ordinary gods (including the gods of the temple) stands 
opposite Sakyamuni and in front of a door leading outside. Each 
scroll and each table has its own incense pot and food offerings. 
Taoists set up identical altars. The particular images on the scrolls 
differ from the images of the black-headed priests, but they are 
painted in the same style, and few laymen could distinguish the two 
types of altars. Taoists replace Sakyamuni with the Three Pure Ones 
(San Qing), the trinity that constitutes the peak of their cosmology. 
Along the two sides of the altar, they place four heavenly deities (Yu 
Huang [the Jade Emperor], Zi Wei, Nan Chen and Bei Di). Note 
that these lower deities along the sides include the Jade Emperor, the 
highest of the popular deities. Taoists incorporate the popular cos-
mology, but rank their own deities higher. Ceremonies in Buddhist 
temples do not require special altars. Their standard layout is nearly 
identical to the inner altar of the black-headed priests; it includes a 
Buddha at the front, two associated Bodhisattvas at his sides, and the 
two Protectors of the Dharma next to them. Specialists need to set up 
their own altars only in popular temples, where they replace the local 
gods with their own. 
The number of ceremonies performed before the actual ghost-
feeding varies according to the available time and money. At the Co 
Su Kong temple, the ceremonies usually last for a day and a half. 
They begin at about 5.30 in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of the 
seventh lunar month. Taoists and black-headed priests perform 
roughly the same rituals. They have been described in detail elsewhere 
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(Liu, 1967; Pang, 1977; Saso, 1972), so I will be brief here. The first 
ceremony is a musical performance that purifies the inner altar (/au 
tua:). The next major rituals are the huat piou and the chia: sin. 
These consist primarily of an invitation to the gods to attend the 
ritual, and an announcement of the purposes of the ritual and the 
names of the people involved. Representatives of the Four Great 
Pillars and the lo cu attend this ritual, holding incense in special 
wooden sticks carved in the shape of a dragon. At least one represen-
tative of the community attends each ritual, and representatives of 
all four segments plus the lo-cu attend the more important ones. 
Releasing the water lanterns (pang cui tieng) is the final ritual of the 
evening (see Chapter 1). 
The ceremonies start again at about 6.30 the next morning. The 
priests begin at the outer altar, where they worship Kuan Im and Tai 
Su Ia, requesting their presence to care for and control the masses of 
ghosts. Tai Su Ia, according to the priests, is a fearsome transforma-
tion of Kuan lm who specializes in ghost control. With the gods safely 
in attendance, the priests turn to the bamboo poles to ask the ghosts 
to come. The ceremonies then address the inner altar, where the 
priests read sutras on behalf of the community and renew their food 
offerings to the gods. 35 Late in the morning, the priests visit other 
local temples (out of courtesy to their gods), and they worship at the 
altars set up by the Four Great Pillars and the lo cu, inviting the 
ghosts to consume the offerings that Sanxia's people have prepared. 
A major ritual occurs at about noon- the worship of Thi: Kong, 
the Emperor of Heaven (or, more officially, the Jade Emperor). 
Unlike most of the rituals that have occupied the day, laymen 
understand the purpose of this ritual and consider it important. Thi: 
Kong reigns as the highest deity in the popular pantheon, and only 
the feeding of the ghosts will outrank his worship, at least in the 
popular view. The ritual takes place at the inner altar, facing the 
open door, the courtyard outside, and a sacrificed whole pig (ti kong) 
that constitutes the major offering to the Emperor of Heaven. Sev-
eral representatives of the community attend, as the priest pays their 
respects to Heaven. 
The festivities do not really begin to attract a crowd until after 
lunch. By this time, an opera entertains people in front of the temple, 
representatives of the Four Great Pillars have brought their food 
offerings to the appropriate altar, and the priests have arranged a 
raised altar in front of the main entrance to the temple. The cere-
mony begins in the late afternoon, when the chief p'riest (in a saffron 
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robe), leads his four assistants (in blue or black robes) and several 
musicians (in street clothes) around to each of the altars, to lead the 
ghosts back to the temple for the ceremony. Accompanied by gongs, 
drums and double-reeded shawms, the priests read sutras and per-
form mudras (esoteric hand signs) that purify the altar area in front of 
the temple. The priests and musicians then climb up to the altar 
table, which is raised about a meter off the ground. The assisting 
priests sit at either side of the table, the musicians sit behind them, 
and after a few more minutes of chanting, the chief priest sits in a 
cross-legged, meditative posture on a platform just behind the altar 
table . He has his back to the temple, and faces the small crowd that 
has begun to gather. He installs five powerful deities (Vairocana and 
four associated Buddhas for the Buddhists, and the Wu Lao, Sover-
eigns of the Five Directions, for the Taoists) in a crown that he then 
mounts on top of his ordinary hat. He thus becomes the personifica-
tion of the deities. The priest again purifies the altar area with a set of 
chants and mudras. He invites a series of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas 
(or gods for the Taoists) to the ceremony, and then invites the ghosts 
in a long passage that describes their sufferings in flowery detail. The 
priest now becomes a merciful deity associated with aid for ghosts; 
this is Guanyin (Kuan lm) for the Buddhists, and the Great Unity 
Heavenly Worthy Who Relieves Suffering (Taiyi Jiuku Tianzun) for 
the Taoists (although the Taoist text says Guanyin, the Buddhist 
goddess of mercy, may be invoked instead). In this form, the priest 
transforms the plates of buns and candy on the altar table into 
quantities enormous enough to feed the starving crowd of ghosts; the 
offerings brought by the community could never be enough to sate 
the mob of ghosts. Meanwhile the priest and his assistants describe 
the miserable conditions of the ghosts' lives and preach to them. This 
is the point at which the food is thrown out to the hungry ghosts and 
snatched up by the waiting people. At the end of the two or three 
hour ceremony, the. priest sends newly reformed ghosts to the 
heavenly Buddhist Pure Land, where they are released from their 
ghostly status; he returns the unreformed ghosts back to their suffer-
ings in the underworld. 
Even this quick summary shows a systematically developed struc-
ture of contrast between ghosts and gods or Buddhas. Jf> Gods domi-
nate the beginning of the ceremony, where the priest becomes their 
representative; ghosts dominate the end, where they eat and, if they 
follow the priests' advice, repent. The gods occupy the back of the 
altar, in the chief priest and the temple itself; ghosts occupy the front 
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of the altar, in their paper houses and metaphorically in the crowd 
that stands watching. Food offerings to the gods remain on the altar 
and are in token amounts; food offerings to the ghosts are thrown in 
front of the altar and include big sacks of raw rice, and the tables of 
offerings from the community. Gods are glorious, happy beings, 
whom the priest supplicates; ghosts are pitiful, suffering beings, to 
whom the priest preaches. 
This structure is an important part of the specialist interpretation 
of ghosts in all contexts. Both the Buddhist (or black-headed priest) 
and Taoist performances share the structure, but a fuller analysis will 
show that the two specialist versions differ substantially from each 
other. The following sections examine Taoist and Buddhist ritual 
texts and the social relations in which they are embedded. They show 
how the style of interpretation in both specialist versions of ghosts 
differs from popular versions, and how Taoists and Buddhist differ 
from each other. 
Taoism 
Sanxia's red-headed (and only) Taoists earn their livings by providing 
religious services for their clientele. Curings are the most common 
service. Using a combination of divination techniques and a smatter-
ing of traditional Chinese medical knowledge, they diagnose minor 
ailments. The simplest, cheapest, and most common cures require 
the Taoist to write a charm (hu-a), which the patient places in his or 
her house, or burns to drink the ashes as tea or to wash with. More 
complex diseases or other problems require larger ritual solutions. 
Large rituals conducted for temples and their communities are rarer, 
but more profitable for the Taoists. These rituals range from cel-
ebrating a god's birthday, to performing the Universal Salvation rites, 
to the highest of all Taoist rituals, renewing the cosmic mandate of a 
community by holding a five-day ciou in its main temple. 
Taoism, at least for these priests, is a profession. The meditative, 
mystical aspects of Taoism are important to many of them, but the 
need to retain a faithful clientele overrides religious interests as a 
determinant of the particular knowledge of a Taoist. The great 
majority of the curings and exorcisms that most Taoists perform 
involve little of the more meditative, philosophical tradition of Tao-
ism. In fact, only one Taoist in Sanxia has much knowledge of the 
meditative tradition; he is also the only one who can perform a full 
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ciou ritual. Two others can perform a much less prestigious one-day 
ciou, but none of them meditate regularly. One key to understanding 
the difference between Taoism and the popular tradition is the 
professionalization of Taoism. 
The other key to Taoism is its textual tradition. Taoist ritual 
consists above all in chanting texts. The lay audience can rarely 
understand what it hears (the priests use an unusual pronunciation, 
their chanting distorts the words further, and the muJic usually 
drowns it all out), but the meaning of the ritual for the priests rests on 
the text and on the oral traditions that accompany them. Neither the 
texts nor the accompanying oral explanations are circulated publicly . 
Taoists learn to interpret their rituals only through a lengthy educa-
tion where they apprentice themselves to more accomplished mas-
ters. While the popular tradition undergoes constant reinterpretation 
as the political and economic context changes, Taoist interpretations 
are buffered against such change by their unchanging texts, and by an 
indoctrination system that tries to channel their readings of those 
texts . 
The Taoists of the northern end of Taiwan share most of their 
traditions, and they frequently assist each other in conducting large-
scale rituals like a ciou. If pressed, they will explain that they follow 
the Zhengyi Tianshi sect of Taoism. Yet they rarely seem concerned 
with these large categories within Taoism, perhaps because no one in 
the area claims membership in any other sect. Instead, they identify 
themselves primarily as members of either the Lim family sect (Lim 
Chu Phai) or the Lau family sect (Lau Chu Phai), representing two 
traditions that developed from two early Taoists in the area (Liu, 
1967, pp. 48-9). Many of them had studied under the same masters. 
Acceptance by these groups means invitations to work at the largest, 
most profitable ceremonies. Since these are the only Taoists in the 
northern tip of Taiwan likely to perform the Universal Salvation rites, 
they are the primary concern of this section. Only one priest from 
Sanxia was a member of this group; my analysis centers on him, but 
also draws on Taoists from other areas. 
Politics, Community and Taoist Ritual 
The gods/ancestors/ghosts division from the popular tradition is less 
useful for Taoism. Taoist ritual instead divides most easily into two 
categories: tou (Dao; 'the way') and huat (techniques). Taoists doing 
tou ritual are petioning the highest gods, putting themselves in the 
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inferior position of supplicant. The ciou is the pinnacle of tou rituals, 
and of Taoism as a whole. The ciou purifies and renews a community 
through lengthy rituals conducted by a group of Taoists at a major 
community temple (see Saso, 1972; Liu, 1967). It is held for new 
temples, and then at regular intervals (often every twelve years) 
thereafter. In huat ritual the Taoist acts as representative of the 
highest gods to control various lower beings. The techniques used are 
coercion, threat and command, rather than the respectful petitioning 
of tou ritual. The differences between the two types of ritual are 
consistently marked. Taoists specializing in different types receive 
different titles (tou su and huat su). They wear different robes for 
each type of ritual: simple red robes for huat, and ornate em-
broidered robes for audiences with the highest gods in tou. The 
rituals and their texts differ, the style and instrumentation of the 
music differs, the official seals to be placed on all documents differ, 
and so on. 37 
Taoism, especially in tou ritual, carries the bureaucratic metaphor 
to extremes. The forms and titles of the documents Taoists use, for 
example, closely resemble traditional imperial documents (Schipper, 
1974; Liu, 1967, pp. 70-1). Their ceremonial robes also recall official 
court dress, and in tou ritual they carry hu, narrow wooden boards 
that were traditionally required for audiences with the Emperor. The 
black cloth used to cover important documents in a ciou harks back 
to the black cloth used to cover secret memorials to the Emperor 
during the Han Dynasty (Bodde, 1975, p. 185n). The names and 
ranks of the gods also develop the bureaucracy in even more explicit 
detail than the popular tradition. The only real departure from the 
bureaucratic metaphor comes at the top of the hierarchy . The top of 
the Taoist cosmology is a trinity called the Three Pure Ones (San 
Qing). This apparent departure from the secular principle of a single 
Emperor at the top is resolved by the mystical unity of the trinity that 
is achieved through Taoist ritual and meditation (discussed further 
below). 
Extensive use of bureaucratic trappings involves a claim of legit-
imacy for the Taoist: he is an official in the Heavenly government. In 
modern times, my Taoist informants sometimes compared them-
selves to lawyers in their knowledge of the proper techniques for 
'talking to the gods'. This ability to deal effectively with a bureau-
cracy is the key to the financial success of a Taoist; it gives him a 
monopoly on access to the gods for any complex ritual purpose . 
Taiwanese Taoism differs from elite religion (see Chapter 5), but 
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resembles popular religion in emphasizing malevolent beings. Yet 
these beings differ from the Universal Salvation ghdsts of popular 
religion - their relation to kinship is not important. Instead they 
generally represent malignant stellar forces or fierce armies of 
Heaven or Earth. The priest, as the representative of the highest 
gods, can control these beings through a variety of techniques (huat) . 
A Taoist may also control demonic armies of his own, as described by 
Saso (1978, ch. 4). 
These controllable demons resemble bandits- they are dangerous, 
but potentially allies in local political conflicts. Saso, describing Mao 
Shan magic, stresses the dangers of enlisting such allies: 
The Six Chia [Jia) spirits are truly terrifying demons and their 
control is not a matter for the weak-hearted or the pretender 
among Taoists . .. If the spirit comes in a terrifying shape, eighty 
feet in height or in the form of a monstrous demon, so hideous that 
the Taoist is tempted to run in terror (or 'hide himself in the earth' 
as the text puts it), it is absolutely necessary to show no sign of 
alarm, but to open the eyes wide so that they bulge and look 
straight at the misshapen being ... (1978, p. 188; he goes on to 
describe the rest of the technique) 
Only a powerful man could control either bandits or demons. Both 
tou and huat ritual allow the Taoist to claim power in relation to his 
clients; only he can petition the gods and command the demons. 
The Great Year Star (Taisui Xing) provides another good illustra-
tion of such demons. In the official state cult the Great Year was an 
orthodox power: 'T'ai-sui (Taisui] was the powerful protector of the 
armies, to whom sacrifices were offered before every military enter-
prise' (Hou , 1979, p. 200). In popular belief and Taoism, however, 
he is an evil demon who must be placated. He appears on one type of 
paper spirit money 'as a brigand, brandishing a sabre in one hand and 
in the other a human head that he just cut off' (Hou, 1979, p. 201) . 
Thus the symbol that represents official military power in the state 
cult is a dangerous demon in Taoism and the popular tradition, a 
bandit with whom people make their peace. 
The political message of Taoism resembles the popular tradition; 
Chapter 5 shows how both differ from the elite tradition, which 
denies any independent power to malevolent ghost-bandits. All af-
firm the outlines of the secular government by recreating its bureau-
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racy in the heavens, but only Taoism and the popular tradition also 
recognize the alternative political power of ghosts and demons (or 
metaphorically, of bandits or rebels). They recognize some of the 
real political problems that the elite tradition ignores. The Taoist 
emphasis on powers outside bureaucratic orthodoxy also helps guar-
antee popular support, and thus financial success, by recognizing the 
complex political realities of the Taoist's clientele. 
The political position of Taoism relates to the concerns of the 
community it serves. Taoists in Taiwan are active members of local 
communities, and often have ties to large community temples. In 
some rituals they accent their local orientation when they invoke 
gods from important temples elsewhere in Taiwan. Taoist ritual 
recitals list temples roughly in order from the farthest to the closest, 
and the lists concentrate on local temples. Taoists in different areas 
thus read lists that differ in their ordering and in some of the gods 
mentioned. 
They perform certain rituals for entire communities, rather than 
for individuals. After a fire, for example, a Taoist will perform an 
exorcism (siu sua:) to expel the influence of the element fire, and to 
control it with the element water. The ciou is the most important of 
these community rituals; it unites communities as large as a township. 
Taoists, therefore , are tied to their local areas first through their 
financial dependence on a local clientele, and second through their 
position as intermediaries for the community in rituals. As a result, 
they share with the popular tradition an easily ideologized concern 
for both official and unofficial sources of power. 
Kinship 
Taoists, in their capacity as priests, have little to do with kinship, and 
ancestors are not an important part of the Taoist cosmology. The few 
rituals Taoists do perform that relate to kinship take bureaucratic, 
political forms. Taoists may assist, for example, in a spirit adoption, 
but their primary purpose is to draw up the appropriate documents to 
submit to the heavenly authorities. Taoists outside of Sanxia some-
times conduct funerals. Kinship itself is not emphasized in Taoism, 
which concentrates instead on the more powerful beings of the 
political realm. 
Taoists do, however, take an active part in kinship relations 
independent of their role as priests. First, Taoists in Taiwan are 
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invariably fire-dwelling, living in ordinary communities, marrying 
and raising families. Like their neighbors, therefore , they are mem-
bers of a network of kinsmen and they take part in the cult of 
ancestor worship. Their priestly profession does not alter this part of 
their lives. 
Taoist priests also take part in a system of fictive kinship. Students 
of the same teacher call each other 'brother', call 'their teachers 
'father', call their teacher's co-students 'uncle ', and so on. They also 
take on new names when they become priests. These names are used 
only for ritual purposes and express the same fictive kin relations. 
Taoists retain their secular surnames in their religious names. The 
first character of their personal name is taken from a poem used by all 
'descendants' of a single master ; each 'generation' of students is given 
the same character from the poem, the next 'generation' gets the next 
character, and so on . The second character of the religious name is 
individual. Outside of ritual contexts, however, Taoists use their 
secular names . 
None of these features is unique to Taoism. Nearly everyone 
shares in the ancestral cult, the same kind of fictive kinship typifies all 
master-pupil relations in China, and the same system of naming is 
used in many families. While Taoists as individuals take part in real 
and fictive kinship relations, Taoist cosmology and ritual show little 
concern with kinship . 
In summary, Taoism resembles the popular tradition in recogniz-
ing both official and unofficial sources of power. Like the official cult, 
however , Taoists have developed the bureaucratic analogy in a more 
detailed, thorough and systematic way - they have created a full 
ideology. Bureaucratic details pervade every aspect of the system. 
The relation of Taoism to kinship is similar to the state cult (see 
Chapter 5): kinship is not important within the religious tradition, 
but practitioners take part in the popular ancestral cult. Taoists also 
express their relations to the community by their connection with 
community temples, and by their dependence on a local clientele to 
stay in business. With this background, we can begin to analyze the 
Taoist version of the Universal Salvation festival , expanding on its 
relation to popular interpretations of the festival, and examining the 
systematic differences that Taoist reliance on texts and a particular 
kind of training creates, and explaining how those differences encour-
age a more ideologized version of the popular concern with power 
and hierarchy . 
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Taoist Ghosts 
The Taoist Universal Salvation rites depict ghosts who resemble 
the more pitiful reading of ghosts from the popular tradition . The 
ceremony defines ghosts through two levels of contrast: (1) pitiful , 
suffering ghosts contrast with glorious , generous gods; and (2) the 
violent, improper deaths of ghosts contrast with the more respectable 
deaths of ordinary souls. 
The layout of the altar and the general structure of the ritual text 
(the Taishang Lingbao Zhenji Xuanke, for Sanxia's Taoists) em-
phasize the contrast between ghosts and gods .311 The priests begin by 
dedicating themselves to the Three Treasures of Taoism (the Dao, 
the ritual texts , and the Taoist masters) . Then they invite various 
gods to attend the ceremony , including especially Taiyi Jiuku Tian-
zun (Great Unity Heavenly Worthy Who Relieves Suffering ; he helps 
ghosts transcend their current state), and Tai Su Ia (the fierce 
transformation of Kuan Im , who will keep the ghosts under control). 
Only then do the Taoists lead the ghosts into the altar area in front of 
the temple . The priests urge the ghosts to repent, promise them 
salvation , and sprinkle Sweet Dew (gan lu) over them to quench their 
thirst and cleanse their sins. At this stage the Taoists are ready to 
climb the ritual altar to perform the longer, meditative part of the 
ceremony. The structure of this first segment (inviting gods- inviting 
ghosts - preaching repentance - providing relief) foreshadows the 
more elaborate performance of the meditative segment that follows. 
After the Taoists climb the ritual altar, they again dedicate them- r 
selves to the Three Treasures. The chief priest puts on the five-
peaked hat that identifies him with the gods, and he purifies the altar 
with a series of chants, mudras and visualizations. He invites a wide 
range of different types of gods, and worships them with incense . 
With these gods in attendance, he assumes a cross-legged, medi-
tational posture, and begins to invite ghosts of all sorts, promising them 
relief from their suffering. Now the priest transforms the food offer-
ings into quantities huge enough to feed the starving horde of ghosts. 
This step requires a complex set of mystical chants, mudras, mantras, 
visualizations and meditational breathing (to which I will return 
shortly). The longest section of the text follows , in which the chief 
priest and his assistants invite all kirids of ghosts to eat the offerings , 
describing the sins, the tragedies , and the anguish of each type of 
ghost in turn. The gore in these descriptions emphasizes the contrast 
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with gods. One bloody passage. for example, compares drowning 
victims to Qu Yuan, a loyal Warring States period scholar and poet 
whose emperor suspected him of treachery. and who thus drowned 
himself. The emperor later repented and ordered food thrown into 
the river to feed Qu Yuan's ghost. Annual dragon-boat races still 
commemorate this event today. 
Sailing on river and sea, you suddenly meet wind and waves. 
Drowned in the deep swells, you float onto a sandy beach. Scat-
tered by dogs and dragged by pigs, your corpse lies unburied. 
Ducks nibble and hawks tear, fresh blood flows drop by drop. 
Boats race on the Xiang River, and Qu Yuan is your companion. 
Drowned lonely ghosts, come receive the Sweet Dew! (Taishang 
Lingbao Zhenji Xuanke, n. d.) 
With each description, the priest. throws a small food offering to the 
ghosts (and to the living who watch) in front of the altar. Then he 
douses then with Sweet Dew again. changes the food again. and 
preaches to them. Finally, he sends them all back to the world of the 
dead, ending the ceremony. Each stage of the ritual clarifies the 
contrast between gods and ghosts: gods come first, ghosts come 
second; gods sit with the priests. ghosts stand in front of the altar; 
gods' food remains on the altar; ghosts' food is thrown; gods are 
pure, ghosts are sinners; gods are happy; ghosts are miserable , and so 
on. 
The contrast between ghosts and the proper dead occurs primarily 
in the long descriptions of the various types of ghosts . Almost every 
description begins with the joys of a certain type of life, including 
everything from the glory of military victories to the pleasures of 
seduction. Yet every case ends with disaster- violent death like the 
drowning I quoted above; death caused by leading a sinful life, like 
the case of a shrewish woman who dies in childbirth; or death far 
from home, where no one will care for the remains, like some 
brilliant scholars: 
I bow to talented men of the colleges, students going to take t~e 
examinations. By day they write poetry and compositions, by riight 
they read the Four Books and Five Classics. One day the examina-
tion hall opens, and all will receive an imperial audience . They 
enter the examination site, they leave for the examination site. 
Blue sky [i.e., high position] marks their road . They ascend the 
Dragon Gate [to glory] and enter the Phoenix Pavilion. Fame on 

1.2 Tai Su Ia protects a temple from ghosts 




3.1 Zhong Kui exorcizes demons 
3.2 Domestic offerings to ghosts using isolated sticks of incense 
3.3 Grandfathers Seven and Eight on a tour of inspection 
3.4 Newly renovated Iu Ieng Kong altar with offerings for ghosts becoming gods 
4.1 The Jade Emperor 
(left) and Amidha Buddha 
(right), showing typical 
iconographic differences 
Specialist Ghosts 103 
the first selection of candidates! But a day is not eternal. Dead in a 
far-off land, they are never seen again. Thirty degree-holders are 
on the road. Who was to know they would die in another land? 
Your brave spirits cannot return home; you are lonely souls. Come 
to the ritual convocation! (Taishang Lingbao Zhenji Xuanke, n. d .) 
These descriptions do not belittle worldly achievements; earthly 
success is a genuine possibility. Instead, they play up the contrast 
between worldly success and the disaster that has befallen the ghosts. 
Although the Taoist text does not discuss ancestors (because 
kinship and ancestors are largely irrelevant to Taoism), its descrip-
tion of ghosts resembles one aspect of the popular tradition in 
emphasizing the pitiful nature of ghosts. The popular tradition's 
ghosts, less explicit and less ideologized, are also open to a violent 
interpretation . The Taoists' texts are less amenable to a violent 
interpretation, however, because they are so explicit about the piti-
fulness of ghosts, and because they contrast ghosts with happiness 
and success (in gods and the non-ghostly living), but not necessarily 
with peaceful beings. This portion of the Taoist text offers a more 
ideologized, explicit view of ghosts than the popular tradition, but 
the two views are nevertheless compatible. This compatibility is 
consistent with the close social and professional ties between Taoists 
and their communities. 
Certain parts of the text refer to broader themes of Taoism that do 
not resemble anything in the popular tradition. Pang's (1977) outline 
of the Pho To text used by Honolulu Taoists includes a representa-
tion of hell, which the Taoist systematically breaks open to release 
the lonely ghosts. (The Sanxia text does not include this section.) 
Hell is divided into nine levels according to the arrangement of the 
Luo Shu magic square . This magic square is very old in China, and 
plays an important role both in Taoism and in five-phase theory (I 
discuss it further in Appendix A, see Figure A.4). The numerological 
structure of the Luo Shu is associated with the gradual decline of 
world order in Taoism, and Taoist priests use it in a number of 
ceremonies (Saso, 1978, pp . 136-40). This part of the ritual takes its 
meaning in part from an abstract Taoist numerological and cosmo-
logical system, and in part from the fit between a ghostly underworld 
and the Luo Shu as a symbol of decline. The specific social and 
political concomitants of a particular ritual performance are less 
important to Taoist interpretations than this abstract system into 
which they are socialized. 
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Figure 4.1 Correlations of the Five Phases 
Element Direction Organ Season Color 
wood east liver spring green 
fire south heart summer red 
earth center spleen yellow 
metal west lungs fall white 
water north kidneys winter black 
At the height of the section where the ghosts are fed, the Taoist 
text includes an esoteric invocation of the Sovereigns of the Five 
Directions, who have already been seated in the chief priest's five-
peaked hat. These deities form part of an extensive system of correla-
tions, in which each deity is associated with a direction, a color, an 
internal organ, a taste, a season, one of the five phases. and so on. 
Figure 4.1 shows some of the more important correlations. Each row 
of the figure interacts with all of the other rows through the orders of 
mutual creation and mutual destruction of the five phases (Figure 
4.2). This very structured, systematized code, minus the deities, 
belongs to the realm of five-phase theory; I discuss it further in 
Chapter 6 and in Appendix A. 
For the Taoist, the five phases, personified as the Sovereigns of the 
Five Directions, have many uses. Saso (1978, pp. 214-18) describes 
one of the most important, in which the priest refines the five deities 
into the Three Pure Ones. Taking the phases in the order of mutual 
creation, the priest refines east and south (wood and fire) into the 
Primordial Heavenly Worthy (Yuanshi Tianzun). then the center 
(earth) into the Lingbao Heavenly Worthy (Lingbao Tianzun), and 
finally west and north (metal and water) into the Daode Heavenly 
Worthy (Daode Tianzun, Laozi). He can then further refine the 
Three Pure Ones to achieve unity with the Dao. In the Universal 
Salvation rites, the Taoist calls up each of the five deities from the 
internal organ where it dwells by pressing a joint on the left hand 
(tied into the general system of correlations) and by performing the 
proper meditational acts. 
This most systematically structured level of Taoist ideology is very 
different from the popular tradition. It stresses the creation of a 
personal unity with the Dao through a ritual meditation turning the 
gods into spiritual forces tied to the correlational system of the five 
phases. The Three Pure Ones, the highest figures in Taoism. stand 
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above all secular distinctions, especially when seen as abstract forces 
of meditation. This kind of meditational Taoism transcends the 
community and political divisions that tie in so closely with the 
popular tradition and to more everyday Taoist ritual. 
This level of interpretation, however, was available to very few 
people in Sanxia. Only one person had any real knowledge of it, and 
his knowledge did not compare to the sophistication that Saso ( 1978) 
describes for Master Chuang. A mastery of the highly structured 
systems of meditational Taoism requires extensive training in texts, 
memorization of oral instructions, and practice in ritual performance. 
It thrived in the monasteries of the Chinese mainland, which allowed 
this extensive socialization. The monastic tradition also allowed 
adepts to live in relative isolation from secular social conditions. This 
combination of isolation within a self-defined system of social rela-
tions, and a reliance on unchanging texts, helped shield Taoism from 
constant reinterpretation. The monastery could not hope to forestall 
all reinterpretation, but it could attempt to channel and control 
interpretations by deciding on 'correct' readings, by imposing these 
readings on adepts, and by claiming an eternal truth for them. The 
popular tradition, in contrast, underwent constant pragmatic reinter-
pretation because it was more closely tied to secular political and 
economic events, and it had no institutional authority (like the 
monastery or the Heavenly Master) who could impose an 'orthodox' 
interpretation on unchanging texts. 
Taoists living outside of strict institutional control were freer to 
develop individual reinterpretations. Taiwan never had a monastic 
tradition of Taoism, and the absence of a strongly institutionalized 
ideology left many Taiwanese Taoists caught between the 'orthodox' 
structures of meditatioital Taoism and the less ideologized beliefs of 
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their clients. Some largely ignored Taoist ideology, worshipping gods 
and exorcizing demons for their customers, using the Taoist pan-
theon in ways that fit their clients' concerns with politics and com-
munity. Others became religious intellectuals, who pursued ever 
more sophisticated masters, sometimes even going to the mainland · 
for training. Peq Hok-ci, Sanxia's most sophisticated Taoist, illus-
trates several possible ways of thinking about Taoism. He wavers 
about whether to explore the abstract structures of Taoist thought, or 
whether to fit Taoism instead into Western psychological systems. 
A 'Modernized' Taoist 
Mastery of an ideology requires education in its system of interpreta-
tion , and an institutionalized set of social relations to foster orthodox 
interpretation and channel reinterpretation. Peq partially meets 
these conditions for two separate systems: Taoism and modern 
Western education. 
Peq's knowledge of Taoism comes primarily from his father, who 
was a leader of the Lim family sect. His father died while Peq was still 
serving in the army (there is a universal male draft in Taiwan), 
however, when Peq had not yet received all of his father's teachings . 
He can perform all the major rituals, but he knows he has not 
achieved his father's level of mastery. The other Taoists of northern 
Taiwan form a reinforcing group with which he interacts. but the 
group is tied together only loosely, and individuals guard their 
professional secrets from one another. There is no encompassing 
institution, like the mainland monasteries, to prevent Peq from 
interpreting Taoism in his own way or to prod him into further 
exploration of Taoist ideology. His partial mastery of Taoist ideology 
formed one context in which Peq functioned as a religious intellec-
tual. 
The other context in which Peq thinks about his work rests on a 
modern, Western-style education . He is a high-school graduate, 
which makes him more educated than many people in Sanxia , and 
more educated than any other Taoist I interviewed. His secular 
education gives him a separate abstract system for understanding 
Taoism. He often mentions the psychological effects of his work, 
speaking about the efficacy of his cures in language that would not 
seem unusual from a Western social scientist, and scoffing at any 
religious explanation. He is 'modernized', as he explains in these 
contexts. His psychological discourse about religion is not structured 
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Source: Dore 1915:189 (left) ; black-headed priest's charm from Sanxia 
funeral (right) 
as complexly as his Taoist discourse (probably because the educa-
tional system does not address Taoist ritual) , but both are equally 
abstracted from everyday social experience. 
I had several discussions with Peq about the charms (hu-a) he 
writes, in which he used both types of discourse to explain them. 
Sometimes he would systematize them into abstract Taoist categories. 
Most charms, he explained, have a head, a body and a tail (see Figure 
4.3 for two examples). There is a limited repertory of heads and tails, 
but the bodies vary with the message of the charm. The heads usually 
invoke the power of the Three Pure Ones, although rarely by name. 
Three checkmarks at the top are a common sysmbol for the Three 
Pure Ones. A stylized version of the characters 'to give an imperial 
order' (chi ling) is also common in charm heads. Charm heads are 
usually opaque to the uninitiated; to Peq, they indicate the authority 
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of the highest gods. Peq could not, however, explain charm tails. 
Each school, he said, draws the tail in its own way. 
Charm bodies often feature a few characters that explain the 
purpose of the charm ('Purify!' or 'Let the community be at peace,' 
for example). They also tend to include a number of esoteric marks 
that cannot be interpreted outside of the broader structure of Tao-
ism. One charm, for example, calls down the god of water, as part of 
an exorcism of the fire god after a fire, or to help prevent a fire. 
Underneath the head are several esoteric invocations of water: the 
trigram associated with the phase water; six circling curves that 
indicate the Luo Shu number six, associated with north and thus also 
with water, and the black paper on which the charm is written, also 
associated with water in five-phase theory. The charm has what 
Malinowski (1935, pp. 218--33) called a high 'coefficient of weird-
ness'. Much of it looks impressive, but remains opaque to people 
with no access to Taoist ideology. Many charms strengthen the effect 
by writing one character on top of another. The charm writer protects 
his trade by making the charm impossible to copy. At the same time, 
he increases the coefficient of weirdness. 
Peq's interpretation of charms is not simply a repetition of Taoist 
ideology. He also abstracts and systematizes on his own. As far as I 
know, for example, the structure of charms with heads, bodies and 
tails is his own abstraction . Furthermore, he was willing to revise his 
charms as he understood their properties better. He once asked me 
to let him know if I could discover whether any of his charms really 
worked. He complained that he never found out, because satisfied 
customers did not need to see him again, and dissatisfied customers 
did not want to. If I would pass on what I found out when I talked to 
people, he would learn to write better charms. 
Other Taoists showed the same empiricism within Taoist ideology. 
One man, for example, had just learned a technique that supposedly 
allowed him to control a divination system. The system, called puaq 
pue (I discuss it further in Chapter 6), consists in dropping a pair of 
wooden blocks. The way they fall indicates a 'yes', 'no' or 'maybe' 
answer from the gods. This Taoist asked me to help him test the 
technique. I would throw the blocks, and he would try to make them 
come up 'no'. The first throw indeed came up 'no', and then so did 
the second, the third and the fourth. By this time my own faith in the 
law of probability was wavering (the odds apparently favor a 'yes' 
answer, although they probably vary with. the individual set of 
blocks), but his was not. When the fifth throw came up 'yes'; he 
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immediately announced that the technique was bogus, and he would 
not test it further . Both he and Peq functioned as religious intellectu-
als, working within the Taoist ideology, but continuing to abstract 
and to structure concepts on their own. This other Taoist had chosen 
to study Taoism in more depth; he was apprenticing himself to higher 
masters, and his interpretations would take place increasingly within 
the context defined by the Taoist texts, oral traditions and social 
relations. 
Peq, in contrast, also held a competing ideology. Sometimes when 
he discussed his curing charms, he dismissed Taoist interpretation as 
irrelevant to their real . psychological functions. You could write 
anything you wanted on the charm; it would work as long as the 
coefficient of weirdness was high enough to mystify the patient. He 
told of one woman who was so convinced he was hexing her, that she 
made herself sick. Another patient watched an exorcism, and felt fine 
until he noticed a sign that said people born in his year would get sick 
if they attended. He got sick, and Peq cured him with a charm. All 
this, for Peq, showed the fundamentally psychological nature of his 
business. This secular attitude toward Taoism, reinforced by the 
educational system and the media, sometimes made him cynical. He 
had a whip for use on demons in huat ritual. When it broke, he just 
used the handle instead of repairing it. The demons were invisible (at 
least Peq has never seen one), so he might as well use an invisible 
whip, he said. 
At times, Peq thinks of abandoning Taoism for secular business. 
At other times, however, he sees events for which he has no secular 
explanation. He sometimes cures diseases that he feels only a West-
ern doctor should be able to cure; he says he can keep himself healthy 
by manipulating the five phases through diet and meditation; he likes 
to tell of the spiritual powers of his father. He seems a little like 
Quesalid, the skeptical curer Levi-Strauss (1963) discusses, who 
begins to study curing to debunk it, but ends up puzzled and at least 
partly convinced by the cures he effects. 
Peq entered Taoism through his father, an accomplished master. 
He learned the rituals and a system of interpretation based on an 
ideology of explicit concepts. Yet Taoism, like any established ideol-
ogy, survives only where it is embedded in a social structure that can 
maintain it. In Peq's case, the early death of his father interrupted his 
further indoctrination in Taoist ideology, and the lack of any strong 
institution allowed him to reinterpret many of his activities in individual 
terms that led him away from the orthodoxy of monastic Taoism. 
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Taoist texts, oral traditions and rituals do not determine meaning, 
but instead require interpretation. Reinterpretations of the Bible 
from Martin Luther on show the flexibility with which a set text can 
be read, and also show how institutions attempt to impose particular 
interpretations (for example, through confession or catechism) . Tao-
ism similarly allows many possible interpretations (as Peq showed), 
even while its institutions attempted to channel interpretation into a 
few ideologized forms. The most meditational Taoists were largely cut 
off from the contexts of the popular tradition. These Taoists looked to 
isolated monasteries, which could rule on orthodoxy and which were 
isolated from much day-to-day life of the empire. Yoshioka (1979, 
pp. 244-5), for example, describes the system of lectures that at-
tempted to shape adepts' interpretations at one monastery. Saso 
emphasizes the importance of monastic training for the founders of a 
group of Taoists in Xinzhu, Taiwan (1978, ch. 2), and how one of the 
most meditative of these Taoists remained at the monastery as a 
hermit , and performed no public ritual after his return to Taiwan 
(1978, p. 74). 
Other Taoists worked more within the social, political and econ-
omic contexts of the everyday lives of their clientele . As a result, 
their ordinary ritual deals more directly with gods and demons , with 
community interests and political power. At the lowest levels, they 
are simply specialists in the popular tradition - they have a more 
systematized knowledge of how to deal with gods and demons, but 
they do not draw on the spiritual abstractions of meditational Tao-
ism. Their religion remains more ideologized than the popular be-
liefs, but it does not compare with the Taoist ideology of someone 
like Saso's Master Chuang. 
Buddhism 
The Buddhist version of the Universal Salvation rites, like the Taoist 
version, relies on a set of texts, and on a social organization that helps 
control how people interpret those texts. Both religions rely on more 
explicit and more systematized interpretations than the popular 
tradition, but both also differ importantly from each other. A striking 
superficial similarity between the two Universal Salvation texts hides 
underlying differences of interpretation , which stem from how the 
two religions socialize their priests into orthodoxy. how they relate to 
local communities and to national politics, and how their ideologies 
help create a particular view of the world. 
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Education, Priesthood and Community 
The Buddhist clergy in Taiwan is much more centralized and organ-
ized than Taoism. This situation does not typify all of China, either 
spatially or historically. Rather, it results from two particular proces-
ses in Taiwan. First, the Japanese promoted Buddhism during their 
occupation of Taiwan from 1895-1945. Japanese versions of Buddh-
ism served originally as a way of Japanizing the Taiwanese, and later 
as a tool to unite Japan's new empire, the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese sponsored the construction of 
Buddhist temples in Taiwan, and they instituted controls over the 
clergy. The second influence on Buddhism was a major influx of 
important clergy from the mainland when the Nationalist govern-
ment fled to Taiwan in 1949.39 This new group of clergy has become a 
major intellectual force in Taiwan, and has helped to create an 
extensive system of Buddhist education. 
More than any other group I spoke to in Taiwan (outside of the 
academics), Buddhist monks and nuns are intellectuals. Kiu Kiong 
Kiou's little Buddhist temple houses three nuns. The older one 
typifies an older generation of Taiwanese Buddhists. She is less 
educated in Buddhism than the younger generation, she is more 
willing to perform non-Buddhist ritual for her clients, and more 
willing to allow worshippers to use non-Buddhist offerings (like gold 
and silver spirit money). Yet even she has an extensive knowledge of 
sutras, and she promoted an orthodox education at various Buddhist 
centers for the two young nuns who assist her. These two young nuns 
were the first Buddhists I interviewed, and they stressed my own 
need to explore the Buddhist doctrine through its educational sys-
tem. If I was not going to be a simple tourist, they admonished, I 
would have to read extensively, to attend public lectures in Taibei 
(where famous monks fill the largest auditoriums), and to visit 
important centers of Buddhist education, like Foguang Shan in 
southern Taiwan. They loaded me up with books, and sent me home 
to study. 
Unlike the Taoists, Buddhist priests in modern Taiwan often come 
through an institutionalized education system that helps to insure 
their knowledge of important texts, and to control their interpreta-
tions of those texts. 40 The Buddhist clergy in Taiwan forms a more 
united, homogeneous group than the Taoists. The more institution-
alized social relations of Buddhist clergy help to ensure a more 
uniformly ideologized concept of their religion than exists among 
Taoists as a group. 
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Buddhist monks and nuns often do not have close ties to the 
communities that house their temples. In many cases, the clergy do 
not come from the local area. Even in rural Sanxia, a mainlander 
runs one of the Buddhist chai tng. Buddhist temples also do not 
organize local residents in the same ways that a major community 
temple would, and they do not perform rituals for the benefit of the 
community as a whole. Unlike most Taoists, Buddhist priests do not 
depend on the local community for financial support. They perform 
their rituals instead for individual followers of the temple. Some of 
these adherents may come from the neighborhood of the temple, but 
many others will live in widely scattered areas. The monks and nuns 
themselves tend not to be interested in close ties with a local com-
munity. In contrast to many Taoists, they have joined the clergy to 
avoid the complications of secular life and thus to cultivate them-
selves. Although they are economically dependent on their temples, 
earning a living rarely seems to be the reason for their faith. Buddh-
ists have less need for community ties than Taoists. A lack of close 
local ties helps solidify the institutional organization of Buddhism. 
Monks and nuns are less likely than Taoists to feel pulled away from 
the religion by ties to the secular community. They are safer, for 
example, from the competing ideologies that trouble the Taoist Peq. 
Even the chai tng in Kiu Kiong Kiou, which has extraordinarily 
close community ties because of the local origin of its chief nun, 
depends primarily on outside support. Its closest and most generous 
followers tend to be wealthy women from Taibei and its environs. 
They have become involved in the temple through personal ties with 
the nun in charge. Another of Sanxia's Buddhist temples, found in 
the hills near Qibei, serves primarily an educated clientele. The head 
is a Pure Land monk from the mainland who does not speak Hok-
kien. Although he makes some effort to serve the local community, 
he attends especially to college students, for whom he conducts 
vacation retreats. A third monk lives at the mountainous edge of 
Sanxia. His temple is too far up in the mountains for any regular 
contact with a local community. His ties are instead primarily to 
colleges in Taibei. 
The Buddhist clergy's relations to local communities thus differ 
from the closer ties of Taoists. The Taoist cosmology ideologizes the 
bureaucratic political system, Taoist demons link them to local con-
cerns with illegitimate power, and Taoist practice ties priests to 
community. Buddhism, however, links neither to the national system 
of an interlocking hierarchy of communities, nor to local community 
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concerns. The combination of a relatively institutionalized set of 
social relations that controls Buddhist interpretation, the relative 
absence of close ties to local communities, and the relative indepen-
dence from the secular political system, allows Buddhism to maintain 
a systematized ideology that reflects its independence both from the 
local community and from the government. 41 
Equality, Buddhas and Politics 
In contrast to the division into gods, ghosts and ancestors in the 
popular tradition, or into gods and malevolent spirits in Taoism, m~ 
informants from the Buddhist clergy conceive of ten types of beings 
that fall into two main categories: those who have transcended the 
wheel of reincarnation, and those who are still subject to the agonies 
of rebirth.42 The transcended beings, called the Four Saintly Planes, 
include fo (buddhas, who have achieved the highest level of enlight-
enment), pusa (bodhisattvas, who are capable of becoming Buddhas, 
but choose to remain in this world in order to help others), yuanjue 
(pratyeka-buddhas, who have individual enlightenment but do not 
try to help others), and finally shengwen (sravakas, the lowest level of 
enlightenment, associated in China with Hinayana Buddhism). The 
unenlightened beings are called the Six Ordinary Planes, and consist 
of gods (including the entire popular and Taoist pantheons), humans, 
demons, ghosts, denizens of hell and animals. 
The most important implication of this is that every being in the 
popular or Taoist world view is in exactly the same position: none has 
transcended the most basic feature of life, the bitter cycle of birth, 
sickness, old age and death. Not only have the monks and nuns 
ignored the precise appreciation of hierarchy found within the other 
traditions, but they have made the more radical assertion that every-
one, whether god or man, magistrate or peasant. is fundamentally 
equal. 
More detailed analysis shows the thoroughness of the differences 
between the Buddhist cosmology and the other traditions. First, 
although Buddhas constitute the top of the spiritual hierarchy, they 
are totally unlike earthly rulers or their heavenly counterpart, the 
Jade Emperor. There are many Buddhas, they do not take an active 
part in the affairs of the world, and they have no· bureaucratic 
authority. Thus, while the Buddhist deities form a hierarchy, it is in 
no way bureaucratic. Position in the Buddhist hierarchy depends not 
on political ability to deal with the world, nor on authority to wield 
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power, but rather on faith and a personal commitment to transcend 
the affairs of the secular world. 
Secondly, rank is determined only by the personal merit and 
personal choice of the Buddhist deities; the bureaucratic principle of 
appointment to official position is never invoked. Bodhisattvas are 
not at the highest level (Buddhahood) only because they have made a 
personal choice to remain in this world . This contrasts with the 
deities of the other traditions, whose only orthodox path to power is 
enfeoffment (hong) by the emperor. 
Thirdly, the beings of the Four Saintly Planes differ fundamentally 
from the gods of the other traditions and from men in having 
transcended the physical and emotional limits of humanity. Buddhist 
deities have unlimited vision, knowledge and abilities to transform 
their outward appearance; they have also given up all secular pas-
sions. Gods, on the other hand, do most things better than men, but 
there is no real qualitative difference. The Emperor, like the gods, is 
far more powerful than most people, but even he is not omnipotent. 
Thus, people's relationships with gods are based on their relation-
ships with other humans; but Buddhism requires its clergy to aban-
don these secular principles. Faith is not an important concept in the 
popular religion, just as it is not an important feature of political 
bargaining. In Buddhism, however, faith becomes one of the key-
stones. The most impressive acts of worship done without faith 
accomplish nothing, but a simple prayer said with true faith can ac-
complish anything. 
Fourthly, the iconography of the two religious systems also reflects 
their basic differences. Iconography in Taoism or the popular tradi-
tion, as I discussed above, shows the gods as traditional bureaucrats. 
Buddhist temples, however, are easily distinguished from popular 
temples by their more ordinary architecture, which makes no claims 
to official status. Buddhist temples in Taiwan normally avoid the 
curved roofs and carved pillars of community temples or magistrates' 
yamens. The extra-worldly vision of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is 
enhanced by their images, which are painted gold, dressed in robes of 
a sort never worn in Chinese secular life, and seated serenely on lotus 
blossoms (see Plate 4.1). 
Finally, the ritual offerings distinguish Buddhism from the other 
traditions. Both Taoism and the popular beliefs share a code of spirit 
money, in which silver is appropriate to ancestors and ghosts, several 
levels of gold are appropriate to several levels of gods, and paper 
with various images printed on it is appropriate to ghosts and de-
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mons. It is one of the structural correlates of the gods/ancestors/ 
ghosts distinction in the popular tradition, and of the gods/malevol-
ent spirits distinction in Taoism. Meat offerings reinforce the same 
distinctions, where the preparation of the meat (whether it is raw or 
cooked, cut up or left whole) encodes the type of being who will 
consume it (see Chapter 2; Ahern, 1981a, p. 402) . Buddhism rejects 
both ritual codes. Buddhist temples forbid meat offerings of any 
form, and most also forbid, or at least discourage, the use of paper 
spirit money. Many Buddhist temples substitute a new form of paper 
offering that is more appropriate to their own cosmology. Buddhist 
monks and nuns urge worshippers to burn paper with sutras printed 
on it; there is a smaller form (wangsheng qian; 'rebirth money') for 
the unenlightened beings, and a larger form (yanshou qian, 'lon-
gevity money') for the enlightened beings. These Buddhist ritual 
offerings reject the distinctions made in Taoism and the popular 
tradition, substituting instead their own core distinction between 
enlightened and unenlightened beings . 
Buddhism thus offers people an alternative interpretation of the 
political world. Bureaucratic hierarchy gives way to spiritual equal-
ity, political manipulation gives way to personal freedom, and secular 
desire gives way to faith. Buddhist cosmology levels the social distinc-
tions that Taoism and the popular tradition emphasize , and it re-
places them with an ideology that both transcends and denies the 
affairs of secular life. The alternative political vision of the Buddhist 
clergy both reinforces and relies upon their lack of close ties to 
secular communities. The relatively institutionalized system of 
Buddhist education, and the relatively closed set of social ,relations in 
which most of the Buddhists live (discussed in the next section), help 
maintain an ideology at odds with most secular political experience. 
At the same time, that ideology encourages most monks and nuns to 
avoid the close community ties that typify the bureaucratic cosmolo-
gies of Taoism or the popular tradition . The Buddhist critique of 
secular politics made it appropriate to a priesthood that cut itself off 
from the secular world. The same ideology, however, could take on 
politically active implications if it was removed from the institution-
alized Buddhist control of interpretation, and placed into the secular 
political field. I will discuss reinterpretations of Buddhism by 'hetero-
dox' rebels in Chapter 6. Buddhist ideology itself does not determine 
the beliefs of monks and nuns; their beliefs come from interpreta-
tions of that ideology, which are embedded in the social relations of 
modern Buddhism in Taiwan . 
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Celibacy and Filial Piety 
Buddhism differs fundamentally from the other traditions in its 
relations to local communities and to secular politics. Many Taiwan-
ese, however, ignorant of Buddhist cosmology, identify the most 
crucial difference between Buddhism and their own beliefs as kin-
ship. The Taoist cosmology, like the Buddhist one , largely ignores 
kinship. Yet Taiwanese Taoists themselves take part in the same 
daily kinship relations as anyone else; Taoism may ignore kinship, 
but it does not reject kinship. In contrast, Buddhist monks and nuns 
leave their families (chut ke) to enter the faith, and then remain 
celibate. They are open to accusations of abandoning their parents by 
not caring for them in their old age, and even worse, by committing 
the most unfilial of acts - not providing their parents with descend-
ants. This led to vehement denunciations of Buddhis.m for espousing 
unfilial acts, and to equally adamant denials by the Buddhist 
clergy. The clergy is quick to point out that its members, too, worship 
their ancestors. This is a Chinese innovation in Buddhism, and shows 
the truly fundamental concern of Chinese with the ancestral cult .43 
Furthermore, many of the people who become Buddhist clergy have 
already raised families . The head nun at Kiu Kiong Kiou's chai tng is 
a good example . Her father was a devout lay Buddhist, and she had 
always intended to become a nun. She was an only child, however, 
and therefore married uxorilocally in order to provide her parents 
with descendants. She became a nun only shortly after she bore a son. 
Buddhist monks and nuns, like Taoists, take new names when they 
enter the religion. Unlike Taoists, however , they drop their original 
names altogether when they become monks or nuns. If surnames are 
needed (for official documents, for instance) , they all use the charac-
ter Shi, the beginning of the Chinese pronunciation of 'Sakyamuni' 
(Shijiamoni) . The process of 'leaving the family' to join a new social 
group is thus marked not only by shaving the head and wearing 
robes, but also by changing names, even the surname. Buddhist 
names reinforce the end of secular kinship ties for the clergy. 
Buddhist monks and nuns not only cut off most of their original 
kinship ties, but also take on new kinship responsibilities by worship-
ping dead people to whom they have no kinship ties at all. These 
include the remains of cremated clergy and lay Buddhists. For a 
price, Buddhist clergy also worship the dead relatives of other fam-
ilies. These are almost invariably marginal relatives- children , child-
less adults, and so on- whose right to a position on the ancestral altar 
Specialist Ghosts 117 
is tenuous. By performing this service, Buddhists again place them-
selves outside the normal system of kin relations. 
People thus have some good grounds for seeing Buddhism as 
opposed to normal Chinese kinship values: Buddhist monks and nuns 
leave their families, change their surnames, and worship other peo-
ple's marginal relatives. Nevertheless, Buddhists accede at least to 
the most obvious outward expression of Chinese kinship ideals -
ancestor worship. 44 
Buddhist Ghosts 
With the crucial differences between Buddhism and the other tradi-
tions in mind, we can turn to Buddhist interpretations of ghosts in the 
Universal Salvation rites. The most common Buddhist text, and the 
only one I saw used in Sanxia, is the Outline of the Yogacara Feeding 
of the Flaming Mouths (Yuqie Yankou, YQYK). 45 Buddhist inform-
ants also referred me to a Ming Dynasty commentary on the text, on 
which I rely for some of my analysis (Zhuhong, 1976). Unlike the 
tightly guarded Taoist texts, both the Buddhist sutra and the com-
mentary are easily bought in Buddhist bookstores. 
Most temples precede the ghost-feeding with several days of sutra 
reading. Most important are sutras that relate to saving ghosts, like 
the story of Kshitigarba, who vows not to become a Buddha until all 
the ghosts are saved. Black-headed priests, and some Buddhist 
temples, follow the Taoists in worshipping Heaven at noon on the 
final day of the ceremonies, although Buddhists omit the pig sacrifice. 
The actual ghost-feeding begins, as for the Taoists, in the late 
afternoon. The basic structures of the Buddhist and Taoist texts are 
almost identical, largely because the Taoists modelled their text after 
the Buddhists' (Pang, 1977, p. 95). Taken out of context, the two 
texts suggest a much greater similarity between Buddhism and Tao-
ism than really exists. When each text is seen in relation to the full 
structure of Buddhist or Taoist ideology, the underlying differences 
appear clearly. I have argued (Chapters 2 and 3) that people under-
stand much of the popular tradition piecemeal, as they relate their 
rituals to the particular situation in which they occur. Piecemeal 
interpretations are much Jess likely for the more ideologized beliefs 
of Buddhism or Taoism, where the priests are trained in an explicit 
system of interpretation. The differences between the Buddhist and 
the Taoist texts become clear only when they are understood in 
relation to the entire religious ideology. 
118 Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion 
The Buddhist text, like the Taoist, begins with a short prelude that 
summarizes the ceremony to come. It invites Buddhas and ghosts to 
attend, and explains how the ghosts will be saved. At this point the 
priests climb the altar, and the chief priest assumes a five-pointed 
crown. This crown looks nearly identical to the Taoist crown, al-
though it has different characters written on it. Wearing the crown 
associates the chief priest with five Buddhas, the most important of 
whom is Vairocana, associated with resolute activity and wisdom 
(zhi). The chief priest purifies the altar and the offerings with a series 
of mantras and mudras that again resemble the Taoist purification. 
The priests then dedicate themselves to the Three Treasures of 
Buddhism (Buddha, dharma and sangha), which served as a model 
for the Taoist Three Treasures (Pang, 1977, p. 106). The chief priest, 
now sitting in a meditative posture, creates a mandala of the Dia-
mond World (Jingang Jie, Vajradhatu) through a·series of mantras, 
mudras and visualizations. The Diamond World is one of many 
universes, each associated with a particular Buddha, and each having 
special characteristics that allow it to help speed enlightenment. The 
Diamond World is associated with Vairocana, the Buddha in the 
five-pointed crown. This part of the text has no parallel in the Taoist 
text used in Sanxia, but Honolulu Taoists have a similar section in 
which they create a mandala of the underworld (Pang, 1977, pp. 
111-13). 
Now the chief priest visualizes Guanyin (Kuan Im), the Bodhi-
sattva of mercy, sitting on a lotus blossom. The image expands until it 
merges with the chief priest and he becomes Guanyin. As Guanyin, 
the priest smashes open the gates of the underworld, ·and invites each 
kind of ghost to the ceremony. The lists of ghosts, and the des-
criptions of the ghosts, are very similar to the Taoist text. Each type 
of ghost is fed (by tossing rice and buns in front of the altar), urged to 
repent, fed again, and given Sweet Dew to drink, just as in the Taoist 
text. The ceremony ends by returning the ghosts to the underworld. 
A closer analysis of the text, and a comparison to the broader 
ideology of Buddhism, will penetrate the superficial similarities be-
tween the Buddhist and Taoist texts. 
The Buddhist and Taoist interpretations of ghosts differ fundamen-
tally from each other. The discussion of Buddhist cosmology above 
showed how the most important distinction is between enlightened 
and unenlightened beings. Hungry ghosts are a separate order of 
being, but their essential similarity to humans, demons, gods and the 
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rest of the unenlightened is primary. The Universal Salvation text 
reinforces this view. Although it emphasizes ghosts, the ritual is 
really for all beings of the Six Ordinary Planes, and the priest 
visualizes all of them in front of his altar. This is especially explicit at 
one point during the actual feeding of the ghosts: the chief priest 
reiterates his invitation to a range of hungry ghosts, and then also 
invites animals, demons, living humans (with the greedy and the 
nobility mentioned specifically), and even the gods (i.e ., of Taoism or 
the popular tradition) to join the ghosts in eating the offerings and 
listening to the sermons. 
Some of my Buddhist informants explicitly analyzed the ghostly 
plane as a metaphor for human greed. The text includes a description 
of the ghost who inspired this ceremony by appearing to Ananda, a 
disciple of the Buddha (illustrated in Figure 4.4) . 'Once the Arhat 
Ananda was meditating in a forest. During the night a Ghost King 
appeared to him. His mouth spat fire and his hair spewed smoke; his 
body was hideous and his joints sounded like a broken cart. His 
throat, entwined with flames of hunger, was as fine as a needle.' 
(YQYK, p. 14) Hungry ghosts have insatiable appetites and appro-
priately huge bellies, but their throats are so tiny that they can eat 
almost nothing. To make matters worse, fire consumes every bit of 
food they put to their mouths. There is a dual message: first, human 
desires can never be fulfilled and so should be transcended, and 
second, indulgence now must lead to suffering later. Hungry ghosts 
are a metaphor 'for human lust after worldly things. 
The sections of the text that describe and preach to the ghosts 
stress over and over the fruitlessness of worldly endeavors. I translate 
a single example: 
I sincerely invite you talented men of the schools. A student living 
in a thatched hut finds the apricot blossom [i.e., finishes third in the 
imperial examination] and enters the world of the literati. He 
travels to the thorned academy [i .e., examination hall] to take the 
examination. But now the glow-worm lamps [that provided light 
for a scholar too poor to afford oil] are scattered. Three years of 
work in vain! He rubbed through an iron inkslab [by writing so 
much and so diligently], and spent a decade overflowing with 
suffering. Alas! His name appears on a funeral banner in seven-
foot characters [indicating high rank], and a mound of yellow earth 
covers his compositions. Scholars and officials of this type, all 
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Figure 4.4 Guanyin appears to Ananda as a hungry ghost 
Source: YQYK 
ghosts of this rank, take advantage of the strength of the Three 
Treasures [Buddha, dharma, sangha). Rely on the esoteric mud-
ras. Come now to the Dharma Meeting! (YQYK, p. 44-5) 
The emphasis on the ultimate failure of all endeavors and the inevita-
bility of death typifies the entire text, and it contrasts with the Taoist 
affirmation of the genuine worth of wordly success. 
Ghosts illustrate the suffering created by being caught in the world 
Specialist Ghosts 121 
of illusion. They are part of the consistent dichotomy in the ritual, 
and in Buddhism as a whole, between mortals and Buddhas, greed 
and selflessness, sickness and health, pity and devotion . Buddhist 
ghosts are a metaphor for the greed that typifies all unenlightened 
beings; they are not simply the improper death that Taoism and the 
popular tradition emphasize . 
A look at the Esoteric Sect (Mi Jiao), from which the text origin-
ated , will further clarify the structure of the Buddhist Universal 
Salvation rites . The Esoteric Sect flourished in China in the Tang 
Dynasty, the period when the Yuqie Yankou was written .46 The text 
follows the general structure of Esoteric meditation: it begins with a 
purification , followed by visualization of a mandala of gods and a 
merging of the self and the gods (during which the ghosts are fed and 
preached to), and concludes with a return to the ordinary world. This 
occurs most importantly in the Universal Salvation text where the 
priest merges with Guanyin. Just as part of the interpretation of the 
Taoist Universal Salvation rites rests on a particularly Taoist medita-
tional tradition, the interpretation of the Buddhist ceremony rests in 
part on a structured meditational sequence that the ritual shares with 
other parts of Buddhism. 
The mandalas of the ritual also typify the Esoteric Sect. These are 
generally circular arrangements of Buddhas (or Bodhisattvas) and 
their avatars, each associated with the appropriate direction, color, 
power and so on. Mandalas are very appropriate for a structuralist 
analysis: each term is meaningful only in its contrast to a set of similar 
terms, and each set reproduces the structure of the other sets. 
Freemantle and Trungpa (1975) give an elaborate example of such a 
mandala, as it is worked out in the Tibetan Book of the Dead. The 
mandala of the Universal Salvation rites is simpler, but just as tightly 
structured. The Diamond World is one of an infinite number of 
worlds, each existing at once, each ruled by a Buddha, and each with 
an identical structure (see Figure 4.5) . The Diamond World rep-
resents the adamant , active nature of Vairocana and wisdom (zhi) . It 
is opposed to the Womb World (Taizang Jie , Garbhadhatu) , which is 
passive, represents cause and reason (li), and gives rise to the 
Diamond World . Like all of these worlds, the Diamond World rests 
on wheels of wind , water and land . Holy Mount Sumeru rises from its 
center, surrounded by seven smaller peaks. Four major continents 
surround the mountains. Each continent is associated with a direc-
tion , a color, a shape and a mantra; they make natural material for 
structural analysis. Two subcontinents flank each continent , and each 
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Figure 4.5 Mandala of the Diamond World 
• • • 
Source: Zhuhong, 1976, p. 183 
of them also has a direction, color, and so on. Without going into 
further detail, it should be clear that each mandala makes up a 
structurally defined set of correlations and interrelations. The parti-
cular system differs from Taoist correlations based on the five phases, 
but both rely on similar coded contrasts. Both codified systems form 
part of the explicit ideologies that priests must learn, and differ from 
the more piecemeal popular worship. 
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Buddhism, Taoism and Ideology 
The Buddhist and Taoist rituals mold a view of ghosts relatively 
independent from the broader political and economic contexts in 
which they occur. Both concepts of ghosts rely on their relationship 
to a broader ideology, based on a set of texts interpreted within the 
relatively institutionalized contexts of Buddhism or Taoism. The two 
Universal Salvation texts, the religious ideologies that encompass 
them, and the social institutions that channel their interpretation, 
combine to create a system of meaning relatively independent from 
the secular political economy in Taiwan. Reference to these broad 
systems of meaning differentiates Buddhist or Taoist religious inter-
pretation from the popular tradition. In the popular beliefs, for 
example, ghosts may be conceived of differently when they are 
appeased at a curing than when they are fed in the seventh month; 
the vicious ghosts that cause illness receive different kinds of rituals 
from the pitiful Universal Salvation ghosts. The Buddhist and Taoist 
clergy, in contrast, always treat ghosts consistently; Taoists perform 
the Universal Salvation on the last day of a ciou, and Buddhists may 
perform it on any occasion. The social organization of interpretation 
in Buddhism and Taoism creates a more consistent, ideologized 
religious discourse than the popular tradition. 
I do not, however, intend to imply that there is an unbridgeable 
void between ideologized and pragmatic interpretations. Some ex-
perts surely interpret their beliefs in light of particular circumstances, 
and non-experts systematize their beliefs to greater or lesser extents 
(see Chapter 6) . As a relative distinction, however, the conclusion 
here is useful - expert religion is more systematized , while popular 
religion is more pragmatic . 
This is consistent with the findings of some studies of Western 
political ideologies. Converse (1964) concludes that elite political 
beliefs are organize into a few wide-ranging systems whose objects 
are remote, generic and abstract. The political beliefs of non-elites 
are instead organized as clusters of ideas with few internal relation-
ships, whose objects are simple, concrete and close to home. Mann 
(1970, p. 435) argues similarly that 'only those sharing in societal 
power need develop consistent societal values' . 
In attempting to explain the world according to universal or eternal 
principles, intellectuals are striving quite deliberately to transcend 
context. They will make versions of a symbol that conflict in different 
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contexts into what they view as an explicit, systematized ideology. 
This analysis is consistent with the views of Geertz ( 1964b) and 
Weber (1951, 1968} on the need of intellectuals to create all-
encompassing systems of meaning: 
It is the intellectual who conceives of the 'world' as a problem of 
meaning. As intellectualism suppresses belief in magic, the world's 
processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, 
and henceforth simply 'are' and 'happen' but no longer signify 
anything. As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the 
world and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is 
significant and meaningful. (Weber, 1968, p. 506) 
Intellectuals extract meaning from the arena of everyday action and 
place it in a broader, more self-consciously systematized framework. 
Taoists in particular range widely from pragmatic to ideologized 
interpretations. Some consistently interpret their rituals in reference 
to Taoist meditation systems, the Three Pure Ones as abstract 
spiritual forces, and five-phase theory. Less 'orthodox' Taoists, 
however, may not know much of these abstract systems, and may 
interact more closely with the interpretations of their clients. This 
range in styles of interpretation rests on a range of social relations. 
The most pragmatic Taoists interact extensively with a paying clien-
tele and function as active members of the local political economy. 
More ideologized Taoists tie instead to a broader network of master-
pupil ties and ritual schools that transcend local boundaries. The 
most ideologized in late imperial Taiwan often interacted only margi-
nally with a clientele, depending instead on elite patronage for their 
livelihood (Saso, 1978, pp. 82-3). The ideologization of Taoism 
culminated traditionally in the great monasteries of mainland China, 
where Taoists could maintain their system of interpretation relatively 
free from the secular world. 
The range of variation within Buddhism is smaller in Taiwan than 
the range within Taoism. The majority of the modern Taiwanese 
Buddhist clergy maintains a very ideologized style of interpretation 
by demanding a high level of education that is controlled by a few 
major centers, and enforced by a relative isolation from the secular 
world. Both Buddhism and Taoism share their ideologized styles of 
interpretation with the traditional Chinese elite, and to a lesser 
extent, with the modern elite. 
5 Elites, Ideologies and 
Ghosts 
Local elites join everyone else in the community in popular religious 
performances. Elite styles of intepretation, however, differ syste-
matically from non-elite styles. I have so far distinguished only two 
main styles of interpretation - the more piecemeal, contextualized, 
pragmatic interpretations of the popular tradition, and the more 
explicit, universalized ideologies of Buddhism or Taoism. Analysis of 
the elite calls for further refinement: the modern elite often re-
interprets the active spirits of the popular tradition as passive models 
that inspire good behavior. This style of interpretation grows out of 
the traditional state cult, an ideologized religious system that the elite 
generally interpreted passively, and that they used as a form of 
ideological control. This chapter discusses the modern elite pantheon 
and traditional elite uses of the state cult, especially as the elite 
sometimes used the cult to promote religious unities that would serve 
its political interests. The chapter concludes with a return to the 
Universal Salvation festival. It examines state attempts to repress and 
to manipulate the ceremony over the last century, singling out 
especially the effects of varying styles of interpretation (pragmatic/ 
systematized, active/passive) on the successes and failures of the 
state's attempt to control a unified religion that would serve its own 
interests. 
Elite Styles of Interpretation 
I define the local elite primarily by economic position and by edu-
cation, and I use a broad definition in order to capture the real 
range of variation in a rural township like Sanxia, which hosts very 
few members of the top national elite. 47 For my purposes the local 
elite are people with a high school (or higher) education, and whose 
work ties them to the modern, national economy (big businessmen, 
and white-collar workers in government and business), rather than to 
local, more traditional sectors (farmers, laborers, small shop-
owners).48 I treat education and economic position together, because 
they correlate very strongly in Taiwan; the correlation in my ques-
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tionnaire sample is so high that the two factors are largely impossible 
to separate. Education and economic position were even more 
strongly connected for the traditional elite: the elite defined itself 
through educational achievement, education was a prerequisite to 
official political power, and families that achieved wealth through 
land or business consolidated their position by educating their 
children. 49 The educational system and economic position together 
comprise the social relations with which religious interpretations 
interact. 
Both the modern and traditional local elites participate actively in 
the popular religious tradition. They take part in daily worship at the 
household altar with the same frequency as everyone else, and they 
are visible participants in major community rituals like the Universal 
Salvation festival or Co Su Kong's birthday. I had originally expected 
that people would see a secular education (one of the elements of 
elite status) as leading people away from traditional religion, but I 
was wrong. When I asked people to agree or disagree with the claim 
that 'people with a high educational level are less likely to worship 
gods', only 22 per cent of the people interviewed agreed (16 per cent 
of the educated). Even more clearly, when I substituted 'ancestors' 
for 'gods' in the statement, only 8 per cent agreed (also 8 per cent of 
the educated). People perceive the educated as religious, because 
they feel that education develops morality. 
Nearly all Chinese felt that religion serves, in part, what we would 
call psychological or moral functions. I was told that worshipping, 
drinking tea made from incense ash, and other religious acts make 
people feel more at ease. My next door neighbor, for example, was 
fond of urging me to worship at the local community temple because 
my 'heart would be more peaceful' (sim khaq pieng an), rather than 
because this would make the god more favorable toward me. The 
popular tradition, however, also sees religion as more than a psycho-
logical crutch. Gods, ancestors and ghosts are real actors who can be 
dealt with just like visible beings. When people go to temples they 
want more than just to ease their minds: they want sons, wealth, 
success and help with a whole range of very real problems. The 
objects of popular worship, as of Buddhism or Taoism, are active 
beings who can have a visible effect on the world. 
Many of my elite informants, however, both young and old, saw 
the pantheon merely as a passive model, not as active beings. They 
scoffed at the idea of asking gods, ancestors and ghosts to grant 
favors. These people worshipped without expecting the objects of 
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their worship to take any action. Instead they saw gods, ancestors 
and ghosts as personified representatives of moral ideals. Worship, 
according to these informants, should serve only to commemorate 
the achievements of gods or ancestors while they lived, and to 
encourage the living to be equally virtuous. Religion inspires people 
to be filial children, hard workers, and loyal subjects of the state . 
Tan Kim-thian (discussed in Chapter 2), for example, says he 
burns incense only for his ancestors. Although he controls Sanxia's 
Ma Co temple, he says he only nods to gods, because so many of 
them do not express the proper virtues. Gods are a metaphor for a 
pure heart (liang sim).50 Another educated old member of the elite, 
whose father and maternal uncle had both held imperial degrees, 
explained: 'Worship of gods is a matter of respect for people with 
worthy accomplishments. There is no need to talk about divine 
protection (pou pi). Only your heart is important. I am not afraid of 
any gods.' These members of the modern local elite have not worked 
the pantheon into an explicit ideology like Buddhism, Taoism, geo-
mancy, or the state cult, but have instead transferred it, in varying 
degrees, from an active force to a passive model. 
One of the items on the questionnaire asked respondents to agree 
or disagree with the statement 'worship of gods is only to respect 
their accomplishments while alive, not to request their help'. Table 
5.1 shows that elite respondents are more likely to agree than 
non-elite respondents. 51 These answers also support the contention 
that educated elites tend to see as passive models the same beings who 
are more active in the popular tradition . Other questionnaire results 
lead to the same conclusion. The elite are significantly more likely 
than others to disagree that 'fate determines poverty or wealth' 
(Table 5.1) . They tend to agree with non-elite informants in asserting 
that religion is important to people, but to disagree with claims that 
spirits have real powers. 
Elites are also less likely than non-elites to agree that 'sooner or 
later science will be able to solve all problems; the power of religion 
will not be necessary' (Table 5.1). I found this result puzzling at first, 
because I would expect the opposite pattern in the United States. It 
suggests that the educated elite is more likely to see religion and 
science as serving separate functions - one is a moral model, the 
other is an explanation. Non-elites instead see science and religion as 
having overlapping functions, and can thus foresee a day when 
science would replace religion. 
Local elites generally take part in the Universal Salvation ritual, 
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Table 5.1 Attitudes Toward Religion 
1. Worship only for respect. 
Agree Don 't know Disagree 
Non-elite 49 11 28 
Elite" 15 10 10 
"x2 =4.67, p<O.l 
2. Fate determines wealth. 
Agree Don 't know Disagree 
Non-elite 49 14 25 
Eliteb 6 8 21 
bx2 =15.7, p<O.Ol 
3. Science will replace religion . 
Agree Don't know Disagree 
Non-elite 14 27 47 
Eli tee 2 7 26 
ci=4.87, p<O.l 
but generally within a passive framework. Lombard-Salmon (1975, 
pp. 471-8) provides a good instance of elite attitudes toward the 
Universal Salvation festival as performed by mostly Hokkien Chinese 
in Java around the turn of the century. Confucian reformists were 
attempting to do away with the ceremony, while equally educated 
traditionalists felt it should be reformed. The argument centered on 
whether or not the ceremony encouraged filial piety - no one 
mentioned concern over the condition of the ghosts or fear of ghostly 
reprisals. In this case, the active ghosts of the popular tradition again 
appear as passive models for the elite. 
An active principle (like the gods of the popular religion) can 
explain real events, and can be manipulated to achieve results in the 
world. Passive principles instead provide a model for ethical behav-
ior; they can be cited to support or condemn behavior, but they 
cannot be used directly to achieve empirical results. Western science 
is an active system in this sense; moral philosophy is passive. Weber's 
'magic garden of Taoism' is active . 
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Empirical evidence can support the existence of active forces , 
while it is less relevant to passive models. Thus, for example, Har-
rell's (1974b) conclusion that people believe more strongly in Taiwan-
ese rituals for whose efficacy they have empirical evidence reflects these 
people's active cosmology: only active beings could provide such evi-
dence. The passive elite pantheon, in contrast, explains nothing. It is 
only a model to illustrate traditional moral values, and many of the elite 
regard it explicitly as a tool for inculcating those values in people . 
My characterization of elite interpretations as passive is not absol-
ute. Active and passive interpretations are a relative distinction , and 
the same individual may use both in different contexts. The highly 
educated head of the temple to Co Su Kong, for example, always used 
passive interpretations in public and in interviews with me: he explained 
his service to the temple as a contribution to the community . Yet he 
was widely rumored to have become so involved in the temple 
because he felt that Co Su Kong had saved his son's life during the 
Second World War - a very active interpretation. Elites in late 
imperial China also occasionally wrote of active gods. Nevertheless, 
passive interpretation is a style that both the late imperial and 
modern Taiwanese elites use in abundance; in formal contexts like 
interviews, the modern elite (at least) uses this style almost exclus-
ively. 
State Cult, Ghosts and Political Control 
The modern Taiwanese elite cosmology is more passive than popular 
interpretations, but it is not more ideologized. The modern local 
elite , on the whole, speaks no more explicitly, and no more system-
atically about religion than other non-specialists. The modern elite 
differs in this from the late imperial elite who had a strongly ideol-
ogized religious platform in the state cult. 
Both traditional and modern elites, however, share their relatively 
passive style of interpretation of the personified cosmology. For 
example , Xunzi expressed similar ideas in the third century BC: 
When people try to save the sun or moon from being eclipsed, or 
when they pray for rain in a drought, or when they decide an 
important affair only after divination, they do so not because they 
believe they will get what they are after, but to use them as ornament 
to government measures. Hence the ruler intends them to be an 
ornament, but the common people think they are supernatural. It is 
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good fortune to regard them as ornamental, but it is evil fortune to 
regard them as supernatural. (Chan, 1963, p. 121) 
Modern passive styles of interpretation have their roots in earlier 
times. Whether modern or traditional, passive styles lend themselves 
to political ends. If people see gods as active forces, they follow the 
gods' instructions, but if gods are a passive metaphor, they become 
available as tools for political rhetoric. The elite (both late imperial 
and modern, national and local) has a political opportunity in the 
passive pantheon that most of its subjects interpret actively. The late 
imperial national elite took particular advantage of this opportunity 
leading it to ideologize religion more than the modern elite. Their 
generally passive, personified pantheon was a metaphor for ortho-
doxy; their control over deification and official ritual aimed to en-
courage popular obedience. The late imperial state ideology used this 
strategy for each of the major social topics of the popular tradition -
kinship, community and politics - helping to create diverse styles of 
interpretation within a unified set of social concerns. The following 
sections examine the political uses of the passive cosmology in the 
state cult and in the Universal Salvation festival. 
State Cult and Official Morality 
Although kinship did not play an important role within the state cult 
proper (except for worship of the Emperor's ancestors), it was always 
an important part of officially propagated morality. Both late imperial 
and modem elites (except for some Christians) take part in the ancestral 
cult, and both put extensive emphasis on non-religious expressions of 
kinship. Officials took extended leaves after the death of a parent, the 
Classic of Filial Piety was a required text, the Twenty-Four Filial Acts 
(a set of moral tales) were frequently cited, and so on. Even now, 
there is much official emphasis on the secular expression of filial 
piety. During my fieldwork, for example, the media carried the story 
of a Taibei girl who had copied one of the Twenty-Four Filial Acts-
she cut off a piece of her own flesh to use as medicine for her sick 
mother. In spite of some initial chastisement about superstition, the 
government presented her with a large monetary reward to commend 
publicly her filial piety. 
The late imperial government made similar attempts to promote 
proper kin morality among its subjects, by building memorial arches, 
for example, to chaste widows. This elite version of kinship is 
------- --- - ----
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passive; it has no place for the active ancestral spirits of the popular 
tradition. It was, in part, a political tool that promoted filial obedi-
ence in a state that drew explicit parallels between itself and the 
family. The Emperor was a father; he would be benevolent, and his 
subjects would be obedient. Yet the elite treatment of kinship was 
not simply a cynical political tool. Lineage ties and marital alliances 
were very important to the elite at all levels, and their emphasis on 
kinship, just like the non-elite emphasis on kinship, results in part 
from their ties to social relations in which kinship plays a large role. 
The shared concern with kinship thus results both from the widely 
shared social importance of kinsmen, and from elite attempts to 
universalize a certain view of kinship. 
The state cult and the popular tradition also share a general 
concern with community, but the styles of interpretation and their 
particular messages differ. The popular tradition defines communities 
primarily in horizontal opposition to each other. It recognizes secular 
administrative hierarchy only at the most local level: villages (under 
Earth Gods) are subsumed by the larger community (Sanxia, under 
Co Su Kong), but there are no further intervening units short of the 
central government (under the Jade Emperor) . The state cult, on the 
other hand, explicitly and accurately followed the secular administra-
tive hierarchy. 
The state cult required that four kinds of open altars be built in all 
administrative cities down to the xian (county) level. These included: 
(1) altars to the land and grain (sheji), (2) altars to wind-rain-thun-
der-clouds, (3) altars to mountains and rivers, and ( 4) altars to the 
unworshipped dead (/i) (Feuchtwang, 1976). Official rank and the 
place of the altar in the administrative hierarchy determined who 
could take part in rituals at these altars. All administrative cities also 
housed official City God temples and some official versions of tem-
ples to a few popular deities like Kuan Kong, who had been incorpor-
ated into the state cult. These temples were the main points of 
contact between the state and popular cults. When this system was 
actively functioning, it must have shown local communities simply as 
equivalent units in a nation-wide hierarchy rather than the indepen-
dent, closely knit entities that the popular religion stresses. 
This implies that at the local level, late imperial elites could use 
one or the other religious tradition to emphasize alternative mes-
sages. A magistrate, for example, would have been required to 
emphasize national solidarity by performing state rituals. Signifi-
cantly, worship at the open altars apparently fell into disuse in the 
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nineteenth century (Hsiao, 1960, p. 223), in a period of increasing 
local autonomy at the expense of the central government in China 
(Wakeman, 1975). A magistrate may also have chosen to bow to the 
local community, however, by worshipping at local unofficial tem-
ples, or by recommending a local hero for deification. After retire-
ment, many scholars and ex-officials became involved in local 
temples. 
The same alternatives exist for the modern elite in Taiwan, al-
though they no longer take the same form. Local temples still express 
local solidarity, while national solidarity is now shown by following 
the government policy of opposition to large religious displays, rather 
than through the defunct state cult. Thus, a man like Tan Kim-thian 
(see Chapter 2), who is trying to establish himself both as a local 
leader and a representative of the government and the Nationalist 
Party, must play a very complex game. He publicly affirmed his local 
commitment by taking over management of Sanxia's Ma Co temple, 
but emphasized his national commitment to a group of political 
leaders by recommending a thriftier and simpler performance of 
Sanxia's most important annual festival. 
Just as for kinship, the elite and popular traditions share a social 
concern for community, but differ in their emphases. The shared 
social concern, and national elite attempts to universalize their own 
version of community through the state cult, helped unite the elite 
and popular traditions; at the same time, different goals and social 
experiences of community helped to divide them. The local elite is in 
a position to take advantage of both versions. 
The popular tradition and late imperial elite uses of the state cult 
both feature heavenly parallels of secular bureaucracy, which rest on 
a unified social experience of politics, diverse particular understand-
ings of politics, and rhetorical use of the passive cosmology by the 
elite. One of the most important political uses of the state cult was to 
draft local heroes into national legitimacy by deifying them. This 
fostered what the government considered good moral values, but 
more importantly, prevented local heroes from being used as symbols 
by unofficial, and therefore unapproved, groups. While this plan may 
have worked well on some occasions, it could also lead to abuses. 
Powerful local elites often managed to get magistrates to recommend 
their ancestors for deification (Hsiao, 1960, p. 226--9). This would 
add to the prestige of already powerful families, but could also have 
effects opposed to the moral enlightenment the government in-
tended. In mid-Taiwan, for example, influential descendants of the 
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powerful strongman Lin Wencha convinced the government to deify 
him and build a temple to him in Taizhong. Lin Wencha, however, 
must have been a very unpopular figure in local minds, since he and 
his brother had taken advantage of a local rebellion to destroy their 
enemies and vastly increase the family's land and water holdings at 
the expense of their neighbors. Although the government intended to 
honor Lin's military achievements in Fujian, the temple probably 
harmed the imperial cause in the eyes of the victims of his more local 
tyranny (Meskill, 1979, p. 210). 
The national government also used religion to claim legitimacy 
directly for itself. Officials and gods were part of an interdigitated 
hierarchy, so that secular officials could promote gods, but at the 
same time, a new magistrate had to present his credentials to the 
local City God. Officials, and especially the Emperor, also com-
manded the skills that keep the supernatural order running smoothly. 
Hsiao translates a good example from an eighteenth-century magis-
trate: 
In the fourth month of the chi-yu year [1789), when I was leading 
my subordinates in rain prayer, [the images of) over twenty gods 
were carried [by rural inhabitants) ... to the hall of the yamen. 
Clerks of the Li-fang [Division of Rituals) ... requested me to 
perform the customary act of worship. I said 'This is not in 
accordance with the prescribed ritual form.' ... Thereupon elders 
of the villages knelt and beseeched [me to comply with the re-
quest) . I told them that ... 'the government has laid down definite 
rules prescribing the ritual forms to be followed by officials . . . ' 
Now the land gods of rural areas [the images of which you carried 
here] are the counterparts of the ti-pao [constables appointed by 
local officials- RPW) ... Local officials cannot treat ti-pao as their 
peers; how can land gods be treated as the equals of local officials? 
(Wang Hui-tsu , in Hsiao 1960, p. 632; brackets in original except 
as marked) 
Participation in official rituals also reflected political rank. No 
commoners could worship at the open altars, and the higher the level 
of a ritual, the higher the rank of the officials involved. The implica-
tion was again that officials were needed to keep the world function-
ing properly, and that ordinary people had no place at such .an 
important event. Even today, attendance at the annual ceremony for 
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the birthday of Confucius in Taiwan (the only vestige of the official 
religion) is by invitation only. 
The state cult allowed no independent authority to ghosts or other 
malevolent beings. A local populace might realize a symbiosis with 
bandits through the vicious 'ghosts' who pillaged the scaffold in the 
nineteenth century, and local Taoists might confirm such unofficial 
power through their alliances with malevolent spirits, but the state 
allowed only orthodox political arrangements. Religion for the elite 
was, in part, an aspect of government, and they emphasized its 
political facets, presented in the most orthodox light. 
The State and Ghosts 
The state in Taiwan has never been comfortable with popular perfor-
mances of the Universal Salvation festival, and its policies illustrate 
the political potentials of the pantheon, as different styles of interpre-
tation produce different versions of ghosts. Symbolically, the state 
could not legitimate the image of politically marginal ghosts - an 
illegitimate power that could demand protection money from the 
population. The . state instead maintained that it could control the 
unruly and care for the needy. Politically, the state wanted to dis-
courage the large, and especially the violent, crowds of the Universal 
Salvation festival. Economically, the state regretted the huge expen-
ditures of wealth on what it considered frivolity at best. Especially in 
the twentieth century, the state wants to promote investment in the 
modern industrial sector, rather than in the traditional sectors that 
benefit more from popular religion .52 
The various governments that have ruled Taiwan have tried vari-
ous combinations of repressing the Universal Salvation festival and 
manipulating it. In the long term, neither strategy has been success-
ful, and the explanation lies in popular styles of interpretation of 
ghosts. Attempts to repress undesirable realizations of ghosts largely 
failed because pragmatic interpretations of ghosts do not exist in any 
repressible social organization. The government could change peo-
ple's interpretations only by changing their political and economic 
experiences. Manipulation failed because the government could do 
no more than suggest their own ideology of ghosts to replace the old 
one, and had no mechanism to propagate the new ideology. People 
continued to interpret ghosts in light of their experiences; if the 
state's religious ideology did not fit experience, It was safely ignored. 
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The Universal Salvation festival, or parts of it, was repressed at 
least four times between 1860 and 1980. The first occurred in 1889, 
when Liu Ming-chuan, the first Chinese governor of Taiwan, made 
robbing the lonely ghosts illegal. Liu had no way of enforcing this 
ban, and it had no long-term effect. 
The second repression occurred in the first few years after the 
Japanese occupied the island in 1895. The Japanese state inserted 
itself much more effectively into local affairs than the traditional 
government could manage. The new government repressed religion 
at first; it burnt down a number of temples, including Sanxia's main 
temple, in retribution for attacks on the Japanese . After a few years, 
however, they relaxed their policy toward religion. Although they 
encouraged Japanese Shinto, Buddhism and Christian missionizing, 
they guaranteed religious freedom to the Taiwanese. They feared 
that systematic repression of popular religion would create unrest, 
and they preferred the minor problems of the religion to major 
political disruptions. 
By the late 1930s, Japan was at war on the Chinese mainland, and 
thus again adopted a repressive policy toward Taiwanese religion. 
The repression was at its worst just after the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident of 1937, when the Japanese invaded China. During this 
period, many areas (including Sanxia) set up Shinto societies under 
official urging. The government even removed the local god images 
from temples in a few areas, putting some in museums and burning 
others. They explained to the local people that their gods had been 
'promoted' to Heaven as Shinto deities (TWSZ, 12, pp. 292-5). The 
government soon softened its position on religion again, not wanting 
to create an internal battlefront by pushing the Taiwanese toward 
'Japanization' too fast. This period coincides with the low point in 
performances of the Universal Salvation festival. I have explained in 
Chapter 3 that changes in the economy were a crucial factor in 
changing the robbing of the lonely ghosts. The Japanese repression of 
the 1930s was also important. The government did not attack the 
festival itself, or people's ideas about ghosts. Instead they attacked 
the material core of all popular religion- temples and ritual perform-
ances of all kinds. As we shall see, this was the only occasion on 
which state interference had much effect. It worked because it 
attacked the concrete base of popular religion, directly bypassing 
popular ideas about ghosts. People's changing treatment of ghosts is 
irrelevant as long as there can be no material expression of their 
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ideas. Over the long run, however, the Japanese were not willing to 
risk further alienation of the population by repressing popular re-
ligion. Effective repression never lasted more than a few years. 
The Nationalist government conducted the fourth and final repress-
ion of the festival. The new government continued to fight a civil war 
on the mainland from 1945-1949, and there was major unrest in 
Taiwan at the same time. For these first few years, therefore, the new 
government also discouraged massive religious demonstrations like 
the Universal Salvation festival. In 1948, for example, newspapers 
reported that police in Yilan County and in Guanyin Xiang of Xinzhu 
County would disperse any performances of the Universal Salvation 
festival as part of the government policy of 'suppressing insurrection 
and being frugal' (kan Juanjie yue). Guanyin Xiang substituted a pig 
competition for the festival (XSB, 9 August, 1948, p. 6: 28 August, 
1948, p. 6). At the same time, however, Miaoli County had a large 
performance of the festival by five monks and 5000 spectators (XSB, 
19 August, 1948, p. 6). Even under the unsettled conditions in 
Taiwan, the repression of the festival was neither thorough nor 
completely effective. As the situation calmed down in Taiwan, the 
government relaxed its repression. I have found no later account of 
complete prohibition of the festival. 
Manipulation was the other method the state used to try to control 
the Universal Salvation festival. The late imperial Chinese govern-
ment made the most extended attempt to manipulate the popular 
interpretation of ghosts. The popular treatment of ghosts was unac-
ceptable to them. They feared the violent crowds that the Universal 
Salvation festival drew; they regretted the large expenditures of 
wealth that the festival required; and they could not condone the 
image of ghosts as politically marginal beings who had to be propi-
tiated because they could not be controlled. The state cult provided 
an entire religious ideology that was intended to supersede the 
popular conceptions. An altar for neglected spirits (li tan) stood in 
the suburbs of every administrative city, and it brought ghosts into 
the state cult. 
The state cult required magistrates to perform rituals at these altars 
three times each year. The spirits received offerings appropriate to a 
'common sacrifice' (qunsi) for deities at the lowest level of the cult, 
including Kuan Kong, the City God and others (Feuchtwang, 1976, 
pp. 585-7). In contrast to the popular offerings to ghosts, the official 
offerings thus did not mark ghosts as a marginal category. Instead, 
they treated ghosts as full, if low-ranking, members of the official 
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hierarchy. The official text that the magistrate was supposed to read 
further emphasizes how the government claimed to resolve the 
marginal status of ghosts, and to make them into orthodox citizens. It 
instructs ghosts to serve the purposes of the government: 
The Son of Heaven sacrifices to the deities Heaven and Earth and 
the mountains and rivers of the world; [the officials in charge of) 
the kingdoms (i.e. provinces) and each prefecture, district, and 
county sacrifice to the mountains and rivers within their territory, 
and to the deities [of their territories]; the common people sacrifice 
to their ancestors and to the deities of the neighborhood and the 
local altars. The rites to be performed by high and low differ in 
degree .. . [The ghosts') names have been blotted out of a sudden, 
the sacrificial rites to which they are entitled are unknown and 
unrecorded. These lonely souls have no one on whom to depend in 
death ... Whatsoever persons there be among the people of our 
county who are obstinate and unfilial and do not hold in respect the 
six relationships (i.e. father and mother, eldest and younger 
brothers, wife, and child): who rob and defraud in defiance of the 
public laws; who subvert the honest and oppress good citizens; who 
run away from the police or maintain themselves by preying on 
poor households- such confirmed evildoers, such corrupt, lawless 
fellows you shen [spirits) must report to the [City God for 
punishment] . . . If there be persons who filially obey their par-
ents, keep on friendly terms with their kinsmen, stand in awe of 
the magistrate, respect the li and the law, who do not act as they 
ought not to, who are good and upright persons - these you shen 
must make known to the [City God) and secretly protect .. . (from 
a Fengshan Xian, Taiwan, gazetteer, in Thompson, 1975, pp. 
27Q-2). 
The state thus denies any independent, marginal power to the ghosts, 
and asserts instead its control over them, and its ability to ease their 
suffering. The ghosts here appear almost like yamen runners or local 
constables (dibao, who help the magistrate in local control, but who 
are generally disliked and feared by people). An alternative text turns 
things around slightly: it instructs the City God to have good and 
upright spirits reborn as humans, and to punish evil spirits (Hsiao, 
1960, pp. 63Q-1). Ghosts in this second text are less a part of the 
government than in the first text, but they are just as thoroughly 
under the control of the government. In both cases, the City God (as 
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godly equivalent of the magistrate) controls the ghosts. The state 
claims to fulfill the ideal roles of a state: it protects the people from 
harm, and provides welfare for its most unfortunate citizens. 
Hsiao (1960, p. 223) writes that the ghostly part of the state cult 
had died out in many parts of China by the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. This was apparently not entirely true of Taiwan. 
Official altars were built and rebuilt throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in Taiwan (TWSZ, 18, pp. 103--4). It is not clear 
that official rituals were performed at all of these altars , but people 
did use them to store coffins of bodies awaiting the proper geomantic 
moment for burial, or of people too poor to afford a burial. Here 
again, the government could legitimize itself through the ghost altars; 
it provided a real welfare function for the bodies of just those people 
who were most ghostly, those who were too poor or too socially 
isolated to be given a normal burial. The continuing official emphasis 
on li tan in nineteenth-century Taiwan may reflect government con-
cern with the increasing popularity of the Universal Salvation festival 
in Taiwan. The official ghost altars were the primary ideological 
weapon with which the government could attempt to undercut the 
popular vision of ghosts. 
An early nineteenth-century subprefect of Gemalan (now Yilan 
County) made one of the most inventive attempts to manipulate the li 
tan to foster a new image of ghosts. Like much of Taiwan, this area 
had been wracked by frequent battles between Chinese and abori-
gines, and among Chinese with different places of origin on the 
mainland (primarily Hakka, Hokkien from Zhangzhou, and Hokkien 
from Quanzhou). The subprefect forced about two thousand rep-
resentatives of the feuding groups to attend a ritual at the official 
ghost altar. Just as tablets for the ghosts were placed at the right and 
left sides of the altar, he arranged all the Zhangzhou people at the 
left, all the Quanzhou people and Hakka at the right, and sat all the 
aborigines on the ground in the middle. Various officials made the 
usual state cult offerings for ghosts, and the subprefect read a special 
sacrificial text. The text described the violent settlement of the area. 
He explained that the many deaths that resulted created an evil force 
(li qi) of starving ghosts. 'Random gravemounds lie hither and 
thither; the bones lie abandoned and rotten, unidentifiable. Liver 
and brain are obliterated, without even five feet of land (for a proper 
burial] .' Fortunately, he explained, the Emperor has put a stop to the 
bloodshed by his generous policies. Peaceful humans mean peaceful 
ghosts: 
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If enemies who hate one another will discuss matters together, they 
themselves can dispel the evil forces .. . Thus, humans and ghosts 
will be at peace; the people and the aborigines will find permanent 
happiness. Coming from different directions and far away places, 
all will come to resemble the golden age of [the legendary Emper-
ors] Shun and Yao. Stagnant souls and wronged spirits become 
peaceful wind and sweet rain. (Yao, 1957, pp. 85-7) 
Ghosts are again clearly a metaphor for the humans of the district, 
but unlike the popular ceremony, this ritual denies their autonomous 
power. It stresses instead that the government has brought these 
marginal elements into orthodoxy. The government claims to have 
them in its control. 
Even this systematic attempt to manipulate the ghost cult for 
specific government purposes had little apparent success. In general, 
the great majority of the population ignored the rites of the official 
cult . If the official ideology of ghosts had any effect at all, it must have 
concentrated primarily on the elite, who were the main people in 
attendance. The state had no mechanism beyond its official ritual to 
propagate its version of ghosts. Its alternative to the popular cult was 
primarily a systematized set of ideas, in which ghosts were the 
unfortunate dead who were brought into the official hierarchy by a 
generous government. The state failed to propagate this ideology 
successfully for two reasons: (1) They had no effective social organiz-
ation that could impose this interpretation as the correct reading of 
ghosts. The official reading existed only in the writings of the elite 
(like Yao Ying's sacrificial text above) and in the performances of the 
state cult. Neither form had any significant contact with the bulk of 
the population. There was no institution through which the state 
could effectively impose its ideology. (2) The popular understanding 
of ghosts was pragmatically tied to changing political and economic 
experiences of marginality (see Chapter 3). It concentrated in the 
nineteenth century on a politically marginal population that the state 
did not control. The official version of ghosts thus simply did not 
mesh with people's real experience of marginality. The state could 
not manipulate the popular ideology of ghosts, because there was 
little worked-out popular ideology beyond the general contrast of 
ghost with gods and ancestors. The popular understanding of ghosts 
was flexible and bound to experience. It could not be fought simply at 
the level of ideas, and the government was incapable of fighting it at 
any other level. 
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The Japanese made no significant attempt to manipulate popular 
treatment of ghosts. They never accepted Chinese religion enough 
to offer alternative interpretations of ghosts. They thus influenced 
popular religion by repressing it entirely for short periods, or by 
offering wholesale alternatives like Shinto or Japanese Buddhism. 
Neither strategy was applied thoroughly enough to have many long-
term effects. 
Popular religion underwent a resurgence after the first few years of 
Nationalist rule. By 1950, the Universal Salvation festival again 
thrived. Markets were crowded and prices were high in the seventh 
month. Beggars frequented major temples. In Beitou, a northern 
suburb of Taibei noted for its nightlife, a major temple sacrificed 200 
pigs, and the bar girls asked for the night off (XSB, 29 August, 1950, 
p. 5). The same article that reported the popularity of the festival 
made some attempt to suggest a new image of ghosts. Watching the 
people free to worship in Taiwan reminded the reporter of the 
suffering of those who could neither live nor die in peace on the 
mainland. Ghosts, he was suggesting, were the people living under 
Communist rule, and people should contribute their money to efforts 
to retake the mainland rather than wasting their wealth on popular 
religion. 
The decades that followed continued to see official attempts to 
discourage the ceremony. As time went on, these attempts became 
more rhetorical and less repressive. The 1948 slogan about suppress-
ing insurrection and being frugal became 'rigorously enforce frugal-
ity' (li xing jie yue) by 1955 (XSB, 2 september, 1955, p. 5), and had 
eased still further to 'encourage frugality' (gu li jie yue) by 1960 
(XSB, 3 September, 1960, p. 3). Frugality became the overriding 
ideological theme; mutual feasting, ritual food offerings, and the 
festival itself were blamed for wasting precious resources that could 
have been used to help retake the mainland, to build Taiwan's 
economy, or to help the needy at home. There is an implicit similarity 
to the late imperial state cult view of ghosts. Ghosts are the needy, 
and the people should contribute to the government, who will help 
those in need, rather than to the ghosts themselves. The government 
also tried a secondary ideological theme, which held that the festival 
was really a Buddhist ceremony of filial piety for deceased ancestors, 
and that people should thus stop offering meat and forget all about 
pitiful or dangerous ghosts. 53 This ideal also harks back to the state 
cult's denial that ghosts really form a marginal category outside 
government control. Modern official attempts to manipulate the 
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meaning of ghosts are not as systematized as the state cult had been, 
but both manipulations shared the vain effort to undercut the politi-
cal and economic experience that shaped popular treatment of 
ghosts. 
Newspaper accounts of the Universal Salvation festival in 1960 
illustrate both many of the official attempts to manipulate the festi-
val, and their general failure. By this time, the government had 
largely succeeded in what would be its only victory in this battle; it 
had gotten people to perform the ritual primarily on the fifteenth of 
the seventh lunar month, rather than on various days scattered 
throughout the month. On the lunar thirteenth (3 September), the 
government held meetings to discourage people from sacrificing 
whole pigs or from offering large feasts. They were supposed to 
contribute the money they saved to local reconstruction. Each area 
would report how much it had saved, and the most successful would 
receive prizes (XSB, 3 September, 1960, p. 3) . The next day, how-
ever, the financial section reported that the price of pork was much 
higher, and that to meet the demand for pork offerings, 1500 pigs 
would be killed for the Taibei market that day, and 1800 were 
planned for the next day. This contrasted with a normal average of 
1030-40 pigs per day (XSB, 4 September, 1960, p. 6) .54 On the lunar 
fifteenth in 1960, the papers again urged frugality and donations to 
the poor. Although the ceremony would not take place until that 
afternoon, the paper also claimed that people in Taibei were indeed 
more frugal than before. An editorial on the same page, however, 
gave a very different impression. It said that the government was 
holding its meetings again this year, but that they would probably 
have no more effect than they had in any other year (XSB, 5 
September, 1960, p. 3). It was thus already clear by 1960 that the 
government was not having any effect. 
When I saw the festival in 1976, 1977 and 1978, the government 
had already given up on its meetings, although it continued to 
editorialize about frugality, the evils of conspicuous consumption, 
and the real meaning of the ceremony being filial piety. The indirect 
effects of the government campaign appeared at the meeting in 
Sanxia's Co Su Kong temple (which I discussed in Chapter 2), where 
Professor Li and Tan Kim-thian suggested that Sanxia institute some 
of the government's frugality measures. They wanted to require 
people to bring only vegetable offerings. Various aspects of the 
temple reconstruction required government approval, and Professor 
Li was under pressure to cut down on the temple's rituals or face 
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denial of his requests. As I discussed, the people of Sanxia simply 
ignored the suggested reforms. Government pressure through the 
temple had no effect. Each year the officials express their position, 
and each year the people ignore that position. 
The Nationalist government failed to discourage lavish expendi-
tures on the Universal Salvation festival for the same reasons that the 
traditional government failed. First, it created no institution that 
could impose its version of ghosts as the correct reading. The meet-
ings it sponsored during the first years of its regime were a step in that 
direction, but they probably did not reach the public much better 
than the state cult rituals had. Second, popular interpretations of 
ghostly marginality are shaped by political and economic experience. 
As long as the interpretation of ghosts is tied to experience, it qmnot 
be countered simply at the level of ideas. 
The Limits to Mystification 
The passive elite cosmology lent itself easily to political uses. Elite 
manipulation began with some of the unified concerns of Chinese 
religion- especially kinship, community and politics- trying to foster 
a particular interpretation that favored their position. The elite saw 
its passive pantheon, in part, as a mechanism of social control. 
Some Marxists have argued the more extreme case that ideologies 
in general support the ruling class by mystifying the true nature of 
power, by disguising contradictions in the social system, and by 
supporting traditional authority. Godelier (1975, p. 84), for example, 
argues that religion among the Pawnee and Wichita served such a 
mystifying function: 'Religion legitimates the domination of the 
chiefs of the dominant lineages . But one also perceives that this 
domination is shared by both the dominated and the dominating. 
There inheres in religion, therefore, the source of a violence without 
violence, the ideal cement for exploitative social relations. '55 
Mystification theories illuminate certain aspects of Chinese re-
ligion. The widely shared heavenly bureaucracy, for example, helps 
make secular politics seem natural and beyond questioning. Yet 
analysis of the Universal Salvation festival shows attempts at religi-
ous domination could fail. Even when much religious symbolism 
was shared (as for feeding ghosts), differing styles of interpretation 
created a greater religious diversity than mystification theories recog-
nize. 
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After a review of the dominant ideologies of feudal and capitalist 
Europe , Abercrombie and Turner (1978, p. 149) conclude that: 
There is good evidence that the subordinate classes are not incor-
porated into the dominant ideology and that, by contrast, the 
dominant classes are deeply penetrated by and incorporated within 
the dominant belief system. In most societies the apparatus of 
transmission of the dominant ideology is not very efficient and, in 
any event , is typically directed at the dominant rather than the 
subordinate class. 
The Universal Salvation festival and the state cult support the same 
conclusion. The government manipulation of ghosts consistently 
failed because it could not penetrate popular styles of interpretation. 
Mystification theories point to an important pressure on Chinese 
religion to conform to the structure of power, and the traditional elite 
increased those pressures through the state cult . Yet they never 
succeeded in fully controlling the interpretations of other groups . 
The particular styles of interpretation of non-elites, and the social 
relations in which they exist , always created a counter-pressure 
against a complete and effective hegemony. Unity and diversity in 
Chinese religion thus interlock. The general concern of the entire 
secular population with kinship, community and politics helped to 
unify religion around those concerns. Yet the varying social relations 
of different segments of the population led to diverse styles of 
interpretation , and allowed that diversity to persist in spite of official 
attempts to impose a unified religious ideology. 
6 Unities, Diversities and 
Reinterpretation 
Chinese religion is neither simply unified nor simply diverse. The 
varying social relations of its adherents allow interpretation and 
reinterpretation of religious symbols to create both unities and 
diversities. Approaching these interpretations as active processes in a 
social context has helped analyze three main points about Chinese 
religion in Taiwan: 
(1) Different groups utilize fundamentally diverse styles of inter-
pretation. At one extreme, the popular tradition offers no systematic 
explanations for most religious acts. People interpret much of their 
religion piecemeal, in relation to the immediate social context. The 
religious ideologies of the state cult and accomplished Buddhists or 
Taoists are more systematized or more passive. Institutionalized 
social relations, such as those promoted by the state or a monastery, 
develop religious ideologies most fully, and they control interpreta-
tion by enforcing their own version of orthodoxy. 
(2) Religious interpretations may change as social conditions 
change. Less ideologized interpretations may change more flexibly, 
because they escape most institutional control. More ideologized 
beliefs change as their institutions change, or when those institutions 
lose control over their ideologies. 
(3) Unities and diversities across styles of interpretation rest on the 
particular social relations of the people involved. Basic unities -like 
a religious concern for secular politics, community and kinship -
persist because they fit the experience of many social groups. Groups 
like the state or the priestly elite push for unity by trying to univer-
salize their own positions. Yet the flexibility of religion allows diverse 
social groups to offer very different reinterpretations of unified 
ooncerns. 
This chapter examines each of these conclusions in more detail, 
and expands on them by supplementing the Universal Salvation rites 
with data from other aspects of Chinese religion. It concentrates 
especially on the political and social implications of religious unities 
and diversities. 
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Diverse Interpretations 
I have analyzed the styles of interpretation in the Universal Salvation 
rites using two broad dimensions: pragmatic/systematized, and 
active/passive. Gods, ancestors and ghosts in the popular tradition 
usually get pragmatic, active interpretations. People talk about these 
spirits, and behave toward them, as if they were embodied beings 
who really affect the world. Many people recognize the moral or 
psychological functions of religion, and many also see it as a meta-
phor for the secular world, but the convincing qualities of the popular 
tradition stem above all from the active reality of its spirits. 
Most people do not systematize their interpretations very thoroughly. 
The simple gods/ancestors/ghosts distinction, and its structural reflec-
tions in incense, paper spirit money, and other ritual media, sets the 
basis for interpretation, but it does not determine people's specific 
understandings. Instead their interpretations have a strong pragmatic 
element- ghosts, for example , exist in relation to the current politi-
cal , social and economic contexts, as well as in relation to gods and 
ancestors. Thus, the structural contrast of ghosts to gods and ances-
tors has not changed over the last century, but pragmatic interpret-
ations of ghosts have been transformed from dangerous bandits to 
pitiful beggars. The popular tradition has little systematized ideology 
of ghosts (beyond the contrast with gods and ancestors) that would 
lead people to a particular interpretation, nor does it have any 
institution that might preserve and promulgate a systematized in-
terpretation. 
Other religious traditions ideologize their beliefs by making them 
more systematized or more passive. Systematized interpretations 
claim to be aloof from the political and economic influences on 
popular interpretations, and they claim to resolve the contradictions 
across social contexts that characterize the popular tradition . Buddhist 
or Taoist interpretations of ghosts, for example ,"do not change from 
one ritual context to the next (as popular interpretations do). 
In reality, systematized ideologies, like any system of meaning, can 
be reinterpreted in new social contexts. Institutions try to protect 
their ideologies from reinterpretation by controlling the context -
they teach , legitimize, and enforce 'orthodox' interpretations, and 
they record those interpretations in texts, whose interpretations they 
must protect in turn. The form of the institution can range from the 
master-pupil ties of modern Taiwanese Taoism or geomancy to the 
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more powerful control of monastic Buddhism or the traditional state 
cult. The popular tradition has the least control over context: there is 
no priesthood, there are no initiations into the religion, and popular 
temples make only weak attempts to control interpretation (as in the 
failed attempt to control offerings to the ghosts at the Co Su Kong 
temple). The popular tradition remains more pragmatic than the 
other traditions, and more open to immediate reinterpretation as the 
political economy changes . 
The modern, and at least some of the traditional, elite often uses 
passive interpretations of religion . The active spirits of other tra-
ditions become metaphors that lead people to proper behavior. The 
elite stresses the moral and psychological functions of religion, but 
generally dismisses the possibility of using active spirits to achieve 
real empirical results. Passive interpretations encouraged the elite to 
use religion as a political tool, as when they deified patriots, raised 
memorial arches to chaste widows, or brought warring factions 
together to worship the ghosts. 
The more ideologized styles of interpretation are strongest when 
an institution controls interpretation by limiting access to texts, and 
by channelling reinterpretation. Professionals monopolize these sys-
tems, thus protecting their means of livelihood. If everyone knew 
how to write charms, for example, the income of some specialists 
would be reduced sharply. Taoists are not content to rely on the 
complexity of their traditions to make it difficult for others to learn 
their trade secrets; they actively restrict access to their knowledge by 
not writing down some information, by accepting few students, and 
by restricting the information given even to those few students. 
These limitations on learning religious knowledge encourage most 
people to reinterpret specialist rituals in terms familiar to them. 
Most people usually relate the visible bits and pieces of these systems 
to concepts of the popular religion, in contrast to specialists who draw 
on their more ideologized interpretations. In Taoism, for example, the 
reinterpretation is straightforward, because most public rituals share 
the public pantheon. Thus at a ciou, people see the worship of the 
Emperor of Heaven and of the ghosts as the two most important 
rituals, since both resemble rituals they themselves perform. The 
meditative rituals associated with the more uniquely Taoist Three 
Pure Ones are performed in private inside the temple. People do not 
understand the details of the performance, nor do they have access to 
the texts, even in public rituals to known gods. 
I have already discussed at length how the styles of interpretation 
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of people in different social conditions lead to diverse reinterpretations 
of the ghost festival. The remainder of this section clarifies this process 
of reinterpretation of shared symbolic systems for two further areas: 
geomancy and communication with the gods. 
Geomancy Reinterpreted 
Geomancy is a technique to harmonize the cosmological characteris-
tics of the time, the landscape, and individual people. People hire 
geomancers to find the best sites for graves (yin dwellings) in order to 
benefit the descendants, and for houses (yang dwellings) in order to 
benefit the residents. Graves are invariably sited under the guidance 
of a geomancer. Even Christians sometimes rely on geomancers to 
site graves. Although modern houses are generally built without the 
help of a geomancer, his help is still considered necessary for houses 
built in the traditional style. In either case, people often ask geo-
mancers to determine the proper placement of the domestic altar. 
Geomancers do not help plan new towns in Taiwan, but geomancy 
often becomes an after-the-fact explanation for a community's for-
tunes (for examples, see DeGroot, 1897, pp. 949-51; Aijmer, 1968). 
The sophisticated workings of geomancy and its basis in five-phase 
theory were traditionally the province of the educated elite, although 
the elite were rarely professional practitioners. Of all the practi-
tioners of five-phase theory, geomancers were the most respectable 
and had the highest elite pretensions. According to DeGroot, the 
geomancer 
assumes all the airs of the literati and the gentry, dresses, as they 
do, in a long gown, wears a pair of large spectacles, though not 
short-sighted, and awes his patrons by . .. speaking a mystifying, 
learned jargon, and by apocalyptic utterances of which the ordin-
ary Chinaman understands nothing . . . About all their move-
ments there is an air of classic decorum; and it is no wonder, 
therefore, that the masses regard the geomancers as fountains of 
wisdom, marvels of learning, capable of fathoming all the myste-
ries of heaven and earth. (De Groot, 1897, p. 1010) 
Freedman also felt that because geomancers have access to a 
technical system not tied to popular religion, they 'are held in an 
esteem not shared by other religious practitioners. They are gentle-
men and attract the curiosity of gentlemen' (Freedman, 1966, 
p. 124). My own primary informant on geomancy was a wealthy man, 
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the son of one of Sanxia's few traditional degree-holders. Not all 
geomancers, however, were kindly old scholars. Some knew only 
enough to convince their customers, others manipulated their recom-
mendations to increase profits, some were in it only because they 
failed the traditional examinations. DeGroot's sarcasm was not en-
tirely unfounded. Nevertheless, people continue to associate geo-
mancy, and five-phase theory in general, with scholarship. Highly 
structured ideologies like geomancy are difficult to learn, because an 
entire system must be mastered. In addition, specialists tend to guard 
their knowledge as trade secrets. Interpretations of five-phase theory 
are just as tied to institutionalized systems of socialization as other 
ideologies like Buddhism or Taoism. In fact, geomancers go through 
a system of apprenticeship much like the system I have already 
described for the Taoists. 
Geomancy and five-phase theory provide an abstract explanation 
of the world that bypasses the personified spirits of the other tra-
ditions I discuss. Both five-phase theory and Western science, the 
two primary sets of impersonal explanations in Taiwan, are strongly 
ideologized. Like Western science, the concepts of five-phase theory 
are not self-evident, and only people with extensive educations can 
interpret the theory in detail. 
Five-phase theory, like Buddhism, Taoism or the popular tra-
dition, explains the world. They all answer questions like why people 
get sick, how they get wealthy, and so on. Yet five-phase theory 
differs from the others by answering these questions through the 
analysis of various impersonal, natural forces like yin and yang. 
Geomancy thus allows identification of another range in styles of 
interpretation, from the impersonal categories of five-phase theory, 
to the personified beings of the popular tradition. As this section will 
show, other traditions consistently reinterpret the geomancer's im-
personal categories as personified beings. 
I will give just a single example of how geomancers analyze a site, 
based on descriptions common to many geomancy manuals and 
generally used by Taiwanese geomancers. (Appendix A gives a more 
detailed discussion of professional geomancy, emphasizing tech-
niques not discussed in the Western literature .) A structure of imper-
sonal categories, called the four animals (si shou), describes the 
immediate vicinity of a site. These are the Azure Dragon (qing long, 
associated with east, spring, wood and the birth of yang), the Red 
Bird (zhu que, associated with south, summer, fire, maximum yang), 
the White Tiger (bai hu, associated with west, autumn. metal and the 
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Figure 6.1 Embracing the Site 
Source: Ye, 1973, Juan 2, p. 17 
birth of yin), and the Sombre Warrior (xuan wu, either a turtle or a 
turtle and a snake entwined in intercourse, associated with north, 
winter, water and maximum yin). Ideally, a site has its back to the 
North, from which the mountain protects it. The Azure Dragon is an 
embracing arm of hills to the left (ascendant, yang) side, and should 
be slightly larger than the White Tiger hills at the right (yin) side. 
The front of the site (Red Bird) should be a clearing proportional to 
the size and importance of the grave or dwelling. It should contain 
gently flowing water, and it should be blocked by another hill in the 
distance. 56 Figure 6.1 shows a mountain chain with potential sites 
marked by circles. Many sites, of course, do not face exactly South. 
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No matter what the direction, however, the Sombre Warrior is the 
back, the Red Bird is the front, and so on. In geomancy, therefore, 
the Four Animals effectively refer to the front, back and sides of the 
site, not to the cardinal points. Note that the concrete characteristics 
of dragons, birds, tigers and turtles are irrelevant; they are simply 
names for impersonal concepts. 
Geomancy's use of such impersonal forces made it a less obvious 
social metaphor than the other traditions, and its esoteric, relatively 
institutionalized theoretical system helped guard it from easy re-
interpretation. The specialist interpretation of geomancy is relatively 
insulated from the political economy; geomancers do not constantly 
reinterpret the general meaning of the White Tiger, the way the 
popular tradition reinterprets ghosts. Geomancy is not, however, 
apolitical for the elite; specific applications of geomancy do react to 
the political context. Geomancy could claim a morally neutral em-
pirical basis (and thus avoid the official damnation that met some 
religious groups), but the particular uses of its findings often had 
political implications. 57 
On the one hand, geomancy can support traditional authority. It 
ties directly into the system of Neo-Confucian philosophy, which the 
imperial government adopted as its basis. It emphasizes a balanced 
interaction between man and the world, which is controlled best by 
people with intellectual and temporal power (especially the Em-
peror). It affirms the official view of society as a meritocracy where 
the most capable are the most educated and thus given the most 
power. 
On the other hand, however, geomancy's reliance on morally 
neutral impersonal forces allows the use of geomancy without respect 
for authority, or even in opposition to it. For example, insurgents in 
· imperial times sometimes destroyed imperial tombs, hoping to 
undermine the dynasty by ruining its geomancy (DeGroot, 1897, p. 
1052). DeGroot (1897, p. 1052) even suggested that 'should Euro-
pean armies have for a second time to march on Peking, it will be 
worth while trying whether the campaign cannot be shortened and 
loss of life spared by a military occupation of the burial ground of the 
Imperial Family'. 
Geomancy also helped ignite the lineage feuds that often plagued 
the traditional government; one group would try to steal the propi-
tious· dragon veins of another (e.g., Baker, 1979, pp. 219-25). The 
authorities frowned on this use of geomancy, as in a section of the 
Qing legal code translated by DeGroot: 
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If some one, coveting another's burial ground which brings good 
luck (to the offspring), has fraudulently dug up a grave of ancient 
date, and the descendants of that dead person lodge a complaint 
against him with the magistrates, who, on investigating the case, 
find incontestable proofs of the crime, the perpetrator thereof shall 
be condemned to strangulation. (DeGroot, 1897, p. 878) 
Geomancy also allowed people to challenge the building of missions 
and railroads in the nineteenth century (DeGroot, 1897, pp. 1042-9). 
Similarly, people in the New Territories often demand government 
restitution for the geomantic damage done by new construction. 
Thus, among the elite, geomancy sometimes supported traditional 
authority, and sometimes opposed it. This political ambivalence was 
possible because the systematized, active and impersonal style of 
interpretation in elite geomancy allowed it to appear politically 
neutral. 
Freedman (1966, p. 126) described geomancy as an amoral system 
in which 'the dead were passive agents, pawns in a kind of ritual game 
played by their desc.endants with the help of geomancers'. He con-
trasted the competitive uses of geomancy to ancestral tablet worship, 
which he saw as stressing moral goals and family harmony. 
Whereas in ancestor worship men are under the dominance of their 
dead fathers (and of the dead of remoter generations), so that a 
hierarchy of forebears imposes a restraint upon the relations of 
living descendants, in the geomancy of burial men liberate them-
selves from their ancestors to give themselves up to an anarchic 
pursuit of narrow self-interest. (Freedman, 1966, p. 142). 
Freedman's distinction supports the claim that members of the edu-
cated elite distinguish between a moral, animate, 'religious' system 
(including tablet worship) that affirms traditional values of harmony, 
filial piety, etc., and an amoral, impersonal 'theoretical' system 
(including geomancy) that can make more varied statements, and can 
even go against the grain of official moral principles like fraternal 
respect. 
Several authors, however, have suggested that Freedman's distinc-
tion may be valid only for professionals in the theory (Ahern, 1973; 
Li, 1976; and, briefly, Freedman himself, 1966, p. 126). Indeed, a 
closer look shows that the popular tradition thoroughly reinterprets 
geomancy, transforming it from a systematized, impersonal theory to 
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a pragmatic, personified set of beliefs. Geomancy may contrast with 
religion and morality for the elite, but it is part of religion in the 
popular tradition. 
Few people can afford the geomantic manipulations that can create 
intra-family competition. The great majority of families bury their 
dead in public graveyards, where geomancers only align the direction 
of the coffin. My findings in Sanxia tally with Ahern's (1973, pp. 
185-8) that geomancy is not an important weapon in fraternal com-
petition. Thus the poor, who cannot afford to find ideal geomantic 
sites, are also unlikely to challenge official kinship morality by using 
geomancy as an amoral tool for the pursuit of narrow s~lf-interest. 
Amoral geomancy remained a technique for the elite. 
Freedman, however, argues that the interpretations of geomancy 
by different people are essentially alike: 
Just as in Neo-Confucian philosophical writings the concretizing 
words shen and kuei [gui] (which are ordinarily translatable as gods 
and demons, respectively) are used for positive and negative 
spiritual forces, beings stripped of their anthropomorphic 
connotations . . . so in popular religion a reverse transformation is 
worked by which the disembodied forces of the geomancer are 
turned into personal entities. (Freedman, 1969, p. 10) 
Freedman concludes that this change is a surface transformation 
(from impersonal to personified) of a shared deep structure. Yet this 
transformation has more far-reaching implications than Freedman 
discussed. The popular version of geomancy is personified and active, 
as Freedman contends. It is also combined, however, with the perso-
nified and active world of gods, ghosts and ancestors. As a result, 
popular geomancy shares the political and social messages of the 
popular cosmology, and contrasts with the elite versions of both. In 
the popular version, ancestors in the grave become active beings who 
enforce kinship values. Geomancy is no longer the amoral, flexible, 
impersonal system of the professional. 58 
There are several types of evidence for this popular reinterpretation 
of geomancy. First, spirit mediums (tang-ki) often ascribe problems of 
the living to geomancy (Li, 1976). Although the reasons for these 
problems sometimes include the grave being in the wrong location, 
other reasons run counter to the professional tradition: the ancestor 
is uncomfortable or unsafe in the grave, the descendants neglect the 
spirit in the grave, an ancestor regrets being buried with a person he or 
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she does not like, and so on. Geomancy in this view is a world of 
animate, moral beings. 
Secondly, in ordinary conversations people often stress the physi-
cal comfort of the ancestor in a grave. Many say they do not want 
to be buried with people they do not like. The scenery must also be 
pleasant , and eyesores detract from the geomancy of a site. Only a 
comfortable ancestor will bring harmony to his or her descendants 
(see also Ahern, 1973, pp. 180-2, Anderson and Anderson, 1973, 
p. 132) . 
Finally, the way that non-professionals occasionally used technical 
terms clearly personifies the impersonal system of the geomancer and 
ties it into the popular cosmology. One woman, for example, ex-
plained that the geomancy of her house was bad, and that her 
daughter had lost a lot of money as a result. She hired a geomancer 
who told her that a hill in front of the house was a White Tiger. In 
geomancy , as I explained above, White Tiger is the hill to the right of 
the site , and is not automatically good or bad. The geomancer 
probably concluded that the five-phase value of the shape or position 
of the hill conflicted with that of the home and its residents. In 
Taoism and the popular tradition , however , the White Tiger is a 
demon who must be exorcised. In addition, the hill was a public 
graveyard , and, according to this informant, it resembled a tiger's 
head . She had reinterpreted the morally neutral, impersonal geo-
mantic 'White Tiger' as an evil demon. Ahern cites a similar example 
where an informant claimed a factory chimney 'hit ' (chiong , Manda-
rin chong, also 'clashed') the grave of his ancestor. Chiong is a 
technical term for an unlucky relation between pairs of Earthly 
Branches in the professional's version of geomancy (see Appendix 
A). This informant, however, meant not only that the smoke from 
the chimney might make his dead grandmother unhappy (Ahern, 
1973, p. 182) . The impersonal , systematized concepts of expert 
geomancy have become concrete and context-bound. 
Taoists often reinterpret geomancy in a similar way. 59 Taoists 
occasionally serve as geomancers, but they do not use the expert 
system. Instead, they adapt their own system of a powerful , active 
bureaucracy to meet the requirements of geomantic siting. They rely 
entirely on the techniques of huat, ignoring the geomancer's special-
ized forms and principles. Taoists use their position and power in the 
heavenly bureaucracy to get imperial approval (chi) of every aspect 
of a site. 60 Their concrete pantheon replaces the geomancer's abstract 
categories. 
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Taoists also perform a ritual at the opening of all new temples, 
based on their own version of geomancy. The ritual is called Settling 
the Dragon and Sending Off the Tiger (an long song hu). The dragon 
can be interpreted either as the mountain chain leading to the site of 
the temple (shan long) , or as the Azure Dragon which, in geomancy, 
represents ascending yang, spring, left and so forth. The Tiger is the 
geomancer's White Tiger, associated with ascending yin, autumn, 
right, and so forth. Both beings are embodied in paper figures in the 
ritual, and a second dragon is also formed from rice , coins and oil 
lamps. The Taoist addresses both personified spirits: he threatens the 
evil Tiger and bribes him to leave, while he convinces the beneficent 
Dragon to stay. As in the popular version of geomancy, the pro-
fessional's impersonal categories become personified and tied to a 
cosmology filled with similar beings. 
Professional geomancy (\nd chronomancy include a technique 
called the Unique Gate of the Hidden Jia, and Taoists have a system 
of magic that uses the same name. The geomancer's technique 
correlates nine of the ten Heavenly Stems with the nine squares of a 
magic square called the Luo Shu (Liang, 1976; see also Appendix A). 
The remaining stem, jia, is replaced by one of the other nine , which 
explains the term 'Hidden Jia' in the title of the system. In the cycle 
of sixty stem-branches, jia (like every other Stem) appears six times, 
each time associated with a different branch. The Taoist technique 
(described by Saso, 1978, ch. 4) uses many of the same technical 
terms, but reinterprets them as personified spirits. The six combina-
tions of jia and a branch in the cycle are called the Six Jia Spirits. 
Each of the Six Chia [Jia] Spirits is a general leading an army of 
spiritual soldiers. All are ready to leap forth at the summons and 
call of the Taoist, provided he has gained power over them by a 
knowledge of the talismanic charms and mantric incantations of 
the nine polar stars. (Saso , 1978, p. 142) 
The 'nine polar stars' are the Big Dipper and two nearby stars; they 
are the residence of the Six Jia Spiritis. Again , the impersonal rela-
tions of five-phase theory have become personified and bureaucra-
tized. They are part of the general Taoist pantheon. 
Reinterpretations of geomancy are not simply surface transfoma-
tions of a shared deep structure, as Freedman suggested. These 
diverse styles of interpretation instead lead to diverse political roles 
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for geomancy. The impersonal forces of elite geomancy allowed the 
elite to engage in some actions against official authority, and in 
fraternal competition, even though such behavior contradicted offi-
cially sanctioned Confucian morality. The impersonal style of inter-
pretation behind geomancy makes the political ethics of the system 
seem safe- geomancy appears as politically neutral, empirical truth. 
The government could never damn it as immoral, the way it damned 
troublesome religions that relied on personified beings. 
In contrast, popular geomancy ties into the personified bureau-
cracy of gods, ghosts and ancestors. If Grandmother is happy in her 
grave, her family will prosper; if she is miserable, her descendants 
will suffer. The personified spirits of the popular tradition cannot 
become the mere pawns that Freedman discusses in elite geomancy. 
· Popular geomancy merges into the rest of the popular religious tradi-
tion, and both share the same political advantages and disadvantages. 
Both have the possibility of flexible interpretations in new contexts, and 
both have the limitations of being part of a cosmology that ties closely 
to the traditional social order. Elite geomancy, in contrast, channels 
reinterpretation through its institutions, and has greater possibilities 
to justify politically improper behavior (like fraternal competition) 
because it relies on impersonal forces. 
Talking to the Gods 
There are various ways of communicating with the gods in Taiwan; 
they illustrate the social grounding of different styles of interpreta-
tion, and the various political potentials of those styles. This com-
munication takes place in two major contexts: (1) in temples, the 
most important of which (like Sanxia's temple to Co Su Kong) are 
controlled by the elite and thus associated with traditional authority; 
and (2) at spirit medium sessions, which are often opposed by the 
elite and can sometimes protest against traditional authority. 
The simplest way to communicate with gods in a temple is by 
throwing moonblocks (puaq pue). Moonblocks are pairs of crescent-
shaped blocks of wood which are flat on one side (yin) and rounded 
on the other (yang). After burning incense and offering food and 
paper spirit money to the gods, a patron may ask questions using the 
moonblocks. After giving his or her name, address and birthdate, the 
person asks a question and drops a pair of moonblocks on the 
ground. If both land with flat sides up, the answer is 'no'; if one is up 
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and the other is down, the answer is 'yes'; and if both land with flat 
sides down, the god is 'laughing', usually because the person failed to 
provide enough information in the initial question. 
A more complex system is available in a set of lots (chiam). The 
number of lots varies, although sixty is a very common number. This 
also begins with worship of the god, followed by throwing the 
moonblocks to ask permission to choose a lot. If permission is 
granted, one lot is chosen from the set, and the patron throws the 
moonblocks again to make sure it is the correct lot. Each lot has a 
number on it, and the patron can get a verse that goes with that 
particular lot. These verses are generally very condensed and meta-
phoric, and most people turn to the temple management for 
interpretation. The slip of paper on which each verse is printed 
usually includes a list of possible questions and very brief indications 
of how the poem answers them. The types of questions supplied are 
very limited in range; there is no way to ask, for example, about 
whether a rebellion will succeed or whether to join a heterodox sect 
(see Ahern, 1981b, pp. 88-9) . Unusual questions can be asked only 
by turning to the temple management for help. The inherent ambi-
guity of the verse permits more flexible interpretations. As I showed 
in Chapter 2, however, the temple management are often members 
of the educated elite. They are unlikely to provide interpretations 
that challenge their own positions of authority. In general, choosing 
lots allows only a very narrow range of interpretations. 
While this system of verse interpretation is not nearly as system-
atized as Buddhism, Taoism, or the state cult, it still shares some 
features with those traditions. It is more institutionalized than much 
of the popular tradition; the temple management may base its inter-
pretations on written texts to which they limit access; and the man-
agement can partially monopolize interpretation, especially by limiting 
the number of questions that can be asked. The management's mono-
poly on interpretation is hardly complete, because new questions and 
new readings of the verses are always possible. Any text is open to 
potential reinterpretation. Yet this system in practice tends to accept 
(if not necessarily to serve actively) the interests of the local elite who 
control it. In general, drawing lots allows for harmless answers to 
politically safe questions. 
Spirit medium (tang-ki) sessions provide a second context for 
communicating with gods. Spirit medium sessions in Sanxia do not 
occur in the major temples, but instead use small temples, ancestor 
halls, or private houses. A god possesses the medium, who will speak 
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or write the god's answers to people's questions. For a small fee, 
anyone can speak directly to the god . The god's speech may be 
slightly stylized, but everyone understands it, and the interactions 
often resemble natural conversation. Bystanders sit and talk casually, 
and they show little special respect for the god. Unlike the system of 
drawing lots, no one has direct control over the questions asked, and 
everyone is in a position to provide his or her own interpretation. 
Interpretation is very pragmatic because no institution really controls 
it. With minor variations, spirit mediums practice in this fashion 
throughout Taiwan, and practiced similarly in late imperial times 
throughout southeastern China. 
Politically safe interpretations of spirit medium sessions are the 
rule, at least in modern-day Taiwan. Most of the questions concern 
illness, and about half of the diagnoses refer to relatives of the 
questioner rather than to some group with wider political significance 
(Li, 1976, p. 330). Yet spirit medium sessions offer a potential for 
much more flexible interpretation than drawing lots. Because people 
are free to ask their own questions, and to provide their own pragma-
tic interpretations grounded in the political context, spirit mediums 
create the possibility for political dissidence . Seaman (1978, pp. 
106-18), for example, describes how spirit mediums representing 
several political factions in central Taiwan waged a supernatural 
battle. In the turbulent years after the Japanese departure from 
Taiwan in 1945, two mediums battled for supmeracy. One was tied to 
a group of landlords and their supporters; the other was tied to a 
group of freeholders. One evening, the same god possessed both 
mediums at once, a paradox that required immediate resolution: 
Chiu announced himself as 'The Second Brother Chen-Wu' and so 
did Pan: a long argument, of accusation and counteraccusation, 
followed. Then the two shamans [mediums] began a 'magical 
struggle'. The struggle became more and more intense, until at last 
Chiu picked up a sawfish bill sword, one of the ritual weapons of 
the shaman, and split Pan's forehead with it, knocking him sense-
less . Pan was never again possessed after this, and the authenticity 
of Chiu's possession was admitted by all concerned. (Seaman, 
1978, p. 115) 
Chiu's faction continued by discrediting and then destroying a 
religious plaque important to Pan's group. This turned out to be an 
error, because Pan's allies had Chiu arrested, and Chiu too was never 
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again possessed. Communication with gods through spirit mediums 
can transcend passive approval of political orthodoxy, because the 
style of interpretation remains more pragmatic and flexible than 
communication with gods in elite-controlled community temples. 
Both the traditional and modern elites actively discourage spirit 
mediums. The traditional Chinese government passed laws against 
spirit possession (see, for example, Overmyer, 1976, p. 24). The 
Japanese colonial government in Taiwan frowned on cults whose 
mediums urged a boycott of Japanese goods (Seaman, 1978, pp. 
26-7) . The current government often accuses mediums of fakery and 
extortion; it is taking gradual steps to outlaw them. These govern-
ments did not oppose mediums simply when they made dissident 
statements; the great majority of spirit medium sessions are politi-
cally innocuous. Instead these governments opposed them because 
their pragmatic flexibility immunized interpretation completely from 
state control, and thus created a great potential for dissident inter-
pretation. 61 
Three Dimensions in Styles of Interpretation 
People involved in different social relations interpret shared ritual 
codes in systematically diverse ways. Geomancy can be personified or 
impersonal, the cosmology can be active or passive, and both can be 
more or less systematized, depending on who interprets them (see 
Table 6.1) . These three dimensions of interpretation- pragmatic/sys-
tematized, personified/impersonal, and active/passive- clarify one of 
the basic diversities in Chinese religion. Even shared religious con-
cerns, like politics or community, are realized differently as people 
see them through different styles of interpretation embedded in 
different kinds of social relations. Thus the popular tradition I de-
scribed in Chapters 2 and 3 is less explicit, less abstracted from the 
immediate social context, less dependent on structural systems of 
contrast, more active, and more personified than the other traditions. 
Systematized, self-conscious ideologies typify elite and specialist 
traditions. The Buddhists and Taoists I have discussed so far share 
with geomancy and the state cult extensive education in a complex 
system of meanings. The Buddhist and Taoist intellectuals who 
developed these systems and who use them with the greatest sophisti-
cation were in fact closely tied to the elites. Officials themselves were 
sometimes learned contributors to Buddhism and Taoism. Further-
more, the large land-holdings of some mainland monasteries made 
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Table 6.1 Styles of Interpretation 




Modern elite pantheon + 
State cult + + 
Five-element theory + + 
them structurally similar to secular power holders. Like elite ideol-
ogies, the Buddhist and Taoist traditions are the product of a leisured 
intelligentsia. Such uses of time are limited to those whose livelihood 
is guaranteed, and social institutions like the state and the monastery 
control access to such guarantees. They reinforce their control by 
reserving the right to determine orthodox interpretations, and thus 
channel some of the flexibility of the popular beliefs. 
There is thus no mechanical dichotomy between pragmatic and 
ideologized interpretation. Religion becomes ideologized (that is, 
more systematized, passive, or impersonal) in various ways, and to 
varying degrees, according· to the social relations of the people 
involved. Even the more complex sets of dichotomies I summarize in 
Table 6.1 should not disguise the fundamental flexibility of all styles 
of interpretation. 
Thus, Buddhism and Taoism share some of the 'magical' character 
of the popular tradition: they deal with active, concrete beings. They 
are, however, more highly ideologized than the popular religion as a 
result of their long histories of intellectual systematization. The elite 
really makes use of two separate systems. The first is their version of 
the pantheon, which tends to be more passive and more systematized 
(in the case of the state cult), but which still consists of concrete, 
animate beings. The second is five-phase theory, which is abstract 
and highly systematized, but which deals with active forces (recall 
that Weber calls it 'magical'). There is no simple dichotomy between 
rationalized and magical thought (although some traditions have 
developed more elaborate structures of explanation), between lit-
erate and illiterate thought (although some traditions rely heavily on 
texts), or between logical and illogical thought (although some tradi-
tions show inconsistencies if social context is ignored). Instead, styles 
of interpretation change with social conditions. 
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Certain styles of interpretation help or hinder attempts at political 
mystification. The passive style of the state cult made it a good 
vehicle for official morality, while the impersonal style of elite geo-
mancy made it difficult to bend entirely to the political ends of the 
state. In general, the state is always trying to use religion to legitimize 
itself. Diverse reinterpretations, however, guarantee that mystifica-
tion never succeeds entirely. State manipulations of religion never 
had the desired effect on the populace, because the pragmatic, 
uninstitutionalized (and thus relatively uncontrolled) style of inter-
pretation in the popular tradition produced flexible re-readings of 
official ritual, rooted in the everyday experience of the populace (as 
for the failed attempts to manipulate the ghost cult). We must look 
beyond shared ritual codes to style of interpretation, and to control 
over interpretation. 62 · 
Making Ideologies 
My emphasis on interpretation over code, on how people actively 
make meaning in particular social relations, implies that any ritual act 
allows many interpretations. Strong institutions may try to monopol-
ize the right to determine 'orthodox' interpretation, but they never 
entirely succeed in eliminating alternate styles of interpretation. I 
have stressed that different styles of interpretation are embedded in 
particular social conditions, both reflecting and changing those condi-
tions: the alternative world-view of Buddhism rests on its isolated 
monastic institutions; the political uses of the passive state cult rest 
on the political interests of the government; the flexible reinterpret-
ations of the popular tradition rest on its lack of strong institutions; 
and so on. 
The constant making of new meaning allows styles of interpreta-
tion to merge into one another. This section explores some of the 
conditions under which interpretations change. In the following three 
examples, adherents of the popular tradition systematize initially 
pragmatic interpretations. Each example concerns a relationship to 
Buddhism, but each also shows one ofthe major processes that can 
create ideologized interpretations. In the first example, an individual 
religious philosopher gradually explores various ways of systematiz-
ing his beliefs. In the second example, the Buddhist clergy gives its 
lay adherents a conscious push into Buddhist ideology and institu-
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tions. In the third example, religious sects rework Buddhist ideology 
when the original institutions lose control over interpretationY 
Looking for the Way 
In many communities on Taiwan individuals create idiosyncratic 
ideologies by combining pragmatic ritual traditions and some contact 
with religious specialists. These people are the Chinese equivalent of 
Radin's (1927) 'primitive philosophers' - contemplative individuals 
who develop complex theories out of a less systematized set of 
popular traditions. Ong A-liong, an artist employed in the recon-
struction of Sanxia's Co Su Kong temple, is one such individual. 
When I first met Ong in 1976, he did not appear especially con-
cerned with religion, although his job as a religious artist gave him a 
more systematized understanding of iconography than most people 
have. By the time I returned to Taiwan in 1977, however, Ong had 
begun a more intensive search for religious meaning. While my 
assistant, a friend and I stood in the temple plaza one day, Ong 
beckoned us over. He was expecting us, he said; that morning, while 
he meditated, Co Su Kong had given him an insight that three good 
people would visit. Ong knew from our faces that we must be the 
visitors. We had a long conversation, during which Ong outlined the 
systematized ideology that he was creating out of his pragmatic 
religious experience. His discourse centered on Co Su Kong and 
many of the religious images he had carved. In this early stage of his 
search, he still concentrated on his extensive immediate experience 
with the temple. Yet he also expanded on some ideas that are 
common in the popular tradition, but rarely thought through. He 
talked about face-reading, a skill based on five-phase theory, which 
everyone knows about, but few people practice. Ong had apparently 
not studied the five-phase techniques of face-reading, but began to 
develop his own system that combined facial features and personality 
features. He had also expanded and systematized the common cliche 
that 'the five religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Islam 
and Taoism) are one' . He spoke with more facility about Western 
religion than anyone in Sanxia, and constantly pressed me for details 
about Christianity and Judaism. He still concentrated his efforts, 
however, on the Co Su Kong temple. 
By the end of the year, Ong seemed less interested in developing 
his own, idiosyncratic, ideology and more interested in mastering an 
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extant system. He began to read more Buddhist sutras, and asked me 
to buy him a Bible. Most importantly he had found a master in a 
nearby town. This master was idiosyncratic in his own right, but 
relied most heavily on Taoism and five-phase theory. Like a Chinese 
storybook holy man, he usually looked ragged and poor, and few 
people (except for Ong, of course) trusted him. Ong absorbed his 
master's ideology in the usual master-disciple pattern - he received 
esoteric knowledge in dribs and drabs, as the master gradually tested 
his faith, patience and loyalty. As Ong began to pull together this 
new knowledge, he passed some of his secrets on to me, swearing me 
to secrecy, and warning of their power. The most important was a 
Taoist meditation technique that symbolically placed the five phases 
in the order of mutual creation. This second stage of Ong's search 
saw him looking to his master's already established, but not very 
institutionalized ideology. 
By the end of 1978, Ong had largely broken his ties with his 
master, perhaps because he began to believe the rumors about the 
master's iniquities, perhap because he had grown beyond what his 
master could teach. He began to turn toward a more thoroughly 
systematized, ideologized set of interpretations- Buddhism. The five 
religions remained valid paths, but Buddhism had become the most 
powerful for Ong. At the end of 1978, he joined me on an interview 
with a very famous nun in the northern suburbs of Taipei. By the 
time I left in 1979, Ong had taken lay Buddhist vows, with the nun as 
his new teacher. He seemed satisfied, both intellectually and emo-
tionally, for the first time since he had begun his systematizing two 
years earlier. 
Individuals face great difficulties systematizing their beliefs on their 
own. Not only is the intellectual challenge considerable, but publicly 
proclaiming truly idiosyncratic ideologies can lead to accusations of 
eccentricity and superstition. Ong never tried to be completely 
idiosyncratic- he always consulted religious texts , and soon turned to 
his semi-Taoist master. This path had its own problems. Ong's master 
and his other disciples formed the beginnings of a religious counter-
institution , centered on a small temple with which the master was 
involved. As such, this network faced opposition from more estab-
lished institutions, especially the state. Eccentricity at this point 
becomes heterodoxy, and adherents face serious social pressure. In 
response, Ong turned toward Buddhism, an established , institution-
alized religious ideology. 
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Buddhists and Laymen 
The most standard path to a systematized ideology is through the 
institution that fosters it. This section briefly examines how Buddhists 
interact with most of the visitors to their temples - followers of the 
popular tradition. The general strategy is to keep people coming to 
the temples by encouraging their pragmatic interpretations of 
Buddhism, and then gradually substituting more orthodox interpreta-
tions for new adherents, while bringing them into ever greater social 
contact with Buddhist institutions. 
An example of popular reinterpretation of Buddhist iconography 
began this book. Although Buddhist temples generally look very 
different from temples in the popular tradition, popular re-
interpretations smooth out these differences, as my neighbor showed 
me in the early days of my research. Buddhist altars usually contain 
three primary images representing three associated Buddhas or Bod-
hisattvas. To the ordinary worshipper, however, all are Hut Co (the 
Buddha Patriarch), just as many of the images in Sanxia's main 
temple are all Co Su Kong. Statues of the Buddhist Protectors of the 
Dharma become the door gods found on all large popular temples. 
Most people offer the Buddhas paper spirit money, which is one of 
the clearest ways people ritually mark the non-Buddhist distinction 
among gods, ancestors and ghosts (Wolf, 1974b). Some Buddhist 
temples even offer some rituals from the popular tradition, like the 
po-un. 
Taoists and geomancers encourage popular ignorance of their 
traditions because it guarantees their control, but Buddhists have a 
different attitude. They are aware of the popular reinterpretation 
but do little about it for two reasons. First, like all temple managers, 
their income depends heavily on popular support and donations, and 
they are thus afraid to antagonize people by challenging their tradi-
tions. The second reason is the Buddhist concept of upaya, teaching 
at the level that best suits the student. Any kind of contact with 
Buddhism, the clergy feel, is a useful first step. Later. perhaps, they 
can lead their adherents to stop eating meat, join a sutra recitation 
group, and gradually come to accept a more sophisticated version of 
Buddhism. Some Buddhist temples take the stronger step of forbid-
ding people to burn paper spirit money from the start. 
The progressive reinterpretations of the Protectors of the Dharma 
provide one example of how Buddhists transform popular. pragmatic 
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interpretations of temple iconography into more systematized 
Buddhist ideology. Most worshippers see the statues of the Protec-
tors of the Dharma as door gods, who guard the entrances of 
temples. 64 The Buddhists do nothing to discourage such readings, but 
they may suggest a further interpretation to special followers - the 
red-faced 'door god' is actually Kuan Kong, the red-faced god of war 
and patron of business, one of the most important figures in the 
popular tradition. Kuan Kong, according to the clergy, converted to 
Buddhism, and now protects the faith . This reinterpretation does 
not bring the adherent especially far into systematized Buddhist 
ideology - it is a piecemeal adaptation of a critical figure from the 
popular tradition . This adaptation makes specijtl claims about 
Buddhism; if Kuan Kong himself guards Buddhist temples, they must 
be special indeed. Further reinterpretation brings followers still 
more fully into Buddhist ideology. The Protectors of the Dharma are 
really two Bodhisattvas. At this stage , the Protectors of the Dharma 
no longer mesh with the popular tradition, but become part of the 
iconographic representation of Buddhist ideology; they are enlight-
ened beings dedicated to saving souls by guarding the Law (dharma; 
one of the Three Treasures of Buddhism). 
The use of paper spirit money provides an even clearer case of 
successive reinterpretations fostered by the clergy. The Buddhist 
temple in Kiu Kiong Kiou allows people to use gold (for the Buddhas 
and Bodhisattvas here, but normally for the gods) and silver (for the 
ancestors or ghosts) spirit money, although it does not approve. The 
chief nun , however, often encourages people to use only gold money, 
telling a story of how a paper manufacturer solved a crisis of overpro-
duction by tricking people into burning silver paper for the dead. 
This seemingly minor ritual point in fact cuts out one of the structural 
underpinnings of the popular cosmology: spirit money no longer 
distinguishes gods from ghosts and ancestors. From this stage, it is 
only a short step to the crucial Buddhist assertion of equality - all 
unenlightened beings are really alike. The alternative paper money 
of the Buddhists, according to their interpretation, fully substitutes 
the Buddhist cosmology for the popular tradition, as one form of 
money goes to enlightened beings, and the other to the unenlight-
ened. The final stage toward Buddhist ideology is not to use spirit 
money at all. The nuns at Kiu Kiong Kiou's temple burn no money 
themselves, since the only real value of the money is the sutras 
printed on it, and they can read the sutras out of books. 
In addition to their gradual replacement of popular interpretation 
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with Buddhist orthodoxy, Buddhists maintain control over interpre-
tation by bringing disciples into Buddhist social institutions. They 
bring followers together by inviting them to special ritu_al occasions, 
and some temples offer classes in Buddhism. The most widespread 
institution is the sutra-singing group, a collection of (usually female) 
adherents who meet periodically to recite sutras. Such groups may 
also recite sutras for paying customers, especially at funerals. Sutra-
singing groups allow the clergy to encourage and control mastery of 
the Buddhist system of beliefs. The controlled transformation of 
pragmatic interpretation into systematized ideology succeeds best 
when some institution, such as the sutra-singing group for lay 
Buddhists, master-disciple ties for Taoists or geomancers, or the 
traditional educational system for the state cult, fosters and organizes 
reinterpretations of religious acts (like burning spirit money, or 
worshipping the Protectors of the Dharma). 
New Institutions and New Interpretations 
Interpretations embedded in static social relations like the monastery 
may be slow to change. Yet Buddhism again illustrates how the loss 
of institutional control can lead to drastic reinterpretations. The 
Buddhist renunciation of the secular political hierarchy led to occa-
sional official denunciations. For example, 'in 624, the powerful 
minister Fu I summarized the political objection to Buddhism: in 
teaching the renunciation of all worldly ties, it led people to become 
disloyal to the ruler and unfilial toward parents' (Yang, 1961, p. 200). 
Fu I was probably overconcerned; Buddhist temples rarely showed 
disloyalty, and Chinese Buddhism made constant efforts to combat 
the perceived lack of filial piety (see Chapter 4). Yet rebellious 
groups did occasionally rework Buddhist ideology. Buddhism gave 
rise to a number of sectarian offshoots, which reinterpreted doctrine 
free from the institutional control of Buddhism itself. Most of these 
sects were never violent (Overmy~r. 1981; see also Jordan, 1982, for 
a Taiwanese example), but these sects- nevertheless shared the rebel-
lious reputation of some of their relatives, like the White Lotus that 
inspired frequent violence against the Qing government. 
Orthodox Buddhism renounced secular politics for a quiescent life 
in the monasteries. Outside monastic institutional control, however, 
rebellious sects easily reinterpreted the Buddhist alternative as a call 
for political action. Many sects share not only a part of the Buddhist 
cosmology, but also many sutras (including the Heart Sutra and the 
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Diamond Sutra), the hope of rebirth in a paradise, and a belief in the 
eventual arrival of a new Buddha. Maitreya. They had close histori-
cal relations with Pure Land Buddhism (Overmyer, 1976. p. 85-9). 
The sects, like monastic Buddhism, reject the popular pantheon and 
its concomitant approval of the secular political hierarchy. They 
emphasize instead faith, equality and compassion. 
Yet the sects reworked some of the Buddhist concepts to fit their 
own needs. Sectarian use of Maitreya is the best example of re-
interpretation of a Buddhist symbol. Both orthodox Buddhism and 
the sects speak of history as a series of kalpas - long periods of time 
begun by the arrival of a Buddha, after which human values steadily 
deteriorate, until the kalpa ends in the devastation preceding the 
beginning of the next kalpa. In orthodox Buddhism kalpas are 
extraordinarily long; one illustration says that if a soft cloth is passed 
over a solid rock forty li in size once every hundred years. a kalpa still 
will not have passed by the time the rock is entirely worn away 
(Soothill and Hodous', 1937. p. 242). In the sects. however. the 
period is shortened to the point at which the end of the kalpa is 
imminent. Sect leaders sometimes proclaimed themselves to be Mait-
reya, the Buddha whose arrival marks the beginning of the new kalpa 
and the end of the old. The orthodox Buddhist interpretation was 
appropriate to a pacific life of moral cultivation. while the sectarian 
interpretation of Maitreya could be used instead to justify violent 
political action. 
The symbol of the future Buddha was thus made potentially useful 
for rebels. The scheme of successive kalpas resonated with the 
traditional Chinese concept of changes in the Mandate of Heaven, 
which justified revolt against an emperor who no longer enjoyed 
divine approval. At the same time. a claim to be the incarnation of 
Maitreya could also give supernatural sanction to the actions of a 
sectarian leader. The difference between monastic Buddhism and 
these sectarian ideologies stemmed in large part from the different 
social relations that support them. Sectarian reinterpretations be-
come possible when Buddhist institutions lose control over how 
people interpret their texts and rituals. The sectarians then devel-
oped their own institutionalized, systematized ideologies. As in each 
of the cases examined in this section. transformed interpretations 
accompany transformed social relations. 
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Unities and Diversities 
I have concentrated so far in this chapter on two major points about 
diversity: that diverse social relations foster diverse styles of 
interpretation, and that all beliefs become open to reinterpretation 
when the institutions and other social experiences behind them 
change. The pressures toward unity in Chinese religion, however, are 
just as important, and just as grounded in social relations as those 
pressures toward diversity. Widely shared social experiences produce 
one pressure toward unity. China was a politically and economically 
unified country, and most of the population shared certain basic 
experiences of kinship, politics and community, though they may 
often have had different points of view. The same is true of Taiwan 
today. Institutions' active attempts to create unified beliefs pr6duce a 
second pressure toward unity. Buddhists offer classes in their doc-
trines; Taoists or geomancers reveal enough to keep their clients; and 
most importantly, the state tried to subordinate much ritual to its 
political goals. 
The most clearly shared concern in Taiwan or late imperial China 
is kinship: nearly all Chinese worship their ancestors. Ties through 
marriage and descent affect everyone, and large lineages often helped 
unite rich and poor in an area. Lineage and descent receive regular 
ritual attention because they concern everyone, and because the elite 
promoted lineage ritual (by building ancestral halls and supporting 
lineage banquets) wherever kinship ties gave them a political and 
economic base of support. 
Kinship is thus a unifying concern, but each of the religious 
traditions treats it differently. Taoism and the state cult pay little 
attention to kinship. Taoists and elites worship their ancestors in the 
same way as the popular tradition, although elites may systematize 
the ancestor cult more (for example, by codifying lineage rules and 
genealogies), and they use more passive interpretations than the 
popular tradition . Taoism and the state cult themselves confine 
kinship to other contexts, elaborating instead on the political meta-
phor. Buddhists are the exception- they contradict some otherwise 
shared basic assumptions about kinship. By asserting that everyone is 
really equal, and by leaving their families to join the clergy, Bud-
dhists imply that they have no more attachment to their own relatives 
than to anyone else 's. They strengthen this implication by worship-
ping tablets to other people's ancestors in their temples. Buddhism 
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supports its ideological emphasis on equality and transcendence of 
the secular world by maintaining a self-supporting monastic tradition 
that could fre~ its followers from dependence on their natal families. 
Geographical community provides another unified religious con-
cern for everyone (except the Buddhists), because community con-
cerns unite all classes of people. Taoism (to the extent that it depends 
on local support) and the popular tradition emphasize the primacy 
and unity of local communities. The state cult instead presented 
communities as units in a nation-wide hierarchy, and the modern 
government promulgates much the same message by disapproving of 
local religious festivals. The shared experience of community favors a 
unified religious concern with community. The government attempt 
to use religion as a claim for its own centrality also emphasized unity, 
but thtt varied interests of local communities countered official moves 
toward national unity. The realization of a particular ritual perform-
ance depends on how these various forces interact in real historical 
conditions. Buddhism is again the exception, because it is less depen-
dent on community support; Buddhist temples typically rely on 
geographically dispersed communities. 
Politics is the theme most elaborated in the popular, elite and 
Taoist cosmologies. The state cult reflected government interests by 
combining with and echoing orthodox political arrangements; it 
ignored or ritually controlled heterodox power. The popular tradi-
tion, and Taoism in even more detail, also recognize this orthodox 
political system. Yet they also recognize heterodox sources of power 
(in bandit-ghosts, for example), taking a more realistic view of power 
at the local level, but putting the central government in a less 
favorable light. Buddhism, the black sheep once again, renounces 
both orthodox and heterodox power, substituting instead its own 
egalitarian vision, and thus appealing to a wide range of the dissat-
isfied. These differences make sense in relation to the political 
positions occupied by the adherents of each tradition: the power-
holders traditionally emphasized their own authority, ordinary sub-
jects (Taoists and adherents of the popular tradition) are more 
willing to emphasize heterodox power, and the Buddhists (who 
generally managed to avoid the government) emphasize equality. 
These various forces of unity and diversity played and counterplayed 
each other in a widely shared ritual like the ghost-feeding. Changing 
social experience promotes diversity (as when popular interpreta-
tions of ghosts changed over the last century), while shared experi-
ence promotes unity (as for the common concerns with kinship, 
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community and politics). Varied styles of interpretation push people 
toward diversity (as when the active spirits of the popular tradition 
receive passive interpretations from the elite). while institutions push 
people to unify around fixed interpretations (as in state attempts to 
manipulate the Universal Salvation festival). 
The particular unities and diversities I have discussed are specific 
to the historical development of northern Taiwan in the last century. 
The broader conclusions, however, can clearly also be applied to the 
rest of China, at least for the late imperial and Republican periods. 
All evidence points to shared concerns with kinship, community and 
politics, and at least suggests the importance of distinctions between 
pragmatic and systematized, active and passive, and personified and 
impersonal styles of interpretation. Even more generally, I would 
suggest that this study's emphasis on interpretation over code, on the 
diversity of styles of interpretation across social lines (going beyond 
simple identification of an ideology), and on the possibilities of 
making and reinterpreting meaning can help clarify issues of culture 
and ideology in any complex society. My conclusions suggest in 
. particular that 'ideologies' are more complex and flexible than usu-
ally granted. Thus various styles of interpretation in Taiwan combine 
in various ways to form different types of ideologies, each open to 
reinterpretation by people in different positions. 
Summary 
Mystification theories stress primarily unified ideological support for 
an entire social system, promoted especially by the ruling class. 
These theories provide an important insight into unity and diversity 
in Chinese religion: certain basic structures. are indeed widely shared, 
and they may benefit one class more than another. Yet mystification 
theory underestimates the counter-pressure toward diversity. More 
than one religious tradition, and more than one style of interpreta-
tion exist in Taiwan. No integrated set of beliefs permeates the entire 
society. Only trained specialists, for example, use Buddhist or Taoist 
styles of interpretation, and different participants interpret even 
shared rituals like the Universal Salvation rites in diverse ways. 
Other theories emphasize only the forces of diversity. losing sight 
of the pressures that mystification theorists stress. 'Moral economy' 
(Scott, 1976, 1977), for example, maintains that peasants develop 
their own ideologies: 
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Woven into the tissue of peasant behavior, then, whether in 
normal local routines or in the violence of an uprising, is the 
structure of a shared moral universe, a common notion of what is 
just. It is this moral heritage that, in peasant revolts, selects certain 
targets rather than others, and that makes possible a collective 
(though rarely coordinated) action born of moral outrage. (Scott, 
1976, p. 167) 
Scott (1977, p. 33) suggests that 'any moral order is bound to 
engender its own antithesis, at least ritually, within folk culture'. He 
writes later that peasant culture and religion 'contain almost always 
the seeds of an alternative symbolic universe . . . This symbolic 
opposition represents the closest thing to class consciousness in 
pre-industrial agrarian societies' (1977, p. 224) Thaxton (1982), for 
example, has applied this principle to rural China by arguing that 
Communist organizers succeeded only by accepting the demands of 
the traditional peasant moral economy. 
Yet peasant ideologies, in so far as they exist, may be new orders 
rather than simple inversions of old ones. Buddhism in Taiwan, for 
example, offers a radically egalitarian message, which contradicts 
both the secular political hierarchy and the standard cosmological 
hierarchy that supports it (Chapter 4). Only the clergy and some 
heterodox sects however, generally recognized this message. In 
normal times, most people reinterpreted the Buddhist pantheon as 
favorable to the secular social order. The public recognized the 
egalitarian potential of Buddhism only occasionally. generally in 
times of rebellion. A potential alternative ideology exists, but it is not 
the particular property of the peasantry or any other class. 
There is no simple case either for cultural unity and ideological 
mystification, or for class diversity and ideological opposition. Differ-
ent social strata may share the same religious traditions, as for the 
general themes of kinship, community and politics shared by all 
non-Buddhists in Taiwan. On the other hand, a single social stratum 
may hold diverse or even contradictory beliefs. For example, local 
elites draw on both popular and elite traditions as they suit the 
particular purposes of the individuals involved (Chapter 5), and 
villagers may interpret the ghost-feeding ritual differently depending 
on their age. For Taiwan, at least, it is not possible to assert that any 
given social position is invariably associated with any unified system 
of religious beliefs. Religious unity or diversity depends in large part 
on how much intellectuals (who develop the ideologies), their back-
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ers, and their institutions succeed in influencing the conceptual 
systems (and the social relations that ground those systems) of other 
groups in the society. 
Still other theorists (e.g., Gramsci, 1971; Sallach, 1974), argue that 
ruling classes deliberately keep the ideas of subordinate classes in 
fragments, that is, they prevent them from becoming ideologized. 
Such pragmatic, unsystematized styles of interpretation create tacit 
acceptance of the social order by keeping the majority of people 
unaware of alternative values. According to this theory, ideological 
confusion, not consensus, is created. Official ideologies are restricted 
because most people do not have access to the training needed to 
master them. Development of new ideologies is inhibited because the 
state can usually control the institutions that foster them. 
This recognition of diverse styles of interpretation realizes that the 
popular tradition is not automatically an oppositional ideology (in 
contrast to the claims of moral economy), yet it also need not simply 
reinforce the structure of power (in contrast to mystification theory). 
The very fact that the popular tradition is not institutionalized, which 
inhibits the development of oppositional ideologies, also inhibits 
state control of popular culture, as the state's vain attempts to 
manipulate the Universal Salvation festival illustrate. 
Some elements of the popular tradition may support the power 
structure, but others may oppose it. These latter can be the roots of 
an oppositional ideology, but that ideology will develop fully only in 
future conflicts. 'The social group in question may indeed have its 
own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception 
which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes -
when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality' (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 327). Gramsci's more flexible view of culture rests on the 
kind of argument that this book shares: people actively make their 
interpretations; they do not simply inherit an established code of 
meanings. This view makes visible the counterplay of forces that 
create a mosaic of unities and diversities in religion. Groups in 
different social positions use diverse styles of interpretation even for 
shared rituals like the ghost-feeding, and for shared concerns like 
politics. Styles of interpretation can change as social relations and 
institutions change. At the same time, shared experience helps unify 
religious concerns, and certain groups may actively promote unity, as 
when the government encourages a favorable reading of the hier-
archical cosmology by bringing local deities into the state cult. 
Popular traditions and ideologies, unities and diversities, form parts 
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of historically developing systems of social relations, tied to institu-
tions, to everyday experience, and to structures of power. Seeing 
beliefs as mechanical correlates of class or society hides the flexibility 
of interpretation in light of ongoing historical experience. People use, 
manipulate and create culture (including religion) as part of everyday 
life within a system of social relations. 
Appendix A: Geomancy 
This appendix serves primarily to illustrate some of the complexities that 
make up highly systematized expert systems of interpretation, and will also 
help fill some gaps in the English literature on geomancy. There are very few 
discussions of the experts' system of geomancy. There are several nine-
teenth-century accounts (e .g., DeGroot, 1897; Eitel, 1873). Feuchtwang 
(1947b) is the most complete study, and Freedman (1966, 1969) remains the 
most important theoretically. Needham (1954-, vol. 2) and Porkert (1974) 
give some of the theoretical underpinnings of the system. 
The most important sources, however, remain the many handbooks pub-
lished for use by geomancers. These include modern discussions of geomancy 
(e.g., Kong, 1977; Lin, 1977; Nanhai , 1976; Wang, 1968), as well as tradi-
tional sources (which I consulted in Jiang, 1967; Wang. 1976; and Ye. 1973). 
In addition, I consulted several professional geomancers. This appendix 
summarizes some of the basic techniques of geomancy, emphasizing aspects 
not usually discussed outside the geomancy manuals. 
Geomancy traditionally constitutes one of the Five Arts (Wu Shu), which 
include fate-calculation (ming), divination (bu), reading appearances (xiang 
(including face-reading, palm-reading, and geomancy), medicine (yi), and 
meditation (shan, literally 'mountains') . A few sources classify geomancy as 
shan rather than xiang, and ignore meditation entirely. A shared theory 
based on the five phases unites the Five Arts. 
The geomancer's goal is to determine the qi or 'configurational energy' of a 
site. (I rely on Porkert (1974) for definition of terms, although I do not 
always adopt his ponderous translations.) Qi is an active force , and its 
movements can be seen in its effects on the mountains and streams of Earth. 
The geomancer examines the shapes and movements of mountains and water 
in order to determine the flow of qi through conduits (mo. literally 'veins') . 
Chinese medicine looks at the flow of qi in the veins, nerves and other 
conduits of the body. Geomancers look at the flow of qi in mountain ranges, 
watercourses and other geographical conduits. Geomancy functions because 
certain conduits connect lineal relatives, and the qi flowing through the Earth 
can be controlled to flow through the conduit of descent. The term 'dragon' 
(long) or 'dragon-vein' (long mo) is sometimes a synonym for geographical 
conduits, although it refers often only to mountain chains. The problem 
posed to the geomancer is how to identify the characteristics of the invisible, 
impersonal qi. Is the qi of a site propitious or dangerous? Is it strong and 
concentrated or weak and dispersed? How does it relate to the qi of the 
clients and of the time period? 
The geomancer approaches his analysis by dividing every site into four 
aspects: (1) the mountain chain (shan long, literally 'mountain dragon'); 
(2) the site, sometimes called the 'den' (xue, more properly, any point of a 
conduit where qi can be tapped; it also refers to acupuncture points), 
sometimes called the 'direction' (xiang, when referring to the direction it 
faces), and sometimes called the ·mountain' (shan, when referring to the 
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direction directly opposite the xiang); (3) water (shui); and (4) other moun-
tains, hills, boulders, etc. (sha). 
Either or both of two techniques determine the characteristics of a site. 
The first is the physical form (xing) of the hills and streams at a site . The 
second is the cosmological principles (/i), like the five phases. which invisibly 
influence the qi of a site. I discuss each technique below. Ideal sites are not 
always available, and the geomancer must compensate by using a third 
technique - fa ('methods', Hokkien huat). This may involve physically 
reshaping the site, but more often demands non-geomantic techniques. This 
is, in fact, the realm of the Taoist. and is not part of the standard body of 
geomancy. 
Forms 
Analysis of the physical form of a site follows the same principles as analysis 
of the physical form of a person's face or hand. At the most basic, certain 
shapes relate to the system of five phases ( wu xing) - the very structured 
system of abstract categories that characterizes nearly everything in geo-
mancy, and that I introduced when I discussed Taoism (see Figure 4.1) . 
Among their many associations are a set of five shapes that correlate with the 
shapes of physical objects: Wood is narrow and rounded. Fire is pointed. and 
so on (see Figure A.l). 
The shapes of the five phases are not considered accurate enough to 
analyze all mountains, and most geomancers rely on two other systems. 
Feuchtwang (1974b, pp. 121-6) describes one. called the Method of the 
Twelve Staves (Shi'er Zhangfa, attributed to Yang Yunsong). The other, 
called the Nine Stars (Jiu Xing; they are associated with the stars of the Big 
Dipper plus two nearby stars). is a variation on the five phases. Five of the 
Stars are equivalent to the five-phase shapes. and the other four are combina-
tions. Each of the Nine Stars subdivides into various numbers of subsidiary 
shapes (Figure A.2 show the subtypes for one of the stars). Similar schemes 
exist for the classification of the shapes of water courses (see 'Gui Hou Jing' 
in Jiang, 1967). 
Geomancers sometimes also borrow non-geomantic terms to describe the 
shape of a site. Objects may resemble an official's cap. a writing-brush stand. 
the character for 'king', a carp, a fishnet. and so on (DeGroot , 1897. gives 
several examples , and Feuchtwang. 1974b has a more systematic discussion). 
Lists of these shapes occur in some geomancy manuals. but there is no 
established system. Choice is limited only by the whimsy of the geomancers. 
These terms, however, tend to be secondary descriptions of sites that already 
fit more standard categories. 
The shape of the entire mountain range can also be analyzed. It is best if all 
the phases occur in the order of mutual creation; it is bad if only one phase 
appears and the range never changes. Mountain ranges may be lively, with 
many peaks and valleys, or they may be smooth and quiet. The qi may 
meander slowly along a range with many curves, or it may charge down a 
straight chain of mountains. As with the relationships among the five phases, 
balance is a crucial goal. The mountains and the water should have a lively 
Figure A. I Forms: The Five Phases 
EARTH FIRE WATER WOOD METAL 
HANDS 
FACES 
MOUNTAINS CJL 0 
....... 
Source: Song, 1973, pp. 47-52 ~ 
176 Geomancy 
Figure A.2 Main Variants of the Star Lu Cun 
Source: Ye, 1973; Juan 1, p. 7 
flow, but not be too rambunctious . A yang mountain chain should have a yin . 
site, and vice versa. A mountain that comes from the right should meet water 
that comes from the left . If the qi is quiescent, the grave should be shallow to 
take advantage of most of its energy. If it is lively, the grave should be 
deeper. Where the qi is straight and powerful, the dwelling or grave should 
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be off center to avoid its force . Where the qi is weak and meandering, it 
should be in the center of the conduit to tap all the force . 
Principles 
The geomancer's compass is the key to discerning the cosmological correla-
tions (li) of a site. These devices consist of concentric rings around a central 
magnetic compass. The rings inscribe a wooden circle. which can be rotated 
around the compass to allow them to be aligned with the magnetic South. 
(Chinese take South as their focus instead of North .) Each direction then 
correlates with a five-phase value , and with a whole host of ther cosmologi-
cal principles. Thus, for example , a geomancer can use the compass to assign 
a five-phase value to the direction of the gravesite, and to each of the 
prominent land forms and watercourses in the area . None of the five phases 
is good or bad by itself, although all have specific properties. The quality of a 
site depends on how they interact through the order of mutual creation 
(xiang sheng) and the order of mutual destruction (xiang ke) (see Figure 4.2). 
Geomancers combine these interactions to create much more complex struc-
tures than the Taoists use. Thus, for example, if a mountain has character-
istics of both Metal and Fire, it is probably unlucky because Fire destroys 
Metal. Metal and Earth would be good, because Earth creates Metal. The 
amounts of the phases must always be balanced; none should overwhelm the 
others. In some cases, for example, where Metal is overpoweringly strong, 
Fire may be a lucky influence because it controls Metal's strength. This same 
situation may be complicated further by the presence of Water, which also 
helps to control Metal because (1) it creates Fire which destroys Metal, and 
(2) Metal is weakened because it creates Water and thus sacrifices some of its 
own power. Geomancy is highly structured- no phase can be understood 
without reference to the others. . 
Yin and yang, the five phases, and all the rest are impersonal forces that 
act on the world. In medicine their balance causes health or illness. in 
geomancy it causes success or failure . The forces it discusses are invisible and 
generalized away from concrete objects. and the relations and implications of 
yin and yang, the five phases, and all the rest are meaningful regardless of the 
particular material situations in which they occur. The concepts of geomancy 
are also systematically interrelated with each other. The various systems of 
classification it includes had separate origins. but are now united into a single 
theoretical scheme. 
Much of the Western literature mentions a Jiangxi [Kiangsi] school of 
geomancy based on Forms, and a Fujian school based on Principles. The two 
are no longer clearly distinguished. I often heard . however. about a different 
distinction between two schools that differ in the types of cosmological 
principles they depend on. The San He school concentrates on analysis of the 
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Figure A.3 The Six Gods 
Both yin or both yang 
Seven Noxious Breaths 
Biased Seal 
Biased Wealth 
God of Food 
Matched 




Injurer of Officials 
Destroyer of Wealth 
ten Heavenly Stems and twelve Earthly Branches, and the San Yuan school 
concentrates on the eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams. Both systems 
compare and evaluate characteristics of the time, the clients and the land-
forms. These systems again show geomancy to be ideologized, based on a 
systematized set of contrasting categories, and impersonal. 
The San Yuan and San He schools use different types of compass. Both 
Martel (1972) and Feuchtwang (1974b) include illustrations of a San Yuan 
compass, but both they and most other writers on geomancy analyze only 
San He geomancy. Martel, whose analysis is purely formal, points out that 
the San Yuan compass he illustrates does not fit the structure he derives for 
San He compasses, but he goes no further. I will sketch the broad outlines of 
both systems below. 
Compasses of either school, as well as mariner's compasses, contain at a 
minimum a magnetic needle (Heavenly Pool) and a ring of twenty-four 
characters (the Twenty-four Mountains), which name the directions. The 
larger San He compasses contain three rings of Twenty-four Mountains, each 
slightly offset from the others, and each associated with some of the other 
rings. These three rings divide the compass into three sections, called the 
Heaven, Earth and Man Plates. Geomancy manuals differ on how each ring 
of Twenty-four Mountains and its associated Plate should be used. One 
common recommendation is to use the Heaven Plate (the outermost section) 
to judge water (shui), the Earth Plate (the innermost section) to judge the 
site itself (xue), and the Man Plate (the center section) to judge the other 
prominent land forms (sha) . 
The five phases are important in understanding forms; they are even more 
important in understanding principles. Nearly every cosmological principle 
correlates with the five phases, and the most common way to compare any 
two things is to take their five-phase value as a least common denominator. 
The various possible relations between the five phases and yin-yang (the 
latter is most important for stems and branches) are called the Six Gods (to 
be distinguished from the Six Jia Spirits discussed in Chapter 6), which I 
summarize in Figure A .3. One of the characters represents the individual (A 
in the table), and the others are compared to it by means of this table . In 
geomancy the point of reference (A) is usually the site of the grave or house 
(xue) . The approximate values of each relationship are clear from their 
names. (The seal ribbon was a symbol of official office.) Balance, as always, 
is crucial. Thus, for instance, if there is too much Wealth , the Destroyer of 
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Figure A.4 Luo Shu Magic Square 
4 9 2 
3 5 7 
8 I 6 
Wealth is propitious. Chao ( 1946) goes into more detail about the use of this 
system for eight-character divination of fate; geomancy adopts precisely the 
same system. 
The trigrams, hexagrams, stems and branches can also be classified ac-
cording to a numerological scheme based on the Luo Shu (see Figure A.4). 
Pairs of Luo Shu numbers correlate with the directions: nine and four are 
south, eight and three are east, one and six are north, two and seven are 
west, and fi.ve is the center. Anything that people conceive as a cycle (e.g., 
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Figure A.5 Eight Trigrams in Former Heaven Order 





time) can be enumerated using the Luo Shu numbers. One of the most 
important systems of chronomancy, called the Unique Gate of the Hidden 
Jia (Qimen Dunjia), correlates the time with various lucky and dangerous 
influences. Because the numbers are also used to identify the compass points, 
the same system can be used to choose propitious directions (see Zhang, 
1977; Ngo, 1976; Tai, 1965). The Luo Shu numbers can also tie together the 
various elements of the Five Arts by using a complex numerology (e.g., 
Wang, 1968). 
Another major category of compass symbols are the twenty-eight aster-
isms, which occupy the outermost part of all larger compasses. Geomancy 
manuals claim that these twenty-eight star groups divide the celestial equa-
tor. The asterisms are all different sizes, and the compass also gives the 
number of degrees occupied by each. Many compasses do this in two rings: 
one using the traditional Chinese division of the circle into 365 1/4 degrees 
(based on the length of the solar year), and one using the division into 360 
degrees introduced by the Jesuits. The asterisms, like everything else, 
correlate with the five phases. These readings are compared to determine the 
relation between the site and the surrounding landforms (sha). The phase of 
the asterism of a site should also be in a relation of creation with the phase of 
its Earth-Penetrating Dragon, that is, the sexagenary stem-branch of its 
direction. 
The trigrams and hexagrams are more crucial to geomancy, and form the 
basis of the San Yuan school. The trigrams are combinations of three broken 
(yin) or unbroken (yang) lines. Traditionally, they were discovered in the 
Former Heaven Order (see Figure.-A.5) by the legendary emperor Fu Xi. 
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The most yang trigram (three unbroken lines) is at the top, a posttlon 
associated with South, fire and pure yang. The most yin trigram (three 
broken lines) is opposite it, and the other trigrams are logically ordered 
between them so that the top is most yang and the bottom is most yin. This is 
associated with the mutual production order of the five phases. The eight 
trigrams can also be ordered in another sequence, called the Latter Heaven 
order. 
The specific techniques for manipulation and comparison of the hexagrams 
come from Yi Xue (study of the Yi Jing). The actual interpretations in the Yi 
Jing are not emphasized. Yi Xue concentrates instead on the logical and 
cosmological associations of the hexagrams (see, for example, Kong, 1977). 
The hexagrams can be used to classify time, space and individuals, and 
geomancers compare the results using the five-phase characteristics and the 
Luo Shu numbers associated with each. 
There is one important system based on the trigrams that is not part of San 
Yuan geomancy, called the Nine Stars of Shape (Xingzhuang Jiuxing). In the 
form used to compare the direction of a grave with the surrounding land-
forms, the geomancer first determines the trigrams associated with the 
direction of the site and the landform in question, using the ring of trigrams 
on the compass. He then uses the 'root trigram' that is, the trigram for the 
direction of the site, and generates the other seven trigrams by changing the 
top line, the middle line, the bottom line, the middle line again, and so on. 
Each resulting trigram is respectively correlated with one of the Nine Stars in 
a pre-determined order. Thus, for example, the 'root trigram' Qian gen-
erates the following: Dui (star: Tan Lang, phase: Wood), Zhen (star: Ju 
Men, phase: Earth), Kun (star: Lu Cun, phase: Earth), Kan (star: Wen Qu, 
phase: Water), Sun (star: Lian Zhen, phase: Fire), Gen (star: Wu Qu, phase: 
Metal), Li (star: Po Jun, phase: Metal), and Qian (stars: Zuo Fu and You Bi, 
phase: Wood). Landforms in the directions of the trigrams associated with 
Tan Lang, Ju Men and Wu Quare propitious; the others are not. With minor 
variations, the same system is used to compare the direction of a site with the 
direction of a watercourse (Fu Star Water Method). 
The sixty-four hexagrams - all the possible combinations of the eight 
trigrams- are the basis of San Yuan geomancy. A Yuan is a time period of 
sixty years, and three of them (San Yuan) is the period it takes to cycle 
through all sixty-four hexagrams, where each hexagram dominates for two 
and a half years. Each Yuan is subdivided into three twenty-year periods 
(Yun). The nine Yun are named after the Nine Stars, and each contains eight 
hexagrams. Actually, sixty-four 2\12-year hexagrams only last 160 years; one 
Yun is missing. For the sake of theoretical elegance, geomancy manuals 
always leave this central Yun blank, and distribute the hexagrams among the 
other eight (see Figure A.6). 
If the eight trigrams in the Prior Heaven order are superimposed on the 
Luo Shu, each trigram can be assigned a number. Each hexagram in the San 
Yuan system is given the Luo Shu number associated with its upper trigram. 
Each hexagram thus has two numbers: its Yun number (numbered one 
through nine), and its Luo Shu number (also numbered on through nine). 
The geomancer proceeds by finding the correct hexagram for the current 
time period (by looking in an almanac) and the hexagram for the directions 
Figure A.6 The Sixty-four Hexagrams for San Yuan Geomancy 
Yun 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yuan upper upper upper middle middle middle lower 
Hexagram Qian 9 Dazhuang 8 Xu 7 Daxu 6 Jue 4 Dayou 3 
and Luo Dui4 Kui 3 Zhongfu 2 Lin 1 Lu 9 Guimei 8 
Shu Li 3 Ge4 Mingyi 1 Jiaren 2 Feng 8 Tongren 9 
Number Zhen 8 Wuwang 9 Yi 6 Tun 7 Shike 3 Sui 4 
Sun 2 Sheng 1 Daguo 4 Ding 3 Jing 7 Gu6 
Kan 7 Meng 6 Song 9 Jie 8 Huan 2 Shi 1 
Gen 6 Jian 7 Xiaoguo 8 Dun 9 Qian 1 Jian 2 























of the various aspects of a geomantic site (by consulting the rings of hexa-
grams on his compass). Each hexagram is compared with the direction of the 
site. If the Luo Shu number of the hexagram in question equals the number 
of its current Yun, it is •considered flourishing (wang). If the Luo Shu and 
Yun numbers do not match, they should at least both be 'east of the river' 
(jiang dong, i.e., both numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4) or both be 'west of the river' 
(jiang xi, i.e., both numbered 6, 7, 8, or 9) . The 'river' is the middle Yun, 
which has no hexagrams associated with it. If the numbers are on opposite 
sides of the 'river', the relationship is called 'weakening' (shuai). 
The hexagram for the mountain chain should be 'flourishing', and the spot 
where the water leaves the site should be 'weakening'. In other words, the 
mountains and the water should be on opposite sides of the 'river'. The 
direction of the grave or dwelling should be on the same side of the 'river' as 
the Yun and the mountain range. Ideally, all should have the same Yun 
numbers; the farther away the YuR numbers are, the slower the geomantic 
benefits will be realized. 
In addition, the Luo Shu numbers of any two aspects of the site should be 
in one of the following relationships: (1) 'birth and completion' (sheng cheng, 
so that the Luo Shu numbers for each direction are paired), i.e., 1 and 6, 2 
and 7, 3 and 8, or 4 and 9; (2) 'harmony of ten' (he shi, so that opposites on 
the Luo Shu diagram are paired), i.e., and 1 and 9, 2 and 8, 3 and 7, or 4 and 
6; and (3) yin-yang (so that the lowest and highest pairs of yin and yang 
numbers are together), i.e., 1 and 7, 2 and 6, 3 and 9, or 4 and 8. Any other 
relationships are not propitious. 
Each hexagram is also associated with one of the five phases via its Luo 
Shu number (1 and 6 are Water, 2 and 7 are Metal, 3 and 8 are Wood, 4 and 9 
are Fire). It is good for the xiang (direction of the site) to create or destroy 
the five-phase value of the shan (back of the site). The reverse relations are 
unlucky. 
It is also propitious if the two hexagrams being compared are inverted ( dao 
pai, where the top and bottom trigrams are switched), or reversed (fan, 
where the entire hexagram is turned upside-down). Thus, for example, if the 
mountain chain belongs to the hexagram "'"' (Lo Shu number 1), a good 
direction for the shan would be its inverse ~ ~ (Lo Shu number 8). The xiang 
~ (Lo Shu number 2) is the direct opposite of the shan, and water flowing 
out at its inverse ~~ (Lo Shu number 9) would be lucky. Note also that the 
long and shan are on one side of the 'river', and the shui and xiang are on the 
other; this is the correct relationship. Furthermore, all four hexagrams are in 
the eighth Yun, making it especially propitious. 
The arc covered by each hexagram is too large to allow precise alignment. 
The compass thus subdivides each hexagram into six units, each represented 
by one line of the hexagram. Whichever line is chosen to align the site 
changes from yin to yang, or vice versa, creating a new hexagram . The upper 
and lower trigrams of the new hexagram are compared. Their Luo Shu 
numbers will be in a relation of 'birth and completion' or 'harmony of ten' if 
the site is propitious. The Yi Jing associates each trigram with a kin relation. 
Geomancers can thus also compare the benefits for various relatives by 
examining the production or destruction of the five-phase values of the two 
trigrams. If no satisfactory alignment is available, the site can be put between 
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two lines, which changes two lines in the hexagram and thus creates more 
possibilities. 
The ten Heavenly Stems and twelve Earthly Branches of San He geo-
mancy also classify space, time, and individuals. Each has a yin-yang value, 
and each is associated with one of the five phases. Running through both sets 
at once results in a cycle of sixty stem-branches, which are used to classify 
time. The eight characters used for fate-calculation are the stem and branch 
associated with the hour, day, lunar month and year. 
Each Stem goes through a life cycle described by the twelve Branches (see 
Chao, 1946). The peak of the life of each Stem occurs at the Branch 
belonging to its phase . Various combinations of Stems and Branches are 
lucky or dangerous. The most important combination is the Three Har-
monies (San He) of each phase, and the San He school of geomancy takes its 
name from this relationship. Propitious relationships are generally called 
harmonies (he) and harmful relationships-are generally called clashes (chong) . 
The system works by finding a site with a propitious combination of the Stems 
and Branches of the current time, the clients, and the land and water. 
Feuchtwang (1974b) contains a more thorough discussion of San He geo-
mancy. 
Appendix B: Character List 
Note: M indicates Mandarin words, H indicates Hokkien words. 
an long song hu (M) 4-·U . .i!.ht 
an tau (H) ~4 
an thai sin (H) ~ $# 
an thai sui (H)~k;A: 
ang ke touq (H) fl.r.~-*. 
Ang Kong (H) ,% "h 
ang thau (H) fl.r..SJi 
Anxi (M) ~5$.-
bai hu (M) a £ 
be ge (H) It jJ-
Bei Di (M) .11:. -f 
biou kong (H) M "h 
bu (M) J-
Cau Kun (H) 1±~ 
ce (H)* · 
chai tng (H) J!t 1.' 
Chan (M) ;if. 
chi (M) f.}J 1 
chi ling (M) f.)J 4--
chia: lang kheq (H) #r A. ~ 
chia: sin (H) -t!# 
chiam (H) l. 
chiong (H) if 
Chit Ia (H) k ~ 
chiu: ko (H) ~:U. 
chong (M) if 
chut ke (H) :!: '8:.. 
ciou (H) ~- . 
Co Su Kong (H) 'fll.~ "h 
cu ciou (H) .:t ~ 
cu hue (H) .:t ~ 
cu pho (H) .:t ~ 
Cu Si: Nia:-nia: (H) .11/J :i. -AA.~P­
cu tua: (H) .:t ;If 
cue ko (H) 1M:~~ 
cui tieng pai (H) 1](.:-ti:.flJ 
dao pai (M) ff').flt 




dibao (M) ~A:f. 
Dingpu (M) 1Ji :t;t] 
Dui (M) 3t. 
En Cu Kong (H) .~ ;fJl ~ 
fa (M) ){; 
fan (M) ~ 
fo (M) 1~ 
gan lu (M) 1t 4: 
Gen (M) tt 
gin-a pho (H) ;#J.1f if 
gu li jie yue (M) jt~ jp ~1 
Guanyin (M) lt il-
gui (M) ~ 
Hai Shan (M) ~ ...l! 
Character List 
Hanlin (M; Frozen Forest) ~;f;f.. 
Hanlin (M; Imperial academy) ~;f;f.. 
he (M) 1} 
he shi (M) 1}+ 
he siu: (H) ;fa ;!.] 
Hengxi (M) fl ~t 
hok kim (H) ;f&{t-
hong (H)# 
hong sui (H) Jjl1]<. 
hou hia: ti (H) *t 5L At 
hu (M) ~ 
hu lo cu (H) .VI'] 1,t.i:. 
hu-a (H) 1f1t 
huat (H) 'A: 
huat piou (H) tbk 
huat su (H) 'A:±-
Hufa Shen (M) f()J;# 
Hut Co (H) 1~ill 
iu ieng kong (H) lj fl.!_~ 
iu ieng kong biou (H) lj fl.!_~ .$i 
iu kiu pit ieng (H) lj .;J<_ .;t fl.!_ 
jia (M) ~ 
jiang xi (M) ):r..® 
jiang dong (M) ):r..f_. 
Jingang Jie (M) {t-~·J ;n. 
Jiu Xing (M) IL!l. 
Ju Men (M) §_ ,, 
Kai Zhang Sheng Wang (M) /lll5t1r..E 
Character List 
Kan (M) J_k 
kan luan jie yue (M) IUL •;; #.1 
kham hun (H) ~i.t 
kho kun (H) 4~ :f: 
Khui Kui Mng (H) I'J) ~ r, 
kieng i (H) ~& ;fz 
Kim Bo (H) 'i:-liJ: 
Kiu Kiong Kiou (H) IL ~ t~ 
kiu pieng an (H) ;J;l.!f-~ 
ko pi: (H) ~~~ 
kua hiu: (H) xHf 
kua kim (H) )(1)-i:-
Kuan Im (H) lt.::i-
Kuan Kong (H) IWj 'h 
kui (H)~ 
Kui: Kui Mng (H) JWl ~r, 
Kun (M) J'f' 
Laozi (M) :::t-t 
Lau Chu Phai (H) 11 It 5~ 
/au tua: (H) rif;, Jf. 
/au ziat (H) rif;, ~!': 
Li (M; trigram) Ail 
li (M; measure of distance) ~ 
li (M ; village) £ 
/i (M; reason or principles) J.t 
li (M; ghost) !;~ 
/i qi (M) ~~ 
/i tan (M) ~ Jf 
li tiu: (H) J?.-* 
/i xing jie yue (M) ~ H ~;; #.1 
Lian Zhen (M) 11:. ~ 
Lim Chu Phai (H) f!;.Jt 5~ 
Lingbao Tianzun (M) ~ \f -7:;. .:tf. 
liang sim (H) FJ__.-:..; 
lo cu (H) ~± 
lo mua: (H) i!,i. tK 
long (M) it 
long mo (M) it~ 
Lu Cun (M) ~{} 
Luo Shu (M) 5-11- t" 
Ma Co (H) :L~;fa 
Meizhou (M) ~hi :It! 
Mi Jiao (M) fJf ~ 
ming (M) 4f-
mng-sin (H) rHt 
mo (M) '*-




Nan Chen (M) itJ ~ 
o thau (H) .f.,.aJi 
o thau sai kong (H) .P.,.aJi $iji 'h 
ong si: ci: (H) {ii. iJ. 
pai (H) n-
pai to (H) Jt 3\-
pang cui tien_g (H) ~ 1j(~ 
Peq-ke (H) a .it; 
Pho To (H) ~If.. 
pieng an (H) 4'-~ 
Po J un (M) M:. :f. 
po un (H) f;lj i! 
pou pi (H) 1:;'-;1~ 
puaq pue (H) llft- ¥,-
Pueq Ia (H) A ~ 
pusa (M) -{} f! 
qi (M) ~ 
Qian (M) ~ 
Qimen Dunjia (M) -+ r, l!_ 'f 
qing Long (M) ~it 
Qu Yuan (M) ~Iff. 
Quanzhou (M) ~5ttl 
qunsi (M) ;f ~e. 
San He (M) _;_ 1i' 
San Qing (M) 3... ;'fr 
San Yuan (M) 3...;i(. 
Sanxia (M) 3... ~ 
sha (M) .Gj· 
shan (M) .l.! 
shan Long (M) .l.! tt 
sheji (M) :fl.«. 
shen (M) # 
sheng cheng (M) 1.1#. 
shengwen (M) ~ rJ(I 
shengyuan (M) 1. }i 
Shijiamoni (M) tftJof-Jt.. 
Shi'er Zhangfa (M) -t .::...H.k 
shuai (M) :it 
shui (M) 1)<. 
Shulin (M) tx'H:f. 
si shou (M) v:J i*. 
si tua thiau (M) v:J :k {i 
Sian Kong (H) 1J.. 'h 
sieng Le (H) ~i {~ 




sim khaq pieng an (H) .-:.;.tz -f-*-
sin (H) ~+ 
Siong Te Kong (H) J:. -If~ 
siu kia: (H) 1/k t-
siu sua: (H) 1/k ·* 
Sun (M) ~ 
Tai Su I a (H) *.. ± ~ 
Taisui Xing (M) -klk, !i 
Taiyi Jiuku Tianzun (M) *..C....;tt*:k~ 
Taizang Jie (M) 1){; ~ Jfr, 
Tan Lang (M) 11 ~It 
tang ki (H) -i" .!;L 
tau (H) 5-j-
te-a po (H) 'fkft~ 
Te Cong Ong Pho Sat (H) Jt.~..E-{Hi 
Te Ki Co (H) Jt.,t.± 
te li (H) ~V!. 
thau ge (H) $Ji ~ 
thiek aq (H) 1M.~ 
Thi: Kong (H) :k ~ 
tho te biou (H) _Ut..$i 
Tho Te Kong (H) .±..Jt. ~ 
ti kong (H) lit~ 
tieng ko (H) ~ ;t, 
Tiong Pho (H) 1' :lilj 
tou (H) .i!. 
tou su (H) .i!.~~ 
wang (M) B.J. 
wangsheng qian (M) {i1: ;fl 
Wen Qu(M) :j:_ db 
Wu Lao (M) .h. ;t-
Wu Qu (M) j( db 
wu xing (M) .h. H 
Wusheng Lao Mu (M) ~1: ;t--B}:-
xian (M) If,~ 
Xian Tian (M) ;l :k 
xiang (M; direction) {a] 
xiang (M; appearances){[] 
xiang ke (M) *1 ki 
xiang sheng (M) :ff! 1: 
xing (M) -Jf3 
Xingzhuang Jiuxing (M) :tf3!1kll!i 
xuan wu (M) -t"j( 
xue (M) ~ · 
yang (M) f% 
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yanshou qian (M) ~ -4' i~ 
yi (M)-1-
Yi Xue (M) ~ .If 
Yi Guan Dao (M) -1t it 
yin (M) ft-
Yingge (M) 'l ~ 
You Bi (M) -;{; ~6) 
Character List 
Yu Huang (M) .J,.. ~ 
yuanjue (M) ~t .1Jt 
Yuanshi Tianzun (M) j(:_.k{; ;k :tf 
yulanpen (M) _1,_ fJ! 1t 
Yun (M) i{ 
zhen (M; township) ~ 
Zhen (M; trigram) :K 
Zhengyi Tianshi (M) iE- :k ~ 
zhi (M) ~el' 
Zhongzhuang (M) tf .lt 
Zhong Kui (M) -Jt!tt 
Zhongpu Li (M) tf Jilj .f. 
Zhong Shan Tang (M) tf ~ 1: 
zhu que (M) '*-:4 
Zi Wei (M) ~,f.-~ 
Zuo Fu (M) ft. $II 
Notes 
1. Others have developed similar arguments for other parts of the world. 
Probably most important for studies of China is Louis Dumont 
(1970[1966)). Dumont, who is strongly influenced by French structur-
alism, suggests that the idea of hierarchy based on purity/impurity 
forms a foundation for the apparently endless diversity of Indian caste 
beliefs. He does not deny that there are major differences in caste 
ideology between modern versions and historic, textual versions, be-
tween North India and South India, or even between one caste and 
another, but he looks below these differences to identify a basic 
structure of purity and impurity. 
Moffatt (1979) makes a similar argument about Indian religious 
worship. Indian villagers of all castes, he argues, share a divine 
hierarchy that reproduces, and thus legitimates the human caste hier-
archy. He writes that religious differences across caste have been 
over-emphasized, and that even Untouchables share a 'deep consen-
sus' with all other groups. See Maloney ( 1975), however, for a very 
different view that emphasizes diversity over unity. 
2. Several more general theories support the hypothesis of fundamental 
ideological or cultural unity. Functionalist ·strain theory', for example, 
holds that ideologies resolve social and psychological conflicts, and 
thus help to maintain social homeostasis; ideology creates a cohesive 
society by supplying a set of shared values (e.g., Apter, 1964). Others 
argue that ideologies support a mode of production, and especially the 
security of its ruling classes, by mystifying people about the true nature 
of power and exploitation in the society (see Chapters 5 and 6 for a 
fuller discussion). 
Clifford Geertz (1964a, p. 207) criticizes these theories for failing to 
address symbol formation adequately. For Geertz, ideology (including 
religion) is a separate system of socially negotiated meanings (i.e., a 
'culture') that resolves cultural, rather than social or psychological 
strain. 'Ideologies . . . are, most distinctively, maps of problematic 
social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience' 
(Geertz, 1964a, p. 220). Geertz rightly shifts attention to meaning 
formation, but he continues to assume, like the strain theorists, that 
ideologies help everyone by helping the society as a whole. Ideologies 
can give differential benefits to different groups. Furthermore, as we 
shall see, the possibility of reinterpretation means that no ideology 
may be accepted (at least not intact) at all levels of a society. 
3. An earlier anthropological distinction between an urban, educated, 
elite Great Tradition, and a village, uneducated, peasant Little Tradi-
tion (e.g., Redfield, 1956, ch. 3) has recently been revived by 'moral 
economy' theorists, especially Scott (1977). This early affirmation of 
cultural diversity in complex societies is no longer common in anthro-
pology because: (1) the elite tradition may not be as homogeneous as 
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the theory suggests; (2) the two traditions may not be as separate as the 
theory maintains; and (3) the theory does not allow the possibility of a 
shared underlying structure of the sort described by Dumont for India 
and suggested by Freedman for China (see Tambiah, 1970, pp. J,-4, 
367-72 for a fuller discussion of these problems). I discuss moral 
economy in more detail in Chapter 6. 
4. Sapir is urging anthropologists to consider individual variation more 
seriously, emphasizing studies of socialization in particular. His more 
flexible view of culture leads equally, however, to the examination of 
the group and class constraints that this study will pursue. We also 
need studies of individual variations in Chinese religion, on differences 
within households, on differences by sex, and on socialization, but they 
must be set in the context of the broader influences on religious 
practice. 
5. Barnett (1977) re-examines changes in Indian caste ideas in this light. 
He discusses the unifying symbol of caste that Dumont also discussed: 
blood purity. Some South Indian castes now see blood purity simply as 
inherited substance, rather than as the traditional combination of 
substance with a code for conduct. These castes are thus beginning to 
resemble ethnic groups, and to function as regional power blocs. These 
changes occurred in conjunction with a Dravidian nationalist move-
ment - there were political motivations behind the change in caste 
definition. There is thus both a basic unity that no one questions (the 
central symbol of blood purity), and an equally basic diversity (some 
groups have redefined caste hierarchy as ethnic difference). 
6. He dismissed Weber's (1951) study of China in a footnote as sociologi-
cally inadequate. Its general theoretical impact as part of Weber's 
sociology of religion, however, was probably greater than any of the 
others. 
7. Much of DeGroot's evidence came from personal observation, but it 
cannot be considered systematic ethnography. 
8. I chose to work in Sanxia primarily because the research of several 
other anthropologists there has provided a solid base for understand-
ing popular religion. Ahern (1973) and Harrell (1974b, 1982) have 
studied religion in two Sanxia villages with different social structures. 
Wolf (1970-1974b) has studied popular religion in the town of Sanxia. 
Wolf and Huang (1980) include a bibliography of works on Hai Shan, 
the traditional name for the area that included Sanxia, and Wang 
(1976) has a brief history of the area. 
9. A township (zhen) is an administrative unit below the county (xian) 
and above the village (/i). Taiwan has 15 countries, Taibei County has 
29 townships (including Sanxia), and Sanxia Township has 22 villages. 
Locally recognized villages or neighborhoods may differ from official 
administrative villages. I will use Hokkien names for locally recognized 
units, and official Mandarin names for administrative units. I romanize 
Mandarin terms in Pinyin, and Hokkien following Bodman (1955) . 
Appendix B gives characters and identifies dialect for all Chinese terms 
used. I have not disguised place names, or the names of individuals too 
well-known to be disguised . I use pseudonyms for all other individuals. 
Notes 193 
10. I will not examine Christianity here . Catholicism is not important in 
Sanxia, but there are about one hundred Protestant families . 
11. I revised the questionnaire from one developed by Xu Jiaming, Li 
Yih-yuan and John McCreery at the Academia Sinica. I am very 
grateful to them for their help and generosity. 
12. On the first day of the seventh month, temples most closely associated 
with the underworld carry out a special ritual, called Opening the 
Ghostly Gate (Khui Kui Mng). The temple management opens a little 
door at the side of the temple, and shuts it again after all the ghosts 
have returned to the underworld on the last day of the month, during 
the Closing of the Ghostly Gate (Kui : Kui Mng). The temples most 
likely to do this are City God temples (City Gods rule over traditional 
administrative capitals, and were recognized by the state cult) , and 
Buddhist temples to the Bodhisattva most closely associated with the 
underworld, Kshitigarba (Te Cong Ong Pho Sat) . 
13. The Universal Salvation rites go back to the Six Dynasties period in 
China. They were originally Buddhist, but the text was soon adapted 
by Taoists. The ceremony was widely performed from the Tang Dy-
nasty on. Yoshioka (1959, pp. 391-401) describes the development of 
the Buddhist and Taoist texts. Chen (1973, pp. 24-34) outlines the 
Yulanpen Jing, the sutra that describes the origins of ghost feeding in 
Mulian's attempt to save his mother from ghosthood with Buddha's 
help. Lombard-Salmon (1975, pp. 29-30) discusses possible meanings 
for the term yulanpen, which is one of the Buddhist names for the 
festival. 
14. Other temples in Sanxia may also hold smaller ghost-feeding rituals. 
The first and last days of the month are ~ especially popular for these 
smaller ceremonies, but any time during the month is possible. Tradi-
tionally, many occupational groups also held their own ceremonies 
during the seventh month. Now, to my knowledge, only the butchers, 
who are most closely associated with death, still hold their own 
ceremony in Sanxia. Some people also make an offering to the ghosts 
of children (gin-a pho), but although people had heard of it in Sanxia, I 
never saw it performed. Especially devout people may thus worship 
the ghosts half a dozen times or more during the seventh month. 
15. In other parts of Taiwan, this parade may be on a much larger scale, 
including up to a hundred water lanterns, and also twenty-foot-tall 
scaffolds (cui tieng pai) hung all over with electric lanterns powered by 
generators on accompanying trucks. This still occurred in Sanxia as 
recently as 1972 (Stevan Harrell, personal communication) . 
16. Meat is never offered at Buddhist temples. Partially prepared veg-
etarian dishes are substituted for sieng le. Often, an artificial sieng le , 
entirely vegetarian but shaped to resemble meat, is offered instead. 
17. Some of the smaller temples in San xi a conduct ceremonies that are 
simplified from the elaborate and expensive performances at the Co Su 
Kong temple. No other temple in Sanxia has an organization to rival 
the Four Great Pillars of the main temple, none has the same influ-
ence, and thus none has ceremonies on the same scale. All these 
temples substitute the cheaper puppet shows for operas. Some of them 
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do not even conduct rituals; people simply bring offerings, burn 
incense and watch puppets. Buddhist temples (chai tng) also put on 
Universal Salvation ceremonies. At the Buddhist temple in Kiu Kiong 
Kiou, the entire ceremony takes three days. The first two are devoted 
to reading Buddhist sutras, and the last to feeding ghosts. A Pho To 
altar similar to the one at the Co Su Kong temple is set up inside the 
chai tng. The chief priest is an ordained Buddhist, but again. his 
performance looks to most people exactly like the performance at the 
Co Su Kong temple. 
18. Black-headed priests are Taoists in other parts of Taiwan (Saso, 1972, 
ch. 5). I discuss them further in Chapter 4. 
19. Buddhists change the characters to read 'Frozen Forest Academy'. 
The two pronunciations are identical except for tone. The Buddhist 
version is a metaphor for the bitter suffering of the world of reincarna-
tion. 
20. Such arguments have their roots in Saussurian structural linguistics. 
and have entered anthropology especially through the works of Claude 
Levi-Strauss. Saussure (1959(1916]) argues that the relation in the 
mind between a word (signifier) and its referent (signified) is arbitrary; 
there is no natural connection, for example between the English 
phonetic string [tri) and the idea 'tree'. The meaning of a word must 
therefore come from its relation to other words (value). The sound [tri] 
means 'tree' because it contrasts with other sounds to encode the 
parallel contrasts of 'tree' with 'bush', 'flower' , etc. Words thus form a 
complex structure of contrasts. which can encode the structure of 
thought. The social context in which a word is uttered is irrelevant; its 
meaning comes solely from position in an abstract structure. 
21. Much of the material in this chapter will be familiar to specialists. I 
present it here to provide necessary background for non-specialists, 
and to recast it in the theoretical framework of Chapter 1. 
22. Some of the material in this section is based on Weller (1984), which 
develops some of these ideas further for Taiwanese affinal kinship. 
23. I divide old from young at age 45 primarily to distinguish those who 
entered their teens before and after the end of the Japanese occupa-
tion. 
24. The boundaries are less clear for areas with very scattered settlement 
patterns and no clear neighborhoods (see Harrell, 1981). 
25 . Zhongzhuang is administratively part of neighboring Daxi township, 
although it has always had strong economic ties to Sanxia. Sangren 
(1979, pp. 243-7) discusses an interesting case of a Chen lineage there, 
whose members take part in both the ritual cycle for Co Su Kong in 
Sanxia, and the one for Daxi's equivalent, Kai Zhang Sheng Wang. 
26. Both of these restrictions are originally Buddhist. Buddhist attitudes 
toward spirit money will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
27. The system did permit, however, criticism of specific gods or specific 
magistrates for misbehavior . 
28. I refer only to division among the long-time residents of Taiwan. The 
division between these residents and the post-1945 wave of exiles 
remains strong. There is no significant number of Hakkas in Sanxia, 
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although conflicts between Hakkas and Hokkiens have been important 
in other parts of Taiwan. 
29. Actually, the annual birthday ceremony contains a ritual technically 
called a one-day ciou. It is performed outside the sight of most people, 
and few know about it. It is not, technical definitions aside, the 
elaborate ceremony most people have in mind when they talk about 
holding a ciou. 
30. Sugar became another crucial export from Taiwan during this period. I 
do not consider it here because it was grown primarily in the southern 
part of the island. 
31. The proportion of the old in Taiwan (and presumably the number of 
dependent old) has generally increased during the twentieth century, 
from about 3.7 per cent over 60 in 1905 (Ho, 1978, p. 316) to 5.8 per 
cent in 1974 (Economic Planning Council, 1975, p. 14). Over the same 
period, the proportion of employment in agriculture (where the old 
can retain more control) has decreased from 68 per cent in 1905 to 33 
per cent in 1970 (Ho, 1978, pp. 324--6). (These figures are for males, 
because only male employment figures are available for the early 
period. Total figures would be slightly higher.) 
32. Silverstein {1976, pp. 49-50, n.d.) argues that informants recognize the 
referential functions of language much more explicitly than the indexi-
cal features. They recognize most easily forms that exist in continuous 
segments, that are not bound to social contexts (i.e., they are not 
pragmatic), and that do not alter the social situation (i.e., they are not 
creative). This is similar to the Taiwanese cosmology in which the 
more abstracted, ideologized gods/ancestors/ghosts model is more 
explicitly recognized than are the elements more thoroughly tied to 
pragmatic interpretations. 
33. For the sake of simplicity, this chapter concentrates only on the clergy. 
Chapter 6 briefly examines popular reinterpretations of Buddhism 
and some popular sects based on Buddhism. Much work remains to be 
done, however, on lay Buddhists. 
34. See Liu ( 1967, pp. 118-27) for details on the specific symbolism of tau. 
35. They read the Cebei Sanmo Shui Chanfa. 
36. I will discuss the general irrelevance of ancestors to Buddhism and 
Taoism in the sections that follow . 
37. See Saso (1972) and Liu (1967) for descriptions of tou ritual; Keupers 
(1977) and Liu (1974) for huat. 
38. Pang (1977) describes another text used in Honolulu. The outlines of 
the two texts appear similar; I mention the major differences below. 
39. Some Taoists, including the Heavenly Master (the titular head of 
Taoism) also arrived from the mainland, but they did not have the 
numbers or the influence of the Buddhists. 
40. Welch (1967) has the fullest discussion of the social organization of 
Chinese Buddhism; it concentrates on the large monastic tradition. 
41. The different relations of Buddhism and Taoism to local communities 
may have a historical basis in the native origin of Taoism and the 
foreign origin of Buddhism. The problem requires greater historical 
depth than is possible for this study. 
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42. These informants were generally more influenced by Pure Land 
Buddhism than any other school, but with only two exceptions , they 
refused to identify themselves with any one school. 
43. Catholics in Taiwan now also worship their ancestors. 
44. Dudbridge (1978, pp. 85-91) shows how the legend of Miaoshan, 
which has ties both to Guanyin and to the Universal Salvation rites, 
constitutes a Buddhist attempt to resolve the conflict between entering 
the clergy and maintaining filial piety. Miaoshan uses her Buddhist 
faith and purity to save her father. 
45. A few Buddhist temples read sutras to Dizang Wang (Ksitigarbha; 
Hokkien: Te Cong Ong) in a much simpler ceremony. 
46. The priests who perform the ritual in Taiwan are not followers of the 
Esoteric Sect. Their own interpretations of the ritual do not depend 
heavily on the specific features of the Esoteric Sect, but draw instead 
on the more general features of Taiwanese Buddhism that I have just 
discussed . 
47. Sanxia also had very few members of the national elite in traditional 
times. There were only three shengyuan (the lowest degree) at the end 
of the Qing Dynasty (1895 in Taiwan) . 
48. This class analysis is simplified from Gates (1979). Clearly, my simple 
distinction between elites and non-elites is only a beginning. It clarifies 
some of the differences in styles of interpretation, and it illustrates 
some of the forces toward unity and diversity, but it will require finer 
division. 
49. Meskill (1979) gives a good example. where the Lins of Wu-feng 
consolidated their local strongman position by educating a younger 
generation. 
50. Although Tan and other members of the local elite may have been 
aware of the history of a term like liang sim in Chinese philosophy. 
they would rarely know the details of the philosophical arguments . 
Instead, such concepts have come to be a kind of general knowledge . 
51. High education correlates with youth in the sample as a whole. but in 
this case , there is no significant difference between young and old 
informants. Youth is a factor. however. in the correlations of the other 
two parts of Table 5.1. . 
52. Gates (1982) has suggested that the resurgence in popular religion has 
been funded primarily by a traditional middle class -largely Taiwanese 
(as opposed to mainlander). and largely cut off from the government 
and big business sectors that provide most opportunities for social 
mobility . She argues that these people spend money on religion as a 
way of gaining status and investing in the local community. indepen-
dent of (and possibly in opposition to) government and big business . 
This argument does not specifically address the ghost cult. but my data 
are nevertheless consistent with Gates's interpretation . 
53. The state does not usually show any special support for Buddhism. In 
this case, however, they are making an opportunistic use of the 
Buddhist origins of the festival in order to promote their own political 
goals. 
54. By 1965. this had grown to 2500 pigs. fully double the average at the 
time (XSB , 10 August. 1965, p. 5) . 
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55. The final chapter of Weber's Religion of China suggests that Taoism 
and Confucianism stunted the autonomous growth of capitalism in 
China. Two factors prevented the development of a modern economy: 
the 'rational' Confucianists never opposed the popular dominance of 
'magical' Taoism; and Confucianism did not create the tension with the 
secular world that Weber considers essential for the development of 
capitalism. 
Completely absent in Confucian ethic was any tension between 
nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, 
consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and 
compensation in the beyond, religious duty and sociopolitical real- . 
ity. Hence, there was no leverage for introducing conduct through 
inner forces freed of tradition and convention. (1951, pp. 235-6) 
The specifics of Weber's argument are no longer accepted; Metzger 
(1977), for example, suggests that Confucianists did not simply strive 
for harmony with the world, but instead experienced a fundamental 
tension with it. Weber's broadest claim, however, that Chinese rel-
igion impeded 'rational' development because it supported traditional 
authority, is similar to more modern mystification theories. Weber 
looked less at exploitation than mystification theory does, but both 
emphasize religion's support for the status quo. 
56. Several authors (e.g., Anderson and Anderson. 1973; Feuchtwang. 
1974b) have pointed out that these structures. plus requirements about 
water flows, soil types, and so on, make good ecological and architec-
tural sense. 
57. Ahern (1981b, pt. I) makes a similar distinction between interpersonal 
ritual and non-interpersonal ritual. Interpersonal ritual involves com-
munication with personified spirits, similar to the kinds of interper-
sonal communication in the ordinary world . Interpersonal ritual is 
strictly defined by rules and uses a restricted code. much like communi-
cation with humans who are physically removed (like signal flags on 
ships) or socially distant (like a petition to a high official) . Non-
interpersonal ritual, most of which is based on five-phase theory, uses a 
more elaborated code, and attempts to determine natural causes, not 
human (or godly) wishes. Ahern's distinction thus also clarifies the 
greater potential of interpersonal communication to act as a metaphor 
for society. 
58. Responses to two questionnaire items illustrate the general acceptance 
of geomancy. I asked, 'will problems develop if a geomancer is not 
consulted when building a house or finding a grave?' Only 22 per cent 
of the respondents felt that no problems would arise. I also asked 
people to agree or disagree with the statement: 'If the rooms of a house 
face in the wrong direction, there will be trouble.' Only 28.5 per cent 
disagreed. The young and the elite, however, are much more likely to 
disagree. The figures for older educated people do not differ signifi-
cantly from older uneducated people. The apparent correlation be-
tween education and doubts about geomancy is thus caused by 
specifically Western education. rather than by education in general. 
198 Notes 
59. Some Buddhists deny the usefulness of geomancy, while others hire 
professional geomancers; the Buddhist tradition itself says nothing 
about geomancy. 
60. I am indebted to John McCreery for introducing me to the huat-su who 
explained his views on geomancy to me. 
61. Weller (1982) discusses spirit mediums in heterodox, sometimes rebel-
lious sects of Buddhism. I address them again below. but only very 
briefly to avoid further complicating the argument. and because such 
sects were not very powerful in Sanxia. 
62. Maurice Bloch (1974, 1975. 1977) has suggested that religious language 
is very formalized- it has impoverished syntax. and makes extensive 
use of metaphor and condensation. Formalized codes are frozen; they 
cannot address concrete events. Bloch argues that such codes can only 
affirm accepted generalities, can never challenge the status quo, and 
thus support traditional authority. His 'formalized codes' are similar to 
my 'ideologies', especially to systematized styles of interpretation. My 
finding that institutions tend to systematize their interpretations. and 
to use them to support their authority (as for drawing lots in temples, 
or for any of the major religious traditions). fits Bloch's suggestion . 
Yet Bloch's emphasis on code over interpretation leads him to under-
estimate the possibility of reinterpretation. Thus, for example, even a 
highly formalized ritual like the Universal Salvation festival undergoes 
regular reinterpretation outside the control of priests or other auth-
orities. Use of the code, and control over its interpretation are at least 
as important as the code itself. 
63 . A fourth process of ideologization is socially secondary. but it can be a 
methodological problem: some informants will construc.t spontaneous 
theories when the anthropologist asks them about an aspect of relig-
ion normally taken for granted. For example, many Taiwanese burn 
three sticks of incense each day: one is for the ancestors. one is for the 
gods, and one is placed outside. I elicited three kinds of responses to 
questions about who the last stick was for. Many informants simply did 
not know and would not speculate; they gave the frustrating answer 
one hears so often. 'It is just our custom' . Many other informants 
hesitated at first, but then answered either that it was for Thi: Kong. 
the Emperor of Heaven. or for the door gods (very low deities). or for 
the ghosts. All these beings are normally worshipped outside. Each of 
these explanations is plausible , and each is ethnographically interest-
ing, but they are also mutually exclusive . These explanations are 
spontaneous constructions created out of pragmatic interpretation that 
does not ordinarily address such questions. Burning incense outside is 
ordinarily something one does, not something one thinks about. The 
explicit religious ideologies anthropologists often report may rep-
resent, in part, theories created by the very process of fieldwork. 
64. Door gods come in different types. appropriate to different kinds of 
temples, but for most people door gods are all the same. Only people 
like temple artisans have such systematized knowledge of iconography. 
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